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Abstract
Agricultural trade barriers and producer subsidies inflict real costs, both on the coun-
tries that use these policies and on their trade partners. Trade barriers lower demand
for trade partners’ products, domestic subsidies can induce an oversupply of agricul-
tural products which depresses world prices, and export subsidies create increased
competition for producers in other countries. Eliminating global agricultural policy
distortions would result in an annual world welfare gain of $56 billion. High protec-
tion for agricultural commodities in the form of tariffs continues to be the major factor
restricting world trade. In 2000, World Trade Organization (WTO) members continued
global negotiations on agricultural policy reform. To help policymakers and others
realize what is at stake in the global agricultural negotiations, this report quantifies the
costs of global agricultural distortions and the potential benefits of their full elimina-
tion. It also analyzes the effects on U.S. and world agriculture if only partial reform is
achieved in liberalizing tariffs, tariff-rate quotas (limits on imported goods), domestic
support, and export subsidies.
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Summary
Agricultural trade barriers and producer subsidies inflict real costs, both on the coun-
tries that use these policies and on their trade partners. Trade barriers lower demand
for trade partners’ products, domestic subsidies can induce an oversupply of agricul-
tural products which depresses world prices, and export subsidies create increased
competition for producers in other countries. In 2000, World Trade Organization
(WTO) members continued global negotiations on agricultural policy reform. To help
policymakers and others realize what is at stake in the global agricultural negotiations,
this report quantifies the costs of global agricultural distortions and the potential bene-
fits of their full elimination. It also analyzes the effects on U.S. and world agriculture
if only partial reform is achieved in liberalizing tariffs, tariff-rate quotas (limits on
imported goods), domestic support, and export subsidies. 
Key findings include:
Global agricultural policy distortions impose substantial, long-term costs on the
world economy; in the long term, the full elimination of these policy distortions
would result in an annual world welfare gain of $56 billion, about 0.2 percent of
global GDP. These projected welfare gains, or increased purchasing power, can be
decomposed into the removal of distortions in production and consumption ($31 bil-
lion), the effects of policy reform on global savings and investment ($5 billion), and
increased productivity gains, mainly in emerging and developing countries ($20 bil-
lion). Total, long-term welfare benefits to the United States from eliminating world
agricultural policy distortions are $13.3 billion annually — about 24 percent of global
gains. U.S. gains would mainly come from our trade partners’ policy reforms. 
Elimination of agricultural trade and domestic policy distortions could raise
world agricultural prices about 12 percent. Import tariffs lower food demand, and
domestic support and export subsidies encourage excess supply — all result in lower
world agricultural prices. European Union (EU) agricultural policies account for 38
percent, and Japanese plus Korean policies combined account for 12 percent, of glob-
al price distortions. U.S. agricultural policies account for about 16 percent of global
price distortions.
Tariffs and tariff-rate quotas account for more market distortions than domestic
subsidies and export subsidies. Tariffs and tariff-rate quotas account for most of the
agricultural price distortions (52 percent) from agricultural protection and support.
Post-Uruguay Round agricultural tariffs remain high, with a global average rate of 62
percent and an industrial country average of 45 percent. Domestic subsidies (31 per-
cent) and export subsidies (13 percent) have comparatively smaller, direct roles in
reducing world prices. The remaining 4 percent measures the interaction effects of the
three policies combined. iv ❖ Agricultural Policy Reform—The Road Ahead/AER 802 Economic Research Service/USDA
Continuing the Uruguay Round reductions (an additional 20 percent) in the
Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) will have less of an impact than level-
ing domestic support across countries and commodities, an alternative, generic
approach to reducing domestic support. An additional 20-percent reduction in the
Uruguay Round ceilings on total support expenditure would affect a small number of
OECD countries, because many countries’ expenditures are already below their AMS
limits, based on 1998 policies. Leveling and reducing domestic support on a commodi-
ty basis would engage more countries and commodities in the reform process.
Commodity impacts would also differ under the two approaches. 
Despite their relatively small aggregate price effects, export subsidies play an
important role in the reform process. Tariffs and domestic support policies of many
countries contribute to distorted global markets. The global effects of export subsidies,
however, are mostly attributable to a single region, the EU. Export subsidies signifi-
cantly affect trade in some markets, create increased competition that strains trade
relationships, and are an integral part of related domestic price support programs. 
Many trade and domestic policies operate interdependently, and options for
reform of some policies are linked. A reduction in tariffs would reduce the problems
related to TRQs by reducing over-quota tariffs. Trade policy reforms can help achieve
reforms of domestic market price support, because price support programs generally
rely on tariffs and export subsidies to be effective. Greater constraints on export subsi-
dies can help some countries ease their reluctance to reduce their import barriers
because of unfairly subsidized competition, and can create pressures for reducing
related domestic price support that encourages surplus production. 
Emerging and developing countries can benefit from further policy reforms.
These countries have diverse, and sometimes divergent, interests in the negotiations.
Global policy reform will lead to increased agricultural exports by many emerging and
developing countries and improved terms of trade. Most of the potential benefits from
policy reform will come from emerging and developing countries’ reform of their own
policies. Their full engagement in a global reform process could increase their welfare
by $21 billion annually. Low-income developing countries’ food aid needs will decline
6 percent as their domestic food production expands in response to higher world
prices. Introduction
The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) concluded in 1994 with an
agreement that fundamentally changed the treatment of
national agricultural policies under the multilateral
rules of global trade. In the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Agriculture (URAA, or the Agreement),
members determined that trade-distorting policies are
to be disciplined, or constrained, so that agricultural
markets can be increasingly directed by market forces
rather than government intervention. Members set the
implementation period for these reform commitments
at 1995-2000 for developed countries, and through
2004 for developing countries (table 1). 
The URAA marked a first step in the process of global
policy reform. The Agreement provided the starting
point for further reform by including a provision that
member countries resume negotiations on agriculture
by December 31, 1999, one year before the end of the
implementation period for developed countries.
Although efforts at the WTO’s November 1999 Seattle
conference failed to initiate a full round of negotia-
tions, agricultural negotiations ultimately began in
March 2000. They are being conducted as special ses-
sions of the WTO Committee on Agriculture in
Geneva, Switzerland (table 2).
The new negotiations present an opportunity to further
reduce policy distortions in global agriculture.
Agricultural trade barriers and producer subsidies
inflict real costs, both on the countries that use these
policies and on their trade partners. Trade barriers help
keep inefficient domestic producers in operation, result
in forgone opportunities for a more efficient allocation
of national resources, and lower demand for trade part-
ners’ products. Domestic subsidies may induce an
oversupply of agricultural products and help to retain
resources in agriculture that can be used more prof-
itably in other sectors. The oversupply of agricultural
commodities leads to lower prices and increased com-
petition for producers in other countries and can create
the need for export subsidies to dispose of excess
domestic production. Consumers are harmed not just
by trade barriers, which directly raise the cost of
imports, but also by the effects of tariffs and subsidies,
which lead to inefficiencies in their economy. When
their country produces less than its potential, con-
sumers’ incomes and welfare are reduced. 
The first objective of this report is to analyze and
quantify the global costs of current trade and domestic
policy distortions and the potential benefits from their
full elimination. While the URAA mandate is to con-
tinue a process of reform, this report’s hypothetical
analysis of the full elimination of agricultural policy
distortions helps us to understand what is at stake in
global agricultural negotiations. We decompose the
global costs and benefits of a full reform by country,
commodity, and type of policy. We take into account
both the direct effects of tariffs and subsidies in dis-
torting production and consumption decisions, and the
long-term effects of these policies on savings and
investment decisions, and in slowing development and
productivity growth, particularly in developing coun-
tries. We base our analysis on current levels of agricul-
tural tariffs, tariff rate quotas (TRQ), domestic support,
and export subsidies.1 In particular, the analysis takes
into account that many countries have recently adopted
less distorting forms of farm support, and that differ-
ences exist in the effects of coupled and decoupled
farm subsidies on production and trade. 
As mandated in the URAA, the goal of further negoti-
ations will be to continue the process of agricultural
policy reform begun in the Uruguay Round. Defining a
path toward partial reform can be more complicated
than considering the full elimination of tariffs and sub-
sidies. Partial reform requires making an informed
choice among potential targets or strategies, and the
alternatives are likely to imply different distributions
of costs and benefits. Also, some domestic farm subsi-
dies are operationally linked with trade policies, and
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1Analyses summarized in this report use common agricultural
policy data from 1998. See appendices 1 and 2 for data on agricul-
tural policies.
Overview
Mary E. Burfisherreforms of one policy can affect the costs and benefits
of remaining policies. For example, market price sup-
port programs that attempt to support a domestic price
level for commodities at above the world price can
only be effective if there are insulating trade policies
in place. Imports must be prevented from entering the
high-priced market and export subsidies may be need-
ed to help dispose of high-cost domestic production on
world markets. Otherwise, the country will likely need
to embark on costly stock holding programs to support
prices. Reforming trade policies alone removes an
important instrument of domestic support and implies
that some domestic programs are likely to be effective-
ly restrained by trade policy reforms. Understanding
and quantifying these interrelationships whenever pos-
sible can help to clarify the choices to be made among
options for policy reform. 
The second objective of this report is to analyze alter-
native policy reform options that are defined as broad
or generic, rather than specific options as proposed by
WTO member countries. Our analysis of options for
policy reform is organized to address these questions:
• What are the potential effects on U.S. and world
agriculture of alternative approaches to improving
market access, including options for making tariffs
lower and more uniform, and for liberalizing tariff
rate quotas?
• What are the potential effects on U.S. and world
agriculture of alternative approaches to reducing dis-
torting farm support, including options for making
domestic support lower and more uniform, and for
reducing domestic support through changes in bor-
der measures?
• What are the potential effects on U.S. and world agri-
culture of eliminating or reducing export subsidies?
• What are the potential effects of further agricultural
policy reforms on less developed countries, particu-
larly the least developed?
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Table 1—Main provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
Implementation period
Negotiated reduction Developed countries Developing countries
(1995-2000) (1995-2004)
Market access Percent Percent
Average tariff cuts for all ag. products  -36 -24
Minimum tariff cuts per product -15 -10
Domestic support
Total cuts in aggregate measurement
of support -20 -13
Export subsidies
Value cut -36 -24
Volume cut -21 -14
Least developed countries were required to bind their tariffs but are otherwise exempt from reduction commitments.
Source: WTO secretariat at www.wto.org
Table 2—WTO negotiations on agriculture: Process and objectives
Venue Special sessions of  WTO Committee on Agriculture, Geneva, Switzerland
Objectives Continue the process of reform begun in Uruguay Round, taking into account the 
experience with URAA reductions, the effects of the URAA on world agricultural trade, 
nontrade issues such as environmental protection and food security, special and 
differential treatment of developing countries, and other concerns 
Scheduled meetings Meetings for Phase I are  March, June, September, November 2000,
February, March, June, September, and November 2001
Country proposals To be submitted to the WTO by December 2000 (with some flexibility through March
2001). Proposals are available to the public at www.wto.org
Source: WTO Secretariat at www.wto.orgProvisions of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture:
First Steps in the Reform Process
The URAA provided for disciplines, or global trade
rules, governing three areas of national agricultural
policies. These areas, sometimes called the three pil-
lars of the Agreement, are market access (tariffs, quo-
tas, and other trade barriers), domestic support, and
export subsidies.
The URAA objectives in market access reform sought
to reduce barriers to agricultural trade and to make
them more transparent. Members committed them-
selves to convert most nontariff barriers, such as
import quotas, to simple tariffs or to a two-stage tariff
system called tariff rate quotas. TRQs allow imports at
a relatively low tariff within a level, or quota, that was
to be expanded over the implementation period. Over-
quota tariffs and simple agricultural tariffs are to be
reduced over the Agreement’s implementation period
of 1995-2000 for developed countries and 1995-2004
for developing countries. 
The URAA provided for a 20-percent reduction of
countries’ aggregate levels of distorting domestic sup-
port during the implementation period. The Agreement
defined an aggregate subsidy measure, the Aggregate
Measurement of Support (AMS), as a means to quanti-
fy and compare countries’ annual levels of domestic
support that are subject to URAA disciplines.
Reduction commitments during the URAA implemen-
tation period were made from a base AMS, defined for
each country as the average of its total support for all
commodities from 1986 to 1988. The URAA also dif-
ferentiated domestic support policies according to their
effects on production and trade (table 3). “Amber box”
policies that directly subsidize production and influ-
ence the decision to produce were included in the cal-
culation of the AMS and made subject to reductions.
“Green box” policies, or domestic farm programs that
meet certain criteria for causing minimal trade distor-
tions, were exempted from any expenditure limits. The
URAA made an exception for “blue box” policies, or
distorting farm subsidies that are linked with supply
limitations. The Agreement allowed these subsidies
because the supply limits partially offset the subsidies’
incentives to over-produce and disrupt global trade. 
The URAA disciplined export subsidies by placing
both the value and the volume of subsidized exports
under limits that are scheduled to decline through the
implementation period.
Other provisions of the URAA addressed the concerns
of developing countries, and included “special and dif-
ferential” treatment in addition to longer implementa-
tion periods. The URAA granted exemptions to their
domestic support policies because of the subsidies’
roles in supporting agricultural and rural development.
The least developed countries received exemptions
from any reduction commitments. 
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Table 3—Treatment of domestic agricultural support in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
Category General criteria Examples of policies
Exempt support  Measures must be financed by the  Green box programs include direct payments
(green box) government rather than consumers and  to farmers that do not depend on current 
must not provide price support to producers  production decisions or prices, disaster 
assistance, and government programs on
Specific criteria are defined for general research, extension, and pest and disease 
government services, public stockholding, control
domestic food aid, direct payments,
and other programs
Exempt direct payments Direct payments under production-limiting Blue box policies are direct payments to
(blue box) programs must be based on fixed area or yields, producers, linked to production of specific
and cover 85 percent or less of the base level crops, but which impose offsetting limits on 
of production or head of livestock output
Nonexempt support Market price support, nonexempt direct Amber box policies include market price
(amber box) payments and any other subsidies not specifically supports, and output and input subsidies
exempted are subject to reduction commitments
Source: Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, WTO.The URAA set up a Committee on Agriculture to
monitor implementation of the Agreement as well as
the possible negative effects of the reform program on
the least developed and food-importing countries. The
Committee is now conducting agricultural policy
reform negotiations in special sessions under the
URAA’s “built in” agenda. The negotiations take into
account the experience during the URAA implementa-
tion period, the effects of the reduction commitments
on world agriculture, nontrade concerns, special and
differential treatment for developing countries, and the
shared commitment to establish a fair and market-ori-
ented agricultural trading system. 
The URAA Reforms Prove Fragile
The experience to date from the URAA implementa-
tion period shows that agricultural policy reform is dif-
ficult to achieve:
• Trade barriers remain high. In the URAA, countries
agreed to reduce their average agricultural tariffs,
but the rates remain high. The global, unweighted
average bound rate for agricultural commodities is
62 percent; the average bound rate of industrial
countries is 45 percent. (The bound rate is the upper
limit on tariffs allowed by the URAA.) Also, tariffs
among countries and across commodities exhibit
substantial disparities. Disparities across commodi-
ties, for example, tariffs that escalate from bulk to
processed agricultural products, can increase the 
distorting effects of tariffs. TRQs have replaced
many nontrade barriers, but some TRQs have com-
plicated import regimes, often with procedures that
are not transparent, and many have very high over-
quota tariffs. 
• Domestic support recently increased. Although
domestic support levels declined early in the imple-
mentation period, and some countries shifted part of
their domestic support into less distorting programs
that are exempt from global trade disciplines,
domestic support has recently increased in some
countries in response to low world prices since
1998. Even though the URAA placed limits on total,
nonexempt domestic support expenditures, there
continues to be a disparity in support levels among
countries and across commodities.
• Unused export subsidy credits now brought forward.
The URAA placed constraining limits on export
subsidies for individual commodities, but allowed
for some flexibility. Lower usage levels early in the
URAA implementation period, when prices were
high, enabled some members to bring forward
unused levels and apply the subsidies when prices
were low and ceilings had been reached.
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Policy Distortions
Global agricultural policy distortions impose substan-
tial costs on the world economy. Agricultural tariffs,
domestic support, and export subsidies leave world
agricultural prices about 12 percent below levels other-
wise expected. Over the long term (about 15 years),
these distorting farm policies will reduce world wel-
fare, or consumer purchasing power, by $56 billion
annually, which represents about 0.2 percent of global
GDP (table 4).
As measured by world price effects, a small number of
countries cause most of the agricultural market distor-
tions — developed economies account for nearly 80
percent of the distortions. The EU accounts for 38 per-
cent of world price distortions, compared to Japan plus
Korea (12), the United States (16), and Canada (2)
(table 5). Countries typically use different mixes of
policies. The EU accounts for over 90 percent of global
export subsidy expenditures; these subsidies are an
integral part of its domestic price support system. The
EU and the United States account for most of the glob-
al distortions related to domestic producer support.
Most other countries rely mainly on tariffs to support
their farm sectors. Particularly in developing countries,
tariffs are a more practical farm support policy because
they raise government revenue, while domestic pro-
grams entail government expenditure. Tariffs are a
potentially more distorting type of farm support than
domestic producer subsidies, because they directly
affect consumers as well as producers. 
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Table 4—Welfare impacts from elimination of global agricultural tariffs and subsidies
Static Static plus dynamic
Resource allocation Investment growth Investment growth
gains gains plus productivity gains
US$ billion
World 31.1 36.3 56.4
Developed country group 28.5 29.7 35.1
Australia and New Zealand 1.6 3.4 3.5
Canada 0.8 1.2 1.4
EFTA 1.7 0.1 0.2
European Union 9.3 8.2 10.6
Japan and Korea 8.6 5.1 6.2
United States 6.6 11.8 13.3
Emerging and developing 
country group 2.6 6.5 21.3
China 0.4 1.8 2.23
Latin America 3.7 4.7 6.1
Mexico -0.2 0.1 1.6
Other Asian countries 1.5 0.3 5.11
Southern African countries 0.3 0.5 0.8
Rest of world -3.1 -0.4 5.4
Static gains refer to the annual gains due to removing distortions to production and consumption decisions in 1997 $US billion. Dynamic gains include effects relat-
ed to cumulative increases in savings, investment, and productivity over a 15-year post-reform period. Dynamic welfare impacts are the annual level about 15 years
after reform. China is not assumed to reform its policies because it is not a WTO member.
Source: Diao, Somwaru, and Roe in this report.
Welfare is an aggregate indicator for the world
and for individual countries. Trade policy
reforms allow resources to shift into the produc-
tion of commodities in which the country holds
a comparative advantage, and allow consumption
to shift toward goods desired by consumers.
Increased production efficiency leads to higher
incomes, lower prices, and increased purchasing
power. Consumption changes reflect a better
match of the availability of products with con-
sumer preferences. Despite higher world prices
for food, most consumers will still benefit
because consumer prices will fall in countries
where the removal of tariffs more than offsets
the change in world prices. The measure of wel-
fare is “equivalent variation,” a measure of the
dollar equivalent of an effective change in
national income, or purchasing power, due to the
policy reform.
What is “welfare”?The Benefits from Eliminating 
Agricultural Policy Distortions
There are two dimensions in calculating the potential
welfare gains following policy reform: static gains and
dynamic gains. The first is related to removing distor-
tions in consumption and production decisions. “Static”
gains accrue after producers and consumers fully adjust
to price changes when tariffs and subsidies are removed.
These static welfare gains accrue over time and reflect
changes in income (wages, land rents and returns on
capital investments) due to increased economic efficien-
cy. These static gains in welfare, or purchasing power,
are worth about $31 billion to the world economy. Most
of the static gains from trade liberalization accrue to
countries with the largest initial policy distortions.
Developed countries receive most of the global, static
welfare gains from full policy reform ($28.5 billion),
compared to the potential welfare gains for emerging
and developing countries of about $2.6 billion. Despite
higher world food prices, consumers in most countries
would still benefit from the reforms because tariff elimi-
nation lowers the consumer price of imported foods, and
the policy reforms produce overall economic efficiency
gains in their economies. Some food-importing coun-
tries face static welfare losses from full trade liberaliza-
tion because they do not have large initial policy distor-
tions and they must pay higher world food prices. 
Additional global benefits from full policy reform will
come from the “dynamic,” long-term effects from
increased savings and investment as policy distortions
are removed, and from the opportunities for increased
productivity that are linked to more open economies.
When these potential dynamic gains are taken into
account, all countries can benefit from global policy
reforms. Reforms lead to higher investments by
increasing the potential returns. Higher investment
increases the productive capacity of economies. The
greater openness of economies can lead to higher pro-
ductivity, especially in developing countries where
there is substantial potential for productivity gains
from increased training and the technological change
that is embodied in investment goods imported from
developed countries. Reflecting their greater dynamic
potential for growth, developing countries stand to
attract increased global investment, which will benefit
developing countries by increasing their resource
availability and benefit developed countries by creating
investment opportunities. Investment growth and pro-
ductivity gains due to agricultural policy reform
account for 45 percent of the total benefits from full
trade liberalization. 
Whereas developed countries will accrue most of the
static gains, emerging and developing countries will
accrue most of the potential dynamic gains from full
trade liberalization. Developing countries, even food-
importing ones, can expect to benefit if the negotiations
eliminate global policy distortions. But, it is developing
countries’own, full participation in global reforms,
especially the reduction of their own barriers to imports,
that is their most important source of potential benefits
from global agricultural negotiations. In the long term,
developing countries’welfare could increase by $21 bil-
lion annually — nearly 40 percent of the potential world
welfare gain from agricultural policy reform.
Nearly one-quarter of the global welfare benefits
($13.3 billion annually) would accrue to the United
States. Because U.S. tariffs, domestic support, and
export subsidies are relatively low, most of the benefits
for the United States come from our trade partners’
policy reforms. Although dynamic gains will not
directly create many benefits for the United States,
mainly because of its technological maturity, U.S. agri-
culture will benefit substantially from the dynamic
gains in developing countries. These countries are
important U.S. export markets whose demand for U.S.
farm products will increase further if their economies
realize their growth potential. In the long run, full poli-
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Table 5—Effects on world agricultural prices of eliminating agricultural policy distortions,
by country and policy
World U.S. EU Japan/Korea LDCs
Elimination of: Percent change from base price
All policies 11.6 1.8 4.4 1.5 2.3
Tariffs 6.0 0.7 1.5 1.4 2.3
Domestic support 3.6 0.9 2.0 0.2 Na
Export subsidies 1.5 0.1 0.9 Na 0.0
Na = not applicable, no policy in use. Numbers do not sum to row and column totals because only selected countries are included and there are interaction 
effects among policies.
Source: Diao, Somwaru, and Roe in this report.cy reform could lead to an increase in the real value of
U.S. agricultural exports of 19 percent each year, an
increase in agricultural imports of 9 percent, and high-
er world prices for U.S. exports. 
Tariffs Are the Most Distorting Policy,
Compared to Domestic Support 
and Export Subsidies
The full elimination of agricultural tariffs, domestic
subsidies, and export subsidies would increase world
agricultural prices 12 percent above their expected level
(table 5). Eliminating tariffs, which distort both con-
sumers’choice and producers’decisions, would
account for most (52 percent) of the potential price
increase. Eliminating the agricultural tariffs of the EU
alone accounts for 25 percent of the tariff-induced price
effects. Agricultural tariffs in Japan plus Korea, and in
the United States, account for 23 percent and 12 per-
cent, respectively, of the tariff-linked price distortions.
Tariffs in developing countries account for 38 percent
of the tariff-linked effects on world agricultural prices.
The relatively large role of tariffs in global policy dis-
tortions should be interpreted in terms of tariffs’ links
with domestic support. Tariffs are a trade policy that
provides a margin of protection to domestic producers.
By restricting imports, tariffs are also an instrument of
domestic support. Tariffs can help to support domestic
prices at above world price levels without the need for
government outlays on price support payments or
stock building. Most countries’ domestic price support
programs have a greater reliance on tariffs, which
increase government revenues, than on domestic sub-
sidy expenditures, such as deficiency payments, which
must be financed through government budgetary out-
lays. The AMS accounts for this link by including the
effects of trade policies (measured as a price gap
between an administered support price and the fixed
world reference price) in the calculation of domestic
support. Removing tariffs alone can therefore accom-
plish both trade liberalization as well as a reduction in
the value of domestic support. 
This analysis of domestic subsidies includes only bud-
getary outlays on output and input subsidies and farm
payments. This is a more narrow measure of domestic
support than the AMS, which also includes the effects
of some trade policies. But to include the market price
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Since the Uruguay Round concluded, some countries have adopted less distorting farm programs that meet
the criteria in Annex 2 of the URAA for being exempted from WTO disciplines. The U.S. Production
Flexibility Contract (PFC) payments provided under the 1996 Fair Act are an example of exempt payments to
farm households. These whole-farm payments are not linked to production of specific crops and so do not
create inter-crop distortions. Farmers make their crop mix decisions in response to market price signals. But
as experience with these programs grows, the extent to which farm household transfer payments may affect
aggregate, total farm production has become the subject of debate. Tielu and Roberts (1998) describe several
ways in which payments that are “decoupled” — meaning that they do not directly depend on or influence
farmers' production decisions — may still stimulate aggregate production: Payments may lead to increased
farm investment by increasing wealth and lowering risk. Payments can reduce farm exit by raising land val-
ues, and may encourage continued output by creating expectations of future payments. There is limited
empirical research suggesting that the aggregate output effects linked to the effects of payments on invest-
ment and risk are likely to be small (Young and Westcott, 2000; Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder, 2000).
In this report, we assume that transfer payments to farm households have minimal output effects. We only
account for the indirect effects that these payments may have on farm output through their effects on raising
household income and aggregate demand for all commodities, including food. To see how important this
assumption is, we analyze the effects on the aggregate world agricultural price due to the removal of all
domestic subsidy expenditures by developed countries. We compare the effects when using our assumption
that transfer payments have minimal output effects, with the extreme assumption that these payments are fully
coupled output subsidies. They are assumed to directly stimulate increased output by increasing the returns to
commodities, with our commodity allocation of whole farm payments based on their commodity-linked allo-
cation in the OECD PSE database. We find that the assumption about coupling has small effects on the results
of our analysis. The world agricultural price index from a full domestic subsidy removal by developed coun-
tries would increase 4.8 percent if the transfer payments are considered to be fully coupled, compared to an
increase of 3.6 percent if they are minimally coupled. The small difference in effects due to extreme assump-
tions about the degree of coupling of household payments suggests that the potential benefits from reducing
these kinds of programs may be quite small.
Effects of assumptions about decoupling on the analysissupport component of the AMS would be to double-
count the effects of tariffs and export subsidies.
Domestic subsidies have a smaller role than tariffs in
causing distortions from agricultural policies, account-
ing for 31 percent of the total agricultural price
impacts of the three policies. One reason is because
domestic production subsidies are less distorting than
tariffs. They distort only the production decision and
have only indirect effects on consumers. Also, there
has been a shift in the way that some countries provide
domestic subsidies to farmers. The provision of subsi-
dies to farmers through output or input subsidies has
declined, while the use of less distorting, green box
policies such as direct transfer payments to farmers
has increased. Transfer payments to farm households
have smaller effects on farm output than production or
input subsidies. Furthermore, we analyze the elimina-
tion of domestic subsidies in member countries of the
OECD only, because data on domestic subsidies in
other countries are not available. This does not bias the
analysis very much, since the use of domestic subsi-
dies in non-OECD countries is limited. 
The EU has a relatively high level of distorting domes-
tic agricultural subsidies. This characteristic, plus the
EU’s importance in world markets, accounts for its
large role (56 percent) in causing the world price dis-
tortions due to domestic subsidies.2 U.S. domestic pro-
grams account for 25 percent of the global price dis-
tortions caused by domestic subsidies.
Export subsidies account for a relatively small share
(13 percent) of the total price distortions caused by
agricultural tariffs and subsidies. Most of the world
price effects from eliminating export subsidies are due
to EU liberalization, reflecting that the EU accounts
for most of world export subsidy expenditures. 
Despite their relatively small aggregate price effects,
export subsidies play an important role in the reform
process. Tariffs and domestic support policies of many
countries contribute to distorted global markets. The
global effects of export subsidies, however, are mostly
attributable to a single region, the EU. Export subsi-
dies significantly affect trade in some markets, create
increased competition that strains trade relationships,
and are an integral part of related domestic price sup-
port programs. 
The separate roles of tariffs, domestic subsidies, and
export subsidies in distorting world prices add up to
less than 100 percent of the total price distortion of all
policies; the simultaneous removal of all three policy
types additionally takes into account their interactions. 
Commodity Impacts of Full 
Agricultural Policy Reform
The aggregate agricultural price impact (12 percent)
can be broken down by commodity and by policy type
(table 6). The largest increases in world price, above
trend levels, will occur in livestock and products
(including dairy products), wheat, sugar, and other
grains. Elimination of tariffs alone will have the great-
est effect on livestock and sugar prices, while the
elimination of domestic subsidies will affect mainly
wheat and other grains. Export subsidies have
depressed global prices mainly for sugar, livestock
and products (including dairy products), fruits and
vegetables, and wheat. 
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Table 6—Effects on world agricultural prices of eliminating all agricultural policy distortions,
by commodity and policy
Commodity Full policy  Global tariff  OECD domestic  Global export 
elimination removal subsidy removal subsidy removal
Percent change from base
Wheat 18.1 3.4 12.0 2.0
Rice 10.1 5.9 2.4 1.5
Other grains 15.2 1.4 12.2 0.6
Vegetables and fruits 8.2 4.9 -0.1 3.0
Oil and oilseeds 11.2 3.1 7.8 0.1
Sugar 16.4 10.9 1.6 3.3
Other crops 5.6 4.2 1.2 0.1
Livestock and products 22.3 12.2 5.5 3.1
Processed foods 7.6 4.8 1.8 1.0
Source: Diao, Somwaru, and Roe in this report.
2EU compensatory farm payments are linked to set-aside
requirements. These requirements are represented in the model by
increasing the agricultural land area by 10 percent when these blue
box programs are removed. EU dairy subsidies are included in this
global analysis, but excluded in the country study of EU export
subsidy elimination described later in this report.Options for Market 
Access Reforms
There are no unambiguous rules for undertaking a
process of reform. Planning reform requires making an
informed choice among potential targets or strategies,
and each option is likely to imply different distribu-
tions of costs and benefits. And, because trade and
domestic policies are operationally linked, independent
reforms of one pillar can be expected to have an effect
on the costs and benefits of the others. WTO member
countries have proposed numerous options for achiev-
ing further agricultural policy reform. Rather than ana-
lyze specific country proposals, we analyze generic
options for achieving further, partial reforms of market
access, domestic support, and export subsidies. Our
framework takes into account the current structure of
agricultural policies, differences in policies’ effects on
production and trade, and the interdependence of their
operation and reform. 
Options for Liberalizing Tariffs
In the Uruguay Round, members agreed to “bind” their
tariffs, meaning that they would not raise their tariffs
above a certain fixed, or bound, level subject to negoti-
ating compensation to other countries. The bound rates
became the base rates from which reduction commit-
ments were calculated. Industrial countries bound most
tariffs (including the over-quota tariffs of TRQ
regimes) at the 1986-88 average levels of tariffs actual-
ly applied to imports, or “applied” tariffs. Many devel-
oping countries set their bound rates at levels well
above their applied rates, creating “water” in their tar-
iffs, a buffer zone that may allow the countries to raise
their tariffs while remaining within their tariff reduction
commitments. In the URAA, countries committed to
reduce their simple (unweighted), bound average tariff
by 36 percent (24 percent for developing countries),
with a minimum cut of 15 percent (10 percent for
developing countries) for each individual tariff line.
The URAA approach to agricultural tariff reduction
kept in place two characteristics that describe the cur-
rent profiles of global agricultural tariffs: differences
among countries in their average agricultural tariff;
and variation, or dispersion, in tariff rates across com-
modities within countries’ tariff schedules. Dispersion
of tariff rates, such as the escalation of tariffs with the
degree of product processing, can lead to greater dis-
torting effects than uniform tariff rates. Tariff escala-
tion can result in a product’s effective tariff protection
exceeding its nominal tariff rate if tariffs on the
imported intermediate goods used in its production are
relatively low. Imposing higher tariffs on processed
goods also impedes trade in high value products, the
fastest growing segment of world agricultural trade,
which tends to be highly sensitive to price. The occa-
sional very high tariff, or “megatariff,” which is some-
times called a tariff peak, also brings to light another
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Four different models were used to develop the quantitative analyses of the potential effects of the agricultur-
al negotiations: a dynamic, global computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, a static global CGE model,
the European Simulation (ESIM) models, and the Food Aid Needs Assessment (FANA) model. Key features
of these models are:
Base year. For the CGE models, the base year is 1997, for ESIM it is 1997/98, and for the FANA model it is
the average of 1997-99. The base year is a “representative” year. The models describe how this representative
year would change, either in a single long run end-point or annually, due to a controlled experiment in which
specific policy reforms occur. The models are not projection models and do not capture the many other forces
that are likely to determine what may actually occur in the economies in the long run.
Agricultural policies. The models use common agricultural policy data for 1998, the latest year for which a
comprehensive policy database is available. Export subsidy data are from WTO notifications by member
countries. Tariff data are from the Agricultural Market Access Database (www.amad.org). We developed a
database on domestic support in OECD member countries that is consistent with the concept of the AMS. We
include the amber box, domestic expenditure component from the 1998 OECD PSE database; and tariffs and
export subsidies for commodities for which administered price support programs were notified to the WTO. 
Economic behavior. The models incorporate assumptions about supply and demand responses to price
changes in order to represent real world behavior and model results can vary depending on the chosen 
parameters.
Modeling the impacts of policy reform on global agriculturedispersion-related issue. Tariff peaks create large rela-
tive price distortions within a country.
The average (simple, unweighted) post-Uruguay
Round agricultural tariff rate for industrial countries is
bound at 45 percent (fig. 1).3 These bound tariff rates
include the ad valorem equivalents of specific tariffs,
which are in some cases very high, and whose values
depend on current prices. They also include the over-
quota tariffs in TRQ regimes. By including the over-
quota tariff, the average bound rate may overstate actu-
al rates of protection. Imports that enter a country
within the quota limits are usually subject to a much
lower tariff rate, and in some cases, over-quota tariff
rates are not actually applied to imports. On the other
hand, a country can levy additional fees and taxes on
imports, which can lead to bound tariffs providing an
underestimate of actual import costs.
The average U.S. agricultural tariff of 11.9 percent is
relatively low in comparison with the average agricul-
tural tariffs of the EU (21 percent), Canada (24 per-
cent), Japan (33 percent), and Norway (152 percent). 
One way to measure and compare tariff dispersion is
to analyze the frequency with which countries’ tariff
lines fall within specified ranges of tariff rates. Figure
2 shows a frequency distribution of selected countries.
All of the industrial countries in this analysis have tar-
iff schedules characterized by a relatively large num-
ber of low tariffs and a small number of very high tar-
iffs. The United States differs from other industrial
countries in that over 50 percent of its tariffs are
extremely low, at 5 percent or less, while only a very
small share are extremely high, at over 100 percent.
All other industrial countries have a much larger pro-
portion of tariffs over 5 percent. For the industrial
countries as a whole, nearly 50 percent of tariffs are
above 25 percent. 
Historically, trade negotiations have taken two broad
approaches to tariff reform: formula and sectoral
approaches. The formula approach defines some gen-
eral rule that applies to all tariffs, for example, “reduce
all tariffs by 10 percent.” Sectoral approaches have
been conducted as either bilateral or multilateral nego-
tiations. One bilateral approach is the request-offer
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Figure 1


























Source: Wainio, Gibson, and Whitley in this report.
Mean agricultural tariff (%)
3This analysis of reduction formulas focuses on industrial coun-
tries only. For more information on world tariffs, see Profiles of
Tariffs in Global Agricultural Markets. Gibson et al. (2001). system in which countries draw up lists of the tariffs
they want other countries to reduce and the tariffs they
are willing to reduce in exchange. An alternative
approach is to attempt to solve sectoral problems for a
commodity or commodity group on a multilateral
basis. A “zero-for-zero” agreement, in which all coun-
tries agree on a zero tariff on specific commodities, is
an example of a successful multilateral approach.
During the Uruguay Round, a zero-for-zero agreement
was reached for beer. (A “super zero-for-zero” would
address reforms of all three pillars in a sector.)
Sectoral approaches can be more effective than formu-
la approaches in achieving greater market access for
specific commodities. On the other hand, sectoral
approaches can leave protection in place for the least
competitive industries, they can create cross-commodi-
ty distortions, and they may be unable to achieve deep
enough cuts in the very high tariffs that abound in
industrial countries’ tariff schedules. 
While a formula approach has some distinct advan-
tages, it can produce very different outcomes depend-
ing on the type of formula that is adopted. There are
two generic types of formulas for targeting the level
and the dispersion of tariffs: linear reductions and har-
monization. A linear reduction formula reduces the
average tariff rate by reducing all tariffs proportionate-
ly (the dispersion of the tariff would also decline by
the same proportion). For example, a country with a
uniform tariff (it has zero tariff dispersion) undergoing
a linear reduction of 10 percent would reduce its aver-
age tariff by 10 percent. Its tariff dispersion would
remain unaffected, however, because its tariffs are
already uniform. In contrast, harmonization formulas
target tariff dispersion. Conceivably, a harmonization
formula could require that all countries make all of
their tariffs a uniform rate, equal to their average rate.
This would leave the average tariff unchanged, but
would reduce the dispersion to zero. In practice, many
of the tariff reduction formulas proposed in past trade
negotiations have included variants that address both
tariff levels and tariff dispersion. Many combine some
overall reduction of the average rate with harmoniza-
tion, based on the progressively larger reduction of
higher rates, or at least, a requirement that all tariffs be
reduced so that the problem of tariff dispersion is not
worsened. 
What is the most effective formula in terms of achiev-
ing greater market access? From a global perspective,
a linear formula may be sufficient when tariff disper-
sion is low. When there is high tariff dispersion, as is
the case currently, some harmonization element is
needed if the very high tariffs are to be effectively
restrained. For individual countries, the effects of 
tariff reduction formulas will depend on their own 
tariff profile.
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Source: Wainio, Gibson, and Whitley in this report.
Figure 2
Frequency distributions of agricultural tariffs—selected countriesThe structure of industrial countries’ agricultural tariffs
suggests that an effective tariff reduction strategy
should address both the mean and the dispersion of
tariffs. For illustrative purposes, we show the effects of
three tariff reduction formulas on the mean and disper-
sion of tariffs in the United States, and the average of
industrial countries: a linear reduction of 50 percent
and two harmonization formulas targeting low tariffs
and high tariffs. Table 7 illustrates that harmonization
formulas are more effective than a linear approach in
lowering the average tariff, because of the many very
high tariff lines in the current structure of global tar-
iffs. Formulas that focus on eliminating low, or “nui-
sance,” tariffs have a relatively large effect on the aver-
age U.S. tariff, because most U.S. tariffs are low.
Formulas such as the Swiss formula, which mandates
proportionately larger cuts in high tariffs, have a rela-
tively greater impact on other industrial countries’ tar-
iffs than on the United States because most other
industrial countries’ tariffs have a larger number of
higher tariff rates.
Options for Liberalizing Tariff Rate Quotas
The URAA abolished all prior nontariff measures
restricting agricultural trade, but allowed members to
convert these restrictions into tariff rate quotas. A TRQ
is a two-tiered tariff in which the rate charged depends
on the volume imported. A limited volume can be
imported at the lower tariff — this is the “quota” part
of the TRQ — and imports in excess of the quota vol-
ume are charged a higher tariff. For most countries, the
average in-quota tariff is substantially lower than the
over-quota tariff rate. A TRQ, although it contains a
quota, is not considered a quantitative restriction
because it is always possible to import over the quota.
In practice, if the over-quota tariff is set high enough, it
effectively deters further imports and so can replicate a
quota. An additional provision of the URAA defined a
minimum access for commodities previously covered
by import restrictions. The URAA set the minimum
access, the quantity allowed to be imported at the lower
tariff, at 3 percent of consumption in 1986-88 in the
base period, to be increased to 5 percent of base con-
sumption by 2000 (2004 for developing countries). 
At the end of 1999, notifications to the WTO totaled
over 1,300 TRQs (table 8). Of the 137 WTO members,
37 use TRQs. Three countries account for one-third of
all TRQs: Norway, Poland, and Iceland together have
431. By comparison, the United States has notified 54
TRQs. Forty-seven percent of notified TRQs are actu-
ally administered as a simple tariff, that is, there is no
over-quota tariff or effective quota. When the TRQs
that behave as tariffs are excluded, the countries with
the greatest number of enforced TRQs are the EU,
Hungary, South Korea, and the United States. 
The quota element of the TRQ creates the opportunity
to earn excess profits, or “economic rents.” If the quota
places an effective limit on the volume of imports, the
importer of goods at the within-quota tariff rate can
earn an excess profit, or rent, based on the effects of
scarcity in driving up the domestic price that con-
sumers are willing to pay. If some over-quota imports
can enter and be sold at the above-quota tariff rate,
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Table 7—Alternative, tariff reduction: Levels of average tariffs and dispersion
Formula name Formula United States All industrial countries
Average Dispersion Average Dispersion
Percent
Base - -  11.9 55.0  45.0 130.0
Linear 50% reduction in all tariffs 6.0 27.5 22.5 65.0
Sliding scale Eliminate tariffs under 5%, 4.2 8.9 11.3 16.6
50% reduction in other tariffs,
with a cap of 50% on tariff levels
Swiss Progressively larger cuts on 5.5 7.4 11.0 12.3
high tariffs, with a cap of 45%
on tariff levels
Dispersion is measured as one standard deviation — the average distance of all tariffs from the mean tariff. In the Swiss formula, the reduction parameter is 45.
Source: Wainio, Gibson, and Whitley in this report.then agents with the right to import goods at the lower,
within-quota tariff rate can earn rents because they can
compete with higher-cost imports. TRQ administration
is the process of rationing these profit opportunities.
While the GATT established general rules governing
how TRQs should be administered, in practice, there
are widely varying interpretations and methods of
administration. The most common forms of TRQ
administration are “license on demand” and “first-
come, first-served” (table 9). Many TRQs are allocated
on the basis of historical market shares. In these cases,
the importing agent, rather than the exporter, can cap-
ture the economic rent. Because TRQs create econom-
ic rents, they also make it profitable to import from
other than the least-cost suppliers, leading to economic
inefficiencies in resource allocation. 
There Is No Simple Rule 
for Reforming TRQs
From a global perspective, there is no single best way to
reform TRQs (table 10). One reason is that individual
TRQs vary with respect to the component of the TRQ
(under-quota tariff, quota, or over-quota tariff) that
restricts trade. About one-quarter of TRQs are character-
ized by a low fill rate, that is imports are less than 20
percent of the quota level. For these TRQs, if the with-
in-quota tariff is the binding constraint, reducing the
within-quota tariff is likely to increase market access.
About one-half of TRQs have a high-fill rate, that is,
imports are at least 80 percent of the quota level. For
these TRQs, and for TRQs with over-quota imports,
reducing the in-quota tariff would have little impact, and
the effects of increasing the quota levels is uncertain. On
one hand, increasing quota levels can have positive
effects if it increases imports and reduces the domestic
price, or if it results in the entry of more efficient suppli-
ers. It can also result in the within-quota tariff becoming
the binding constraint, an effective reform because the
TRQ then becomes a simple tariff regime, and the prob-
lems of rents and inefficiencies of suppliers are eliminat-
ed. On the other hand, it can have negative effects if it
increases the opportunities for economic rents and the
entry of inefficient suppliers. 
About 25 percent of TRQs consistently have imports
that exceed quota levels. In many of these over-fill
cases, the over-quota tariffs are very high. For these
TRQs, the appropriate reform is to reduce the over-
quota tariff. Furthermore, reducing the over-quota tar-
iff may always be an appropriate reform, since it is the
only policy option on TRQs that either achieves
reform, or does no harm. Alternatively, the reform of
over-quota tariffs can be approached through disci-
plines on tariffs in general, since the over-quota tariff
is the same as the bound tariff that was made subject
to tariff reduction commitments in the URAA. 
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Table 8—Notified and enforced TRQs, by country
Countries ranked by number of notified TRQs Countries ranked by number of enforced TRQs
Country TRQs TRQs Country TRQs TRQs  applied
notified enforced enforced as tariff
Norway 232 19 EU 87 0
Poland 109 35 Hungary 68 2
Iceland 90 12 South Korea 63 1
EU 87 87 United States 54 0
Bulgaria 73 45 Bulgaria 45 28
Hungary 70 68 Poland 35 74
Colombia 67 34 Colombia 34 33
South Korea 64 63 South Africa 25 28
Venezuela 61 2 Czech Republic 24 0
United States 54 54 Slovakia 24 0
Subtotal 907 419 Subtotal 459 166
All others 461 307 All others 267 476
Total 1,368 726 Total 726 642
Source: Skully, in this report.Fully eliminating one of the components of the TRQ
(either reducing within or over-quota tariff to zero, or
leaving the quota level open) is an alternative to
reforming one or more components. An infinite expan-
sion of the quota would eliminate the quota problem
embedded in TRQs. If the quota is increased enough,
the TRQ would then become a simple tariff regime,
and the problems of rents and inefficiencies of suppli-
ers would be eliminated. If the over-quota tariff is
eliminated, the TRQ would become a free trade sys-
tem, since importers of duty-free goods would be
unlikely to choose to import within the quota system.
If licensing is still required, removing the over-quota
tariff would make the problems linked to the opportu-
nity to import under an administered quota system
more apparent. Eliminating the within-quota tariff may
worsen the distortions of the TRQ if it increases quota
rents and (without auctions) the potential for less effi-
cient suppliers to enter the market. 
The conditions imposed by tariff administration may
act as the binding constraint on trade, in which case
the administrative rules should be the target of reform.
From a purely economic perspective, the most effec-
tive direction for reform of TRQ administration is auc-
tions. Auctions in effect transform a TRQ system back
into a simple tariff system. Auctions absorb all quota
rents into the equivalent of government tariff revenue
and rely on markets to allocate the rights to import or
export. Auctions, however, are used for only 4 percent
of TRQs, probably because governments would prefer
to simply apply tariffs. Despite the inefficiencies of
other types of TRQ administration, TRQs persist for
many reasons, including their linkages to domestic
farm support objectives and the underlying political
economy of rent-seeking behavior. Market access
could be enhanced if existing WTO disciplines on
TRQ administration and import licensing were clari-
fied and better enforced. 
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Table 9—Methods of allocating right to import within quota
Method of TRQ Explanation Percent of
administration all TRQs
Applied tariff Unlimited imports are allowed at the in-quota tariff rate: 47
that is, the quota is not enforced.
License on demand Licenses are required to import at the in-quota tariff. If demand 25
for licenses is less than quota, Q, the system operates like 
a first come, first served system. If demand exceeds Q, import 
volume requested is reduced proportionately among all applicants.
First come, first served The first Q units of imports to clear customs are charged the in-quota 11
tariff; all subsequent imports are charged the over-quota tariff.
Historical  Right to import at in-quota tariff is allocated in proportion to import  5
market shares in a base period.
Auction Right to import at in-quota tariff is auctioned. 4
State trader or producer group Right to import in-quota is granted wholly or primarily to a state 
trading organization or an organization representing domestic producers
of the controlled product. 2
Mixed Describes a combination of two or more of the six methods above. 4
Other, or not specified Includes methods that do not correspond to any of the seven methods 
above and are not specified in WTO notifications. 2
Source: Skully, in this report.
Table 10—Impacts of TRQ reforms on market access and quota rents
Binding constraint in TRQ
Policy reform Within-quota tariff Quota Over-quota tariff
Lower within-quota tariff + - -
Increase quota 0 ? -
Lower over-quota tariff 0 0 +
(+) denotes policy reform increases market access and/or reduces economic rents. (-) indicates the opposite impacts. (0) denotes no effect.
Source: Skully, in this report.Options for Reforming 
Domestic Support
The URAA made an important distinction between
domestic agricultural support that significantly distorts
production and trade (amber box subsidies), and those
subsidies that were agreed to have minimal or no dis-
torting impacts (green box subsidies). Only amber box
subsidies were made subject to reduction commit-
ments. (Blue box subsidies were also exempted from
reduction commitments because they are linked with
offsetting production limits.) Reduction commitments
during the URAA implementation period were made
from a base AMS, defined for each country as the
average of its total amber box support for all com-
modities during 1986-88. 
In 1998 (the base year for this analysis), OECD coun-
tries provided levels of amber box domestic support
below their ceilings (table 11). Some countries, includ-
ing the United States and Mexico, achieved these lev-
els by shifting some of their domestic support pro-
grams into less trade-distorting programs that satisfied
the criteria for being exempt from URAA commit-
ments. Higher world prices during the early implemen-
tation period also provided more or less automatic
reductions in support levels, making it easier for coun-
tries to meet their WTO ceiling commitments. 
The URAA left in place an uneven playing field of
domestic support across countries and commodities. 
Those countries with relatively high support levels in
the base period continue to have AMS ceilings that
allow relatively high support levels, while countries
with no support in the base period face constraints in
introducing it. In addition to the disparity among coun-
tries in total levels of support, there is dispersion in the
level of support provided to commodities. Many coun-
tries provide most of their support to a small number
of commodities.
In the AMS framework, the measurement of domestic
support includes both government subsidy expendi-
tures on agriculture, as well as the value of trade poli-
cies (measured as the gap between domestic and fixed
international reference prices) for commodities that
receive administered or guaranteed price supports.
Domestic subsidies include output subsidies and inter-
mediate input subsidies. Output subsidies directly
stimulate increased production by increasing the
expected returns from the subsidized commodity.
Subsidies can also be used to provide price support to
the farmer through direct payments that achieve a
guaranteed return. By not actually forcing market
prices in the current period to be equal to the guaran-
teed price to farmers, these payments may be some-
what less distorting of consumer demand than when
market prices are fixed by the government. Subsidies
on intermediate and capital inputs raise output by low-
ering input costs. 
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Table 11—Reduction commitments if AMS is lowered an additional 20 percent from Uruguay Round ceiling
AMS as percent of Cuts in AMS required to reach additional 20-percent
WTO ceiling in 1998 reduction in WTO 1986-88 ceiling
Australia 23 0
Canada 9 0





New Zealand 0 0
Poland 8 0
Switzerland 71 -3
United States 45 0
Only OECD countries represented in the CGE model are included in this table.
AMS = Aggregate Measurement of Support.
Source:Young et al., in this report.The Link Between Trade Policies and Domestic
Price Support in the AMS 
The calculation of the AMS explicitly accounts for the
operational linkage between trade policies and market
price support. The AMS captures how these policies
actually work: An effective market price support pro-
gram requires trade policies to restrict imports and may
require export subsidies. In the absence of such a pro-
gram, domestic price support and storage programs
would become too costly. If the new negotiations con-
tinue within the framework of the URAA, market
access (tariffs and other trade barriers) and export sub-
sidies will be addressed separately from domestic sup-
port, but reforms of the three policies are linked.
Constraints on trade policies alone could either reduce
the effectiveness and current subsidy value of market
price support programs as domestic prices fall, or lead
to a higher current subsidy value if countries respond
with larger expenditures on stock building or price sub-
sidies.4 On the other hand, constraints on a domestic
support program would not necessarily lead to a dis-
mantling of trade barriers. Such barriers can be benefi-
cial to the domestic sectors without the need for admin-
istered prices, although the administered prices provide
an additional layer of short-run protection to producers.
Administered prices create a strong incentive for gov-
ernments to maintain effective trade barriers, and there
can also be greater flexibility to lower trade barriers
when administered price supports are constrained.
We analyze AMS reductions by proportionally reduc-
ing all amber box domestic subsidy expenditures as
well as the applied tariffs and export subsidies when-
ever commodities benefit from administered market
price support programs.5 This approach is consistent
with the AMS accounting framework, which incorpo-
rates the operational link between trade and price sup-
port policies. In effect, this approach implies that con-
straints on administered price support programs are
achieved through lowering trade barriers. 
Lowering AMS Ceilings Versus Leveling 
the Playing Field
We analyze two approaches to further reform of
domestic support policies. These are alternative, gener-
ic approaches to reform rather than specific WTO pro-
posals. Similar to the analysis of tariffs, we analyze
and compare the effects of reducing countries’ overall
levels of domestic support with the effects of reducing
the dispersion of domestic support across countries
and commodities. The first scenario is a continuation
of the Uruguay Round’s 20-percent reduction of AMS
ceilings on aggregate domestic support from uneven
1986-88 base levels of support (to 40 percent below
the base). A further cut in ceilings will affect countries
differently, depending on the relationship between
their current total AMS expenditures and their current
commitment levels (table 11). Many countries would
not be affected by a further 20-percent reduction in
AMS ceilings, including the United States, Canada,
Mexico, Australia, and New Zealand. This scenario
also leaves in place a dispersion of support across
commodities, since it assumes that all program and
commodity benefits are reduced proportionally if their
current AMS exceeds the new ceiling. 
In the second scenario, we “level the playing field” by
requiring countries to limit the level of commodity-
specific support to no more than 30 percent of their
value of production, which is approximately the same
level of aggregate support that the EU would be
allowed in the first scenario (table 12). Countries that
provide less than the maximum levels of support are
assumed not to increase their subsidies. Proportional
cuts are assumed for all policies for a commodity if
the overall subsidy for a commodity exceeds 30 per-
cent of the value of production. Most countries have
commodity programs that would be affected by this
approach, including the EU, Japan, United States,
Canada, and Mexico. This approach achieves signifi-
cant liberalization in commodities that tend to be most
protected, including sugar and dairy.
Tables 13 and 14 show the effects on U.S. bilateral
trade under the two scenarios. A further reduction in
AMS ceilings would affect the United States mostly
through increased demand for U.S. agricultural prod-
ucts by those countries that would be affected by ceil-
ing reductions. U.S. export growth would be largest in
oilseeds, meats, wheat, and coarse grains, with most
exports going to the EU and Japanese markets. Total
U.S. agricultural exports would increase by $900 mil-
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4Technically, the calculation of the AMS as defined in the
URAA would not change since it uses the gap between the admin-
istered price and a fixed base reference price, instead of the current
market price, to calculate the effective level of support.
5In this report, we quantify domestic subsidies by applying the
AMS concept of amber box domestic support to data from the
OECD’s PSE database. While the AMS and the PSE are both mea-
sures of domestic support, the concepts differ. The PSE is a more
up-to-date and comprehensive measure of domestic support, but it
includes policies exempt from URAA disciplines and has a broad-
er measure of market support than the AMS. Without further
manipulation, the PSE database cannot be used to analyze options
for AMS reductions in the WTO. See appendix 2 for a more
detailed discussion. lion, an increase of about 0.2 percent from 1999
exports. U.S. imports would decline by $20 million. 
When commodity support is leveled across countries
and commodities, the global reform becomes more
broad-based, and the effects on U.S. agricultural trade
are slightly larger. Assuming a 30-percent ceiling on
commodity subsidies (with subsidies below that level
assumed not to increase) the largest export gains for the
United States will be for beef, rice, and dairy, mainly to
Japan, the EU, and Canada. This analysis does not take
into account the potential impacts of other policies,
such as EU restrictions on hormone-treated beef. Total
U.S. agricultural exports under this scenario will
increase by $1 billion. Total U.S. imports will increase
slightly ($245 million). 
Most of the value of domestic farm support is provided
through price support programs, and most price sup-
port programs are implemented through trade restraints
and export subsidies rather than stock holding or pay-
ments to farmers. The dependence of domestic support
on trade policies has led some to argue for a strategic
approach to negotiations: focus on reducing tariffs and
export subsidies, and let tighter trade policy rules force
reforms on domestic farm programs. Assuming that
countries respond to constraints on domestic price sup-
port by dismantling related import barriers and export
subsidies, the trade policy component of both the AMS
scenarios considered here accounts for 83 percent of
their global trade effects. This suggests that targeting
trade policies alone can implicitly lead to significant
reform of domestic support. 
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Table 12—Reduction needed to keep commodity-specific AMS less than 30 percent of the value 
of production
Total Wheat Rice Coarse grains Oilseeds Sugar
Percent change from 1998 AMS
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0
European Union 0 0 0 0 0 -28
Japan -19 -65 -64 -56 -17 -51
Korea 0 0 -57 -57 -61 0
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 -9
Norway 0 -37 0 -31 0 0
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0
Switzerland -41 -35 0 -36 -52 -47
United States 0 0 0 0 0 -19
Dairy Beef &  Other Wool Fruits & Miscella-
products sheep meat vegetables neous
Percent change from 1998 AMS
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Canada -48 0 0 0 0 0
European Union -44 -15 0 0 -16 0
Iceland -63 0 -70 0 0 0
Japan -62 -6 -11 0 0 0
Korea 0 -27 0 0 0 0
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0
Norway -10 0 -20 0 0 0
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0
Switzerland -43 -36 -40 0 0 -40
United States -49 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Young et al., in this report, based on WTO notifications, OECD PSE data, and ERS calculations.18 ❖ Agricultural Policy Reform—The Road Ahead/AER 802  Economic Research Service/USDA
Table 13—Changes in U.S. agricultural trade from a 20-percent reduction in URAA AMS ceilings 
Exports
Other Total Total
Canada Mexico EU EFTA Japan Korea countries exports imports
Change from base in US$ millions
Rice 0.0 -0.1 6.1 0.1 17.0 0.0 0.7 23.9 -0.2
Wheat 0.1 1.6 55.8 3.1 15.0 1.6 63.2 140.5 -1.1
Coarse grains 1.0 -1.4 87.4 3.2 -6.7 -1.1 53.6 136.0 -13.9
Oilseeds 1.3 8.8 190.1 0.7 9.4 4.1 8.1 222.4 -0.2
Sugar 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 1.3 -0.4
Cotton and fiber 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.7 1.8 0.0
Fruit and vegetables 0.0 -0.8 18.4 2.1 40.2 8.9 -3.8 65.1 7.8
Other crops -0.8 -0.5 -12.6 0.4 3.6 3.4 -5.6 -12.1 11.3
Beef 2.0 -0.3 52.8 1.0 50.6 9.8 10.2 126.0 -13.4
Other livestock 5.2 0.9 17.0 1.4 37.8 14.3 68.4 145.0 -0.5
Dairy products 1.2 4.1 7.0 1.0 20.7 5.7 10.8 50.5 -0.6
Processed foods 3.1 1.5 16.6 0.0 -27.8 -2.7 12.6 3.3 -7.6
Total 13.3 13.8 439.6 13.0 160.5 44.3 219.0 903.5 -18.7
Source:Young et al., in this report.
Table 14—Changes in U.S. agricultural trade from reducing commodity-specific AMS to no more than 30
percent of the value of production
Exports
Other Total Total
Canada Mexico EU EFTA Japan Korea countries exports imports
Change from base in US$ millions
Rice -0.3 -0.4 -1.7 0.6 265.4 0.3 -0.9 263.0 1.6
Wheat 0.1 -0.7 -5.7 9.2 87.9 1.4 41.7 134.0 3.7
Coarse grains 1.6 -0.4 -11.0 8.9 -18.5 -0.4 83.0 63.4 -25.4
Oilseeds -0.1 -1.6 -19.1 4.2 29.7 21.3 7.3 41.6 0.0
Sugar 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.2 0.0 2.1 4.9 111.3
Fiber 0.4 0.2 1.1 0.1 2.5 1.6 10.0 15.9 -0.1
Fruit and vegetables 0.9 -0.3 75.0 5.0 -14.3 0.1 8.8 75.4 -2.1
Other crops -0.2 -0.3 -15.4 -0.5 -2.4 -0.4 -1.5 -20.8 3.7
Beef 10.4 3.2 216.2 5.5 -4.4 23.7 31.5 286.2 -39.0
Other livestock 0.6 0.9 -2.0 1.1 9.5 4.9 8.4 23.5 -1.6
Dairy products 58.6 -21.4 40.0 2.2 164.6 -2.6 -44.4 197.0 173.8
Processed foods -1.3 0.7 -19.0 -0.6 -19.7 -3.9 4.4 -39.5 18.1
Total 71.4 -19.6 259.0 35.9 501.4 45.9 150.5 1,044.5 244.0
Source:Young et al., in this report.Options for Reducing 
Export Subsidies
From a global perspective, agricultural export subsidies
have smaller impacts than tariffs or domestic subsidies,
accounting for 13 percent of world agricultural price
distortions due to farm support policies. Export subsi-
dies are nevertheless an important pillar of the reforms.
Many countries’tariffs and domestic support policies
contribute to distorted global markets; however, the
global effects of export subsidies are mostly attribut-
able to a single region, the EU. Export subsidies have
significant impacts on trade in some markets and create
increased competition that strains trade relationships.
And, export subsidy reforms can have significant indi-
rect effects because they help to set the stage for
reforms in other areas. Constraints on export subsidies
that are used to help dispose of surplus production can
create pressures to restructure domestic subsidies in
ways that are less distorting of production and trade. In
negotiations, export subsidies are directly linked to tar-
iffs because their reduction or elimination may encour-
age some countries to lower their import barriers. 
A detailed analysis of the EU shows that when the
links between export subsidies and domestic market
price support are accounted for, EU export subsidies
have significant effects on world markets and on U.S.
production and trade of some commodities. Our analy-
sis focuses on the EU because in 1998 it accounted for
over 90 percent of the world’s export subsidies (fig. 3).
Switzerland accounted for 4.4 percent, the U.S.
accounted for 2.2 percent, and all other countries
accounted for about 3 percent of global export subsi-
dies. From 1995 to 1998, the EU provided export sub-
sidies on most agricultural exports, including nearly all
of its exports of coarse grains, butter and butter oil,
beef, and skim milk powder. The commodities includ-
ed in this analysis are wheat, barley, corn, other coarse
grains, oilseeds and their products, beef, pork, and
poultry. (Dairy is not included in the model, mainly
because dairy quotas in the EU limit any potential
change in the sector.) These commodities account for
just over 50 percent of EU expenditures on export sub-
sidies (not accounting for subsidy expenditures on
incorporated/processed products) and roughly 75 per-
cent of the volume of subsidized exports.
In our analysis, the EU is assumed to adapt to export
subsidy elimination on grains, oilseeds, and livestock
by lowering its domestic intervention prices and reduc-
ing its exportable supply. This action will lead to
changes in the relative rates of subsidies among crops.
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Figure 3
Source: Leetmaa, in this report. 
Export subsidy expenditure by country, 1995-98
US$ millionsThe Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the EU
domestic farm program, provides a common price for
all grains. Given world grain prices, this common price
implies relatively high subsidies on barley and other
coarse grains compared to wheat. Oilseed prices are
not supported, although grain, oilseeds, and livestock
producers all receive direct payments. This domestic
price structure has encouraged barley and coarse grain
production. Domestic reforms linked to export subsidy
elimination will change this relative pricing and lead to
a shift in production back to wheat. Lower feed prices
will partially offset a major contraction in the EU live-
stock sector when export subsidies are removed. 
The impact of EU export subsidy elimination on world
prices would be felt most in the wheat and livestock
sectors. In the case of wheat, the world price would
decline due to increased EU production and exports.
Conversely, world livestock prices would increase as
EU exports decline. The expansion of EU wheat pro-
duction and exports will create increased competition
with U.S. wheat, while U.S. production and exports of
other grains and meats, and exports of soybeans, will
expand (table 15). EU imports are assumed fixed. If
import barriers were also reduced, this would be a full
reform of EU policies. See Diao et. al in this report for
those effects.
Even if it fully eliminates export subsidies, the EU will
still be able to competitively export grains and
oilseeds, and some pork and poultry, but will continue
to be uncompetitive in exports of beef. However, the
EU beef industry could restructure in order to enter
into the world’s higher quality beef trade. Dairy, wine,
horticulture, and some other commodities that benefit
from EU subsidies are not included in the analysis.
Approaches to Reforming Export Subsidies:
Value Versus Volume Constraints
The URAA approached the reform of export subsidies
by placing restrictions on both the volume and the
value of subsidized exports. Targeting both compo-
nents creates effective constraints in times of both high
and low prices. When world prices are low, both the
value and the volume limits act as constraints. Volume
limits help to prevent the disposal of excess supply
onto export markets, in an effort to raise low domestic
prices. Value limits become more binding as prices fall
because the subsidy (the difference between the high
internal support price and the declining world price)
becomes larger. When world prices are high, the value
constraint becomes less binding but the volume con-
straint can still set some limit on export subsidies.
Both value and volume limits help to emphasize the
link between export subsidies and fixed internal price
support programs, since constrained export subsidies
can now only partially offset the effects of falling
world prices.
In 1995-96, when world prices were high, the EU was
constrained more by its volume limits than its value
limits. As world prices fell beginning in 1997, the
EU’s subsidy expenditures and value of subsidized
exports increased. Through 1998, the volume limits
were more binding on EU exports than value limits,
with the exceptions of sugar, processed fruits and veg-
etables, tobacco, and alcohol. In 1998, the U.S. provid-
ed export subsidies on dairy and poultry meats, with
dairy reaching 90 percent of U.S. volume limits. 
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Table 15—EU export subsidy elimination and related domestic price reforms: Effects on EU and U.S.
production and exports
Commodity EU U.S.
Production Exports Production Exports
Percent change from baseline volume in 2007/8
Wheat .01 19.5 -1.3 -5.5
Corn Na Na 0.4 0.6
Barley -3.2 -32.7 Na Na
Soybeans Na Na -0.1 0.02
Rapeseed 0.4 -5.5 Na Na
Beef -1.7 -100 1.2 5.7
Pork -4.2 -44 0.5 3.1
Poultry -4.8 -29.8 0.4 1.1
Na = not applicable.
Source: Leetmaa (2001).The Impacts of Reform on 
Developing Countries
Less developed countries (LDC) are a diverse group.
They include agricultural exporters and net food
importers, countries with adequate or with limited nat-
ural and financial resources, and countries in which
agriculture accounts for a large or small share of
national economic activity. While the interests of an
individual developing country are likely to reflect its
own mix of characteristics, some developing countries
have collaborated to present common positions at the
WTO. Some resource-abundant, agricultural-exporting
developing countries have joined the Cairns Group,
including the MERCOSUR countries, Chile, and
Thailand. The group of “like-minded countries”
includes least-developed food-importing countries,
such as Haiti and Cuba. 
LDCs Affected by Both Their Own 
and Developed Country Reforms
Individually, developing countries are small, price-tak-
ing economies in world markets. The potential effects
on developing countries from further global agricultur-
al policy reforms can be decomposed into the impacts
of reform by large, developed economies on world
agricultural markets, and the effects of their own poli-
cy reforms (table 16). Unambiguously, further agricul-
tural policy reforms by developed countries will lead
to an increase in world agricultural prices relative to
their trend levels, and greater market access and higher
prices for developing country agricultural exports. If
developed countries were to fully eliminate their own
agricultural support policies, the value of agricultural
exports by all developing countries would increase by
about 24 percent. Rising world food prices due to
reform in developed countries only would lead to a 2-
percent decline in LDC agricultural imports.
Developing countries’ reforms of their own policies
will lead to increases in both agricultural exports and
imports. If LDCs fully eliminate their own agricultural
policy distortions, developing countries’ agricultural
exports will increase in value by 5.5 percent. Under
the same scenario, agricultural imports will increase
by 25 percent. The expected increase in imports is
large because many LDCs have high import tariffs.
(This level of import growth is likely overstated
because the applied rates of developing countries are
often lower than the bound rates used in this analysis.)
Global policy reform will result in a 20-percent
increase in the value of developing countries’ agricul-
tural imports and a 27-percent increase in the value of
their exports, indicating the potential for a significant
reallocation of production and expansion of trade in
response to global reforms.
Developing countries that have the capacity to increase
their agricultural export supply would account for
much of the increase in exports, especially in products
that compete with the temperate products of developed
countries. Furthermore, some of the export growth can
be expected to embody greater valued added. Many
developed countries have escalating tariffs that impede
the efforts of developing countries to capture more of
the value added in their agricultural exports. Tariff
reform or elimination by developed countries can help
open up opportunities for agro-industrial development
in LDCs that can help to offset the effects of long-term
price declines for many primary commodities. 
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Elimination of developed country country agricultural agricultural
agricultural policy distortions policy distortions policy distortions
Percent change from base
Market access Domestic support Export subsidies Market access All policies
Imports
Value 0.6 -1.5 -1.1 24.6 20.0
Volume 0.2 -4.7 -2.7 17.1 7.9
Exports
Value 18.1 5.5 0.6 5.5 26.5
Volume 10.7 3.4 0.3 4.1 16.1
Source: Diao, Somwaru, and Roe in this report.While lower tariffs in developed countries will benefit
some LDC exporters, others will face an erosion of the
margin of tariff preference enjoyed by their exports
under special, concessional trade agreements.
Preferential agreements, such as the Caribbean Basin
Initiative between the United States and Caribbean
countries, allow many products of least developed
countries to enter duty free. The erosion of preferences
due to multilateral tariff reductions is expected to have
negative but modest effects on the agricultural export
earnings of some developing countries. While loss of
preferences may erode export earnings in the short
term, it may benefit developing countries in the long
run. These preferences have in some cases reinforced
developing country dependence on the export of a
small number of primary commodities, many character-
ized by long-term declines in price. Recent trends in
export growth and commodity composition show that
countries with a high dependence on primary commod-
ity exports showed the lowest export growth, while
countries that have been successful in diversifying their
exports have had the highest export growth. Partner
diversification also benefits developing countries. 
Food Aid Needs Will Decline Slightly
We analyze the effects of global policy reform on the
food aid needs of 67 low-income developing countries.
These countries account for 40 percent of the global
population. Almost all are food importers and have his-
torically received food aid. The world price of food
imports, the domestic supply response to higher world
prices, and the availability of foreign exchange to pay
for food imports jointly determine food aid require-
ments. On the import side, higher food import prices
reduce the financial import capacity of these countries,
but foreign exchange earnings from export growth
increases it. On the production side, higher world
prices are expected to outweigh the effects of low-
income LDCs removal of their own tariffs, leading to a
positive supply response. Food aid needs are projected
by calculating the difference between per capita food
supply (from domestic production and commercial
imports) and projected per capita consumption (using
either status quo or nutritional consumption targets). 
The full global elimination of agricultural policy distor-
tions is expected to reduce global food aid needs by 6
percent. In the absence of any global reforms, the food
aid import needs of low-income developing countries
(assuming status quo per capita consumption levels) are
projected at 12.7 million tons of cereals by 2010 (table
17). If nutritional intake were to improve to recom-
mended Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
dietary levels, their food aid needs would be 21.9 mil-
lion tons in 2010. Full global reform will reduce status
quo and nutritional food aid needs to 12.0 and 20.5
million tons, respectively. Regionally, Sub-Saharan
Africa will gain the most because of its low food
import dependency and the high share of agriculture in
total exports (fig. 4). The status quo food gap in Sub-
Saharan Africa will decline 9 percent. There will be an
increase in the food gap in North Africa.
Overall, several factors account for the relatively small
impact of global policy reform on food security: In
many low-income developing countries, food imports
are a relatively small share of the food supply, agricul-
ture’s share in foreign exchange earnings is declining,
and the food production response to change in world
prices is low unless additional investments are made to
improve agricultural productivity.
Developing Countries’ Own Reforms Are Their
Major Source of Gains from WTO
For LDCs, a key issue in the policy reform negotia-
tions will be the flexibility the outcome will permit
them in adjusting to more import competition.
“Special and differential treatment” is a concept that
provides for exemptions or special provisions in inter-
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Table 17—Full agricultural trade liberalization: Effects on low-income developing countries' food aid 
needs in 2010 
Status quo nutritional intake Adequate nutritional intake
Scenario Million tons of grain
Baseline 12.7 21.9
Global agricultural price increases 12.6 21.4
Developing country export growth plus price increases 12.0 20.5
Source: Shapouri and Trueblood in this report.national trade rules in recognition of the different eco-
nomic, financial, and technological characteristics and
needs of developing countries. In the URAA, special
and differential treatment allowed a longer implemen-
tation period for developing countries’ reforms and
fully exempted the least developed countries from dis-
ciplines. Developing countries’ proposals in the new
negotiations include measures to exempt themselves
from domestic support disciplines, higher de minimis
support levels, and the right to raise tariffs above
Uruguay Round bindings if import competition
becomes too disruptive. 
Special and differential treatment can be used to facili-
tate the adjustment of developing countries to more
open global markets, based on the recognition that
adjustment can be costly, but particularly so for the
most vulnerable segments of the world population. In
the short run, the global community’s role is to provide
food aid targeted to the food insecure and technical
assistance to facilitate the development of competitive
agricultural sectors. In the longer run, improvements in
the economic growth and welfare of developing coun-
tries will depend on whether these countries’ con-
sumers have access to low cost and secure supplies of
food, produced at home or abroad under fair market
conditions. The supply response of farmers in develop-
ing countries will depend on the effective transmission
of market price signals. Although import growth may
require a managed transition, it is only through a full
participation in reform in the long term that developing
countries can fully achieve the potential dynamic gains
from trade liberalization. The increased productivity
and investment that have been shown to be linked with
more open trade policies suggest the long-term bene-
fits to developing countries from their own economic
policy reforms can be significant.
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Figure 4
Effects of agricultural policy reform on food aid needs of low-income developing countries
Source: Shapouri and Trueblood, in this report.
Million tons of grainConclusions
The movement toward a more market-oriented and
orderly global agricultural trading system is important
for the United States because of the large and increas-
ing role of trade in U.S. agricultural production and
food consumption. Expanding export markets provides
an outlet for U.S. agricultural producers as technologi-
cal advances and increased productivity lead to higher
levels of production. For consumers, trade rules help to
ensure access to a safe, varied, and abundant year-
round supply of food.
Global agricultural policy distortions impose substan-
tial long-term costs on U.S. producers, consumers, and
the world economy. U.S. agricultural tariffs and subsi-
dies are relatively low, suggesting that U.S. domestic
adjustments to its own reforms are likely to be small,
relative to the potentially large benefits to the United
States from global reform. Furthermore, U.S. reforms
of its own policies within a global framework can help
to ensure the overall, long-term competitiveness of the
U.S. farm sector in world markets. 
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The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
(URAA) brought agriculture under the discipline of
the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT)
for the first time. The signatories to the URAA Final
Act (1994) committed themselves to reducing agricul-
tural support and protection over the 6-year period
1995–2000 (and 1995–2004 for developing countries)
under three disciplines: tariffs, domestic support, and
export subsidies. Agricultural trade barriers and pro-
ducer subsidies still distort global agriculture. The new
negotiations on agriculture are expected to further
reduce policy distortions in global agricultural mar-
kets. The growth in the world economy since the pre-
vious round of negotiations necessitates an evaluation
of the costs of current agricultural trade and domestic
policy distortions and the potential benefits from their
full elimination both in a global context, and in the
context of a world economy with increased capital
flows. 
This study assesses the possible global impacts of fur-
ther agricultural liberalization in some sector detail
from both a static-snapshot perspective, and in far less
detail from a dynamic longrun perspective. Short- to
medium-run effects of policy reform on well-being can
differ from long-run effects due to reform-induced
changes in the longrun pattern of investment and capi-
tal accumulation. A global analysis of profound policy
reform (i.e., the elimination of agricultural support and
trade protection throughout the world) provides
insights into the costs of agricultural policy distortions
and suggests the potentially greatest effects on coun-
tries, both positive and negative, of the new agricultur-
al negotiations.
To understand the individual and complementary
effects of the various policy reforms on the post-
URAA global economy, this study focuses on three
disciplines: market access (trade barriers), export sub-
sidies, and domestic support. The study decomposes
the global effects of a full reform by type of policy
being used and by commodity (see box) and country.1
Specifically, the study uses the following scenarios: (1)
eliminating agricultural import barriers (tariff equiva-
lents) throughout the world; (2) eliminating agricultur-
al export subsidies throughout the world; (3) eliminat-
ing domestic support in the developed countries; and
(4) combining these scenarios. Because impacts can
vary from country to country, this study identifies spe-
cific country-region effects. As some countries are net
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Chapter 1
A Global Analysis of Agricultural Reform 
in WTO Member Countries
Xinshen Diao, Agapi Somwaru, and Terry Roe
Removing trade barriers, subsidies, and other trade-distorting forms of support will cause aggregate world prices of
agricultural commodities to rise by almost 12 percent relative to an index of all other prices. Agricultural support
and protection in developed countries is the major cause of low agricultural prices, and implicitly, a tax on net agri-
cultural exporters in developing countries. The reform of agricultural policies would likely increase livestock prod-
uct prices more than any other commodity. Reform increases world trade in agricultural commodities, but leaves the
level of total agricultural production almost unchanged. In the short to medium term, some net agricultural import-
ing countries suffer a welfare loss due to the adverse change in their terms of trade caused by reform. In the longer
run, however, agricultural policy reform benefits almost all countries, and developing countries in particular, due to
the change in the developing countries’ investment pattern, growth in capital stock, and growth in total factor pro-
ductivity.
1 Countries and regions included in the study include 1) Australia
and New Zealand; 2) China, including Hong Kong; 3) Japan and
Korea; 4) the other Asian countries; 5) Canada; 6) the United
States; 7) Mexico; 8) Latin American countries; 9) the European
Union; 10) the European Free Trade Area; 11) Southern African
countries; 12) the rest of the world.exporters of agricultural goods and others are net
importers, policies can affect countries differently.
Also, the composition of agricultural exports from
developed countries tends to vary from those of devel-
oping countries. Thus, to identify a country’s/region’s
effects, the study further decomposes scenarios (1)
through (4) by regional options. For example, the
study addresses questions such as: what are the likely
effects on world agricultural price and trade flows, and
on the economy of other countries/regions, if the EU
eliminates its agricultural support and trade protection?
The study uses four indicators to assess the effects of
agricultural liberalization on the world economy, as
well as on each country/region: changes in world agri-
cultural prices, changes in world and countries’ exports
and imports, changes in the level of agricultural pro-
duction, and changes in a measure of social well-
being, or welfare. 
The analysis is based on current (1998) levels of
applied agricultural tariffs, domestic support and
export subsidies, and tariff rate quotas (TRQ). When
the applied tariff rates are not available, the bound tar-
iff rates are used instead. Data on nontariff barriers,
such as state trading agencies and effective TRQs, are
also not available for many countries. For this reason,
the study uses a calculated tariff equivalent rate to
proxy the effects of all other import barriers based on
ERS/USDA estimates.2
Other caveats are noteworthy. First, tariff rates and tar-
iff equivalent rates are based on 1998 data. Because
many countries underwent tariff reductions after 1998,
and because the bound rates are much higher than the
applied rates in many cases, the analysis may overesti-
mate the extent of tariff reduction presumed to take
effect after 2000 for some countries. Other countries
and commodities still have various nontariff barriers in
place, and hence, tariff reduction cannot represent the
full elimination of import barriers. Thus, the analysis
may underestimate the extent of all import barriers.
Second, the analysis focusing on the effect of domestic
support on world agricultural markets considers the
elimination of support only in Australia, New Zealand,
Japan, Korea, the United States, Canada, the European
Union (EU), and three countries in the European Free
Trade Area (EFTA). The analysis does take into
account that many countries have recently adopted
less-distorting forms of farm support, and differences
exist in the effects of coupled and decoupled govern-
ment payments received by farmers on production and
trade. For example, subsidizing intermediate inputs in
grain production (coupled) would affect farmers’ pro-
duction decisions, and removing such subsidies would
affect farmers’ supply response. Eliminating such sub-
sidies gives farmers incentives to adjust their planting
structure, possibly allocating more land to other crops.
On the other hand, direct payments to the owners of all
farmland with no crop targeting (decoupled) would
have little effect on the allocation of the land and,
hence, the planting structure. Removing these subsi-
dies would mainly reduce farmers’ income and have
relatively small effects on aggregate production. 
Third, it is assumed that labor and capital are mobile
between the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors of
an economy. Without factor mobility, the supply
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Sectors in the model Sectors in GTAP data
Rice Paddy rice, processed rice
Wheat Wheat
Corn and other cereal grains Corn and other cereal grains
Vegetables and fruits Vegetables, fruits, and nuts
Oilseeds and products Oilseeds, vegetable oil
Sugar Sugar cane and sugar beet, sugar processed
Other crops and products Plant-based fibers, other crops
Livestock and products Bovine cattle, sheep and goats and meats, other animal products, raw milk
and dairy products, wool, and silk-worm cocoons
Other processed food products Beverages and tobacco products, and other processed food products
2 See discussion of agricultural policies in the appendix to this
report.
Agricultural sectoral aggregation in the studyresponse from countries having a comparative advan-
tage in world agricultural markets would slow, which
may cause world agricultural prices to rise more than
the levels predicted by this analysis. Moreover, the
study assumes full employment. This assumption
places upward pressure on prices, because if rural
unemployed labor is available (which is likely in
developing countries), supply response can occur at
lower cost. 
Full Reform Will Likely Cause World Prices of
Agricultural Goods to Rise Significantly in the
Short to Medium Term
World agricultural prices are sensitive to changes in
tariff levels and domestic support. The study is based
on GTAP database version 5 and calculates average
tariff equivalent rates using the Agricultural Market
Access Database (AMAD), while ERS provides the
average rates of export subsidies and domestic support.
The average world agricultural tariff equivalent rate is
22 percent. This rate, the trade-weighted average tariff
rate, is calculated as the ratio of the total revenues of
all countries’ agricultural tariff equivalents to the value
of their total agricultural imports.3 The similarly com-
puted average world export subsidy rate is 2.9 percent.
The domestic support rate for the developed country
group is 5.3 percent (table 1-1).
The elimination of all tariffs (and tariff equivalents) on
agricultural imports, export subsidies, and domestic
support, worldwide, results in an increase in world
agricultural price levels of 11.6 percent relative to the
level of world nonagricultural prices. This result does
not take into account further agricultural liberalization
in China, which at this time is not yet a participatory
member of the WTO. If China liberalizes agriculture,
the level of world agricultural prices would rise by
12.2 percent, an increase of about 0.6 percent over
non-China predicted values. The following discussion
assumes that China maintains current policies.
This study determines the global price effect of world-
wide agricultural liberalization without accounting for
investment response to price changes. Later, this
assumption is relaxed. Given this consideration, elimi-
nating tariffs, worldwide, accounts for more than 50
percent of the 11.6 percent increase in world agricul-
tural prices, that is, when other policy variables remain
constant and only agricultural import tariffs are elimi-
nated, world agricultural prices rise 6 percent (relative
to world nonagricultural prices) (fig. 1-1). This result
occurs because import barriers protect domestic pro-
ducers by restricting imports. In many import-protect-
ing countries, import restrictions raise domestic food
prices higher than world prices while at the same time
inducing these countries to employ too many resources
in agriculture. Eliminating import tariffs raises the
demand for agricultural imported goods, while supply
contracts, thus placing upward pressure on world agri-
cultural prices. This pressure in turn induces agricul-
tural exporting countries to increase production. 
Eliminating domestic support in the developed coun-
tries, as mentioned earlier, contributes more than 30
percent to the rise in world agricultural prices. In other
words, when other policy variables remain constant
and only domestic support in the developed countries
is eliminated, world agricultural prices rise about 4
percent. Farmers benefit from price support or, indi-
rectly, from lowered production costs. Reducing or
eliminating domestic support in the developed coun-
tries lowers farm income, or, more precisely, lowers
returns to land, farm buildings and machinery, and
owner-operator labor. Farmers in these countries
respond to such policy changes by reducing produc-
Economic Research Service/USDA Agricultural Policy Reform—The Road Ahead/AER 802 ❖ 27
3 The simple average world agricultural tariff rate is 62 percent.
High tariffs for a specific sector usually restrict trade in this sector,
lowering the sector’s share in the world trade. Thus, the weighted
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Table 1-1—Summary of agricultural supports and protection data in the base year (1997)
Rate of tariffs1 Rate of export subsidies2 Rate of domestic supports3
Percentage
World average 22.09 2.87
Developed country group 23.67 4.79 5.25




Other grains 8.68 0.69
Vegetable and fruits 12.13 1.01
Oil and oilseeds 12.57 0.00
Sugar 33.95 6.97
Other crops 11.57 0.05
Livestock and products 48.79 7.03
Processed foods 14.90 0.00
Developed country group
Wheat 68.18 2.99 31.55
Rice 73.34 3.79 2.05
Other grains 11.02 0.84 21.84
Vegetable and fruits 10.22 1.92 0.00
Oil and oilseeds 9.50 0.00 9.94
Sugar 59.14 21.27 2.19
Other crops 9.85 0.17 2.75
Livestock and products 68.45 8.78 3.31




Other grains 6.56 0.13
Vegetable and fruits 16.71 0.11
Oil and oilseeds 15.67 0.01
Sugar 14.50 0.16
Other crops 15.82 0.00
Livestock and products 23.23 0.58
Processed foods 26.51 0.00
Regional average
Australia and New Zealand 5.12 0.01 0.19
Japan and Korea 47.49 2.43
United States 10.65 1.77 2.56
Canada 6.09 2.99
European Union 16.68 12.29 8.19
European Free Trade Area 48.72 43.96 19.29
China 26.47
Other Asian countries 20.71
Mexico 18.93
Latin America 14.67 0.04
Southern African countries 21.65
Rest of the world 17.63 0.70
1Rates of tariffs for sector, country, region, and the world are weighted average rates and the weights are values of sectoral or country's imports.
Both tariff rates and import data are for 1997.
2Rates of export subsidies for sector, country, region, and the world are weighted average rates and the weights are values of sectoral or country's exports.
Both subsidy rates and export data are for 1997.
3Rates of domestic supports for sector, country, region, and the world are weighted average rates and the weights are values of sectoral or country's outputs.
The domestic support data are for 1998, while the output data are for 1997.
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.tion, thus an upward pressure is placed on world
prices. 
Eliminating total export subsidies worldwide has
smaller direct effects than removing tariffs and domes-
tic support. Eliminating these subsidies for sugar and
livestock products, however, causes their prices to rise
more than 3 percent (fig. 1-2). The main reason for
this increase is that while world average export subsi-
dies are much lower than the world import tariffs, they
are relatively high for sugar and livestock (table 1-1).
When other policy variables remain constant and only
agricultural export subsidies worldwide are eliminated,
the world agricultural price rises 1.5 percent relative to
the price of nonagricultural goods.
Agricultural support and protection in developed
countries is the major cause of low world agricul-
tural prices
The decomposition of the increase in world prices by
developed – developing country groups shows that
agricultural liberalization in the developed countries
accounts for about 80 percent of the rise in world agri-
cultural prices. That is, eliminating agricultural support
and trade protection only in the developed country
group increases world agricultural prices 9 percent rel-
ative to nonagricultural prices (fig. 1-1). Eliminating 
trade protection in the developing country group
increases world agricultural prices 2.3 percent.4
Three reasons help explain why liberalization in the
developed countries causes world agricultural prices to
rise. First, as a group, developed countries import more
agricultural goods than developing countries. Excluding
intra-regional trade among EU member countries and
EFTA member countries, developed countries’imports
account for about 57 percent of world agricultural
trade. Moreover, the developed country group has an
average agricultural tariff (equivalent) rate of 24 per-
cent compared with a rate of 20 percent for the devel-
oping country group (table 1-1). This high rate is main-
ly due to the high rates for grain and livestock product
imports by Japan, Korea, the EU, and EFTA (table 1-
2). The tariff rates are low in other developed countries,
such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the
United States. Second, the average export subsidy rate
for the developed country group is 4.8 percent, and
only 0.13 percent for the developing country group
(table 1-1). Finally, developed countries mainly employ
domestic support policies. 
Because agricultural support and protection rates in the
developed countries are higher than those in the devel-
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Decomposition of price effects of global agricultural liberalization
Percent change in selected world commodity prices from the base year in the model
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA 
Percent
0
4 This group includes emerging markets, transition economies,
and China.oping countries, and because the developed countries
are major players in world agricultural markets, it fol-
lows that liberalizing developed countries’ agricultural
support and trade policy causes world agricultural
prices to rise. More specifically, removing import tar-
iffs, domestic support, and export subsidies in the EU
alone, holding the policy of other countries unchanged,
causes world prices to rise 4.4 percent (fig. 1-1), or
more than one-third of the world price increase that
would result. When policy variables for the other
countries remain constant and only the agricultural
support and trade protection in the United States are
eliminated, world agricultural prices rise 1.8 percent.
Liberalization of Japan’s plus Korea’s agricultural
trade policies causes world agricultural prices to rise
about 1.5 percent (fig. 1-1).
Livestock product prices rise the most 
in response to liberalization
For the world as a whole, livestock and livestock prod-
uct (including dairy) trade faces the highest level of
import protection and export subsidies in comparison
to the other agricultural commodity categories (table
1-1). Moreover, the value of world livestock product
trade is almost twice the value of world trade in grain
products. Consequently, world livestock product prices
rise more than other commodity prices after liberaliza-
tion. If all forms of domestic support and border pro-
tection in agriculture are removed, world livestock
product prices would rise about 22 percent, while grain
and other crop prices rise 6 percent to 18 percent (fig.
1-2). Again, the developed countries influence the rise
in world livestock product prices because developed
countries dominate world trade in this sector, as well
as protect their domestic sectors from import competi-
tion (table 1-2).
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Table 1-2—Regional agricultural tariff rates by sector in the base year (1997)
Wheat Rice Other grains Vegetable and fruits Oil and oilseeds
Percentage
Australia and New Zealand 0.00 0.89 0.98 1.5 2.3
Japan and Korea 87.57 336.57 6.81 9.51 10.41
United States 2.60 5.28 0.60 4.70 6.74
Canada 50.24 0.00 0.08 0.27 0.00
European Union 42.98 47.66 38.60 10.86 5.68
European Free Trade Area 119.45 0.00 114.23 69.77 186.09
China 13.46 13.11 14.36 12.56 17.26
Other Asian countries 6.23 19.71 3.96 26.45 19.55
Mexico 13.40 15.00 0.77 17.90 6.89
Latin American countries 5.53 25.57 10.31 13.73 11.10
Southern African countries 20.20 5.55 21.62 15.46 24.72
Rest of the world 8.49 4.47 6.49 12.13
Sugar Other crops Livestock and products Processed food
Percentage
Australia and New Zealand 10.27 2.83 4.43 7.11
Japan and Korea 81.02 7.51 132.39 8.41
United States 53.10 21.46 10.62 8.62
Canada 5.36 0.48 22.63 5.06
European Union 61.91 2.74 42.88 12.20
European Free Trade Area 100.67 55.11 123.57 3.71
China 22.22 25.62 33.28 35.22
Other Asian countries 26.69 21.72 16.38 28.17
Mexico 4.25 7.43 35.72 19.95
Latin American countries 18.68 8.34 17.89 17.29
Southern African countries 11.24 14.63 21.23 30.23
Rest of the world 12.10 9.67 21.59 24.93
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.The resulting higher agricultural commodity prices
that are likely to prevail in this case affects agricultural
importing countries differently. Those developing
countries that are importers of grain and livestock
products, and in which tariff rates on imports are not
prohibitively high, face increased import costs with the
result that consumer’s interests are adversely affected.
For those developed countries that are also grain and
livestock product importers but in which tariff rates on
imports are almost prohibitively high, such as Japan
and Korea, the prices faced by their domestic con-
sumers may not rise. Thus, consumers in these coun-
tries are likely to benefit from agricultural liberaliza-
tion while their producers may be hurt due to competi-
tion from lower cost foreign producers. 
Liberalization Enhances Trade, but Among
Sectors, Affects Production Differently
In general, freer trade results in more trade. The model
results indicate that world agricultural trade is likely to
increase substantially after liberalization. Removing all
agricultural support and protection worldwide results
in an increase in the value of world agricultural trade
of about 30 percent. The corresponding volume of
world trade rises 15 percent (table 1-3).
Agricultural export value from developed countries
rises 32 percent, while exports from developing coun-
tries increase 27 percent. However, the corresponding
increase in the volume of exports from the developing
countries (16 percent) is larger than the increase from
the developed countries (14 percent). This result
implies that the prices for the agricultural goods
exported by the developed countries rise more than the
prices of the agricultural goods exported by the devel-
oping countries. This result occurs because the devel-
oped country group exports more livestock products,
accounting for 76 percent of world livestock product
trade, while the developing country group exports
more vegetables, fruits, oilseeds, sugar, and other crop
products. While, as mentioned earlier, world livestock
product prices could rise 22 percent, world prices for
the nongrain crop product categories rise 6 percent to
11 percent (except for sugar, for which world prices
rise 16 percent (fig. 1-2)).
The removal of import protection is a dominant factor
in the increased growth in world agricultural trade.
When only agricultural tariffs worldwide are eliminat-
ed, world trade rises 26 percent in value and 17 per-
cent in volume. Exports and imports both rise more in
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Table 1-3—Decomposition of world agricultural trade effects of global agricultural liberalization—
Percentage change in total agricultural trade from the base year
Value Volume
Removing agricultural supports and protections by all regions
World trade 29.71 14.66
Exports of developed country group 31.81 13.75
Imports of developed country group 35.93 19.03
Exports of developing country group 26.50 16.05
Imports of developing country group 20.02 7.85
Removing tariffs by all regions
World trade 26.40 17.31
Exports of developed country group 31.28 20.79
Imports of developed country group 28.66 18.39
Exports of developing country group 18.93 11.97
Imports of developing country group 22.89 15.63
Removing domestic supports by developed regions
World trade 2.70 -0.71
Exports of developed country group 0.85 -3.42
Imports of developed country group 5.43 1.82
Exports of developing country group 5.54 3.44
Imports of developing country group -1.54 -4.70
Removing export subsidies by all regions
World trade -0.66 -1.76
Exports of developed country group -1.43 -3.04
Imports of developed country group -0.44 -1.25
Exports of developing country group 0.51 0.22
Imports of developing country group -1.01 -2.54
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.the developed country group than agricultural exports
and imports of the developing country group. The rela-
tively high protection rates in the developed country
group cause this disparity. Moreover, developed coun-
try group exports rise more than the increase in its
imports, both in value and volume, while the develop-
ing country group imports rise more than the increase
in its exports. This important result indicates that,
when only tariffs are removed, the terms of trade
improve in the developed country group relative to the
developing country group.
Removing export subsidies or domestic support alone
appears not to enhance world agricultural trade. When
only agricultural export subsidies worldwide are elimi-
nated, world agricultural trade falls 0.7 percent in
value and 1.8 percent in volume. If only domestic sup-
port in the developed countries is eliminated, world
agricultural trade rises 2.8 percent in value but falls
slightly (0.7 percent) in volume (table 1-3). These
results are consistent with the prediction of trade theo-
ry, that is, subsidies increase exports, albeit at the pos-
sible cost of reducing the exports of the nonsubsidized
commodities. Removing subsidies can decrease total
trade depending upon how consumers allocate the sav-
ings from taxes used to finance the subsidies and the
extent to which the other nonsubsidized sectors
respond to the slight increase in resources that are
released from the formerly subsidized sector.
Even though world trade does not change much when
export subsidies are removed worldwide, as the sub-
sidy policies are mainly applied by the developed
countries, the results suggest that exports from the
developing country group would rise, while exports of
the developed country group fall. If the export subsi-
dies were removed worldwide, the developing country
group exports would rise 0.5 percent in value and 0.2
percent in volume, while the developed country group
exports fall 1.4 percent in value and 3 percent in vol-
ume. When the domestic subsidies are eliminated in
the developed countries, the developing country group
exports rise 5.5 percent in value and 3.4 percent in vol-
ume, while the developed country group exports rise
0.9 percent in value and fall 3.4 percent in volume.
These results indicate that, by stimulating domestic
production and enhancing exports, the developed
countries’ export subsidy or domestic support policies
have lessened the market shares of some developing
countries that are net exporters of the agricultural com-
modities on which the developed countries have
applied supporting policies, but have benefited other
developing countries that are net importers of these
commodities. The net importers benefit because the
subsidy and support policies lower the prices these
countries would otherwise face if world markets were
undistorted. 
Grains, sugar, and livestock products 
trade more after liberalization
As grains, sugar, and livestock products have the high-
est import protection rates, it is not surprising that
world agricultural trade reform causes world trade in
grains, especially wheat and rice, sugar, and livestock
products, to increase more than other agricultural
products. Results suggest that trade liberalization
would increase the value of world rice (78 percent),
wheat (38 percent), sugar (44 percent), and livestock
product trade (61 percent). These sharp rises stand out
relative to the 14- to 24-percent rise for the other crop
and processed food trade (table 1-4).
Again, the increase in both developed and developing
regions’ grain, sugar, and livestock product exports is
mainly due to liberalization in the developed countries.
Eliminating agricultural support and trade protection
only in the developed countries increases world trade
of rice (70 percent), wheat (30 percent), sugar (35 per-
cent), and livestock products (50 percent). Conversely,
when the developed country group is unchanged, the
world trade in grains, other crops, and livestock prod-
ucts only rises 4 percent to 12 percent.
Production effects vary among the sectors
In contrast to the relatively large world trade effects of
agricultural reform, the model results suggest that
reform only slightly affects the level of world agricul-
tural production, at least in the aggregate. For com-
modities such as wheat, however, the effect is relative-
ly large. Moreover, the change in production does not
always point in the same direction as the changes in
trade. For example, the value of world rice trade
increases almost 80 percent when all the agricultural
support and trade protection are removed worldwide,
while the worldwide production of rice falls 1.7 per-
cent (table 1-5). In addition, rice production falls 8.4
percent in the developed country group, due to an
almost 20-percent decline in Japan and Korea, while
rice production rises 1 percent in the developing coun-
try group. Japan and Korea severely restrict rice
imports, and domestic rice in the two countries is three
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When the protection afforded rice producers is
removed worldwide, so that all farmers in different
countries face essentially the same world prices, the
uncompetitiveness of rice production in Japan and
Korea becomes obvious and production falls in those
two countries.
Besides rice, the production of sugar (including sugar
crops and raw sugar), other crops, livestock products
and processed food also falls slightly in the world after
reform, due to the decline in production in the devel-
oped country group (table 1-5). While production of
these commodities rises in the developing country
group, the effect is not sufficient to cover the fall in
production in the developed countries. For example,
sugar production falls 1 percent in the world and 10
percent in the developed country group when all agri-
cultural support and trade protection is removed world-
wide, while sugar production rises 3.2 percent in the
developing country group. Some developed countries,
such as Japan, the EU, and EFTA, protect their domes-
tic sugar sector through both high tariffs and export
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Table 1-5—Decomposition of agricultural production effects of global agricultural liberalization in the 
model—Percentage change in output of selected agricultural goods from the base year
EXP-1 EXP-2 EXP-3 EXP-4
World DCs LDCs World DCs LDCs World DCs LDCs World DCs LDCs
Wheat 2.12 1.23 2.70 1.20 5.02 -1.04 -0.04 -5.07 2.92 0.07 -1.03 0.71
Rice -1.65 -8.42 0.91 -1.18 -6.05 0.59 -0.21 -1.19 0.15 -0.03 -0.34 0.09
Other grains 1.83 1.07 2.48 2.19 4.71 -0.27 -0.49 -3.18 2.13 -0.11 -0.43 0.20
Vegetable and fruits 0.25 0.60 0.10 0.39 0.56 0.28 -0.10 0.04 -0.20 0.02 -0.03 0.06
Oil and oilseeds 0.70 -5.28 4.84 1.04 2.02 0.32 -0.49 -6.99 4.28 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
Sugar -1.01 -10.09 3.21 -0.26 -6.18 2.32 -0.64 -2.72 0.27 -0.16 -1.68 0.50
Other crops -0.28 -2.78 1.47 0.16 -1.37 1.22 -0.44 -1.44 0.27 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02
Livestock and products -1.04 -2.53 1.38 1.28 1.96 0.17 -1.90 -3.47 0.67 -0.24 -0.61 0.36
Processed food -0.09 -0.33 0.46 1.00 1.46 -0.02 -0.96 -1.51 0.26 -0.11 -0.23 0.16
Experiment-1: Removing all agricultural supports and protections, worldwide
Experiment-2: Removing tariffs, worldwide
Experiment-3: Removing domestic supports in the developed countries
Experiment-4: Removing export subsidies, worldwide
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.
Table 1-4—Decomposition of world agricultural trade effects of global agricultural liberalization—
Percentage change in world agricultural trade by sector from the base year
EXP-1 EXP-2 EXP-3 EXP-4
Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume
Wheat 37.64 13.41 17.71 12.62 7.40 -3.56 -0.69 -2.16
Rice 78.12 47.21 76.70 52.72 1.66 -0.69 -0.68 -2.02
Other grains 24.19 3.87 7.24 4.80 9.02 -3.02 0.17 -0.40
Vegetable and fruits 14.15 8.23 15.27 9.60 -0.62 -0.56 -0.37 -0.68
Oil and oilseeds 23.50 11.38 11.66 8.05 11.11 3.45 0.00 -0.05
Sugar 44.43 23.24 43.57 27.72 1.72 0.10 -1.50 -4.12
Other crops 14.08 7.59 13.26 8.25 0.87 0.29 -0.13 -0.20
Livestock and products 61.42 28.96 56.62 35.75 3.76 -1.45 -1.60 -4.35
Processed food 18.27 9.61 18.59 12.80 0.45 -1.25 -0.61 -1.55
Experiment-1: Removing all agricultural supports and protections, worldwide
Experiment-2: Removing only tariffs, worldwide
Experiment-3: Removing only domestic supports in the developed countries
Experiment-4: Removing only export subsidies, worldwide
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.subsidies. Eliminating agricultural protection world-
wide strongly suggests that some of these countries
have less of a comparative advantage in either growing
or processing, and, hence, sugar production falls in
these countries. For example, sugar production falls
more than 20 percent in Japan and Korea, more than
10 percent in the EU and EFTA, and almost 10 percent
in the United States.
Wheat production has the highest increase among agri-
cultural commodities when all agricultural support and
trade protection are removed worldwide. World wheat
production is likely to rise almost 2 percent, and more
than 1 percent in the developed country group, mainly
due to increased production in Australia and New
Zealand, Canada, and the United States. These coun-
tries appear to hold a strong comparative advantage in
wheat production. Wheat production falls considerably
in other developed countries, such as Japan plus Korea
(30 percent) and the EU (18 percent). Under the same
scenario, wheat production rises almost 3 percent in
the developing countries. 
Tariffs, export subsidies, and domestic support affect
production levels differently among countries.
Removing tariffs worldwide would stimulate produc-
tion in most agricultural sectors (except for rice and
sugar), though most sectors would experience only
small gains. Other grains, which is mostly corn, is an
exception, as production rises more than 2 percent in
this aggregate sector. Under this scenario, wheat and
corn and other grain production rises mainly in the
developed country group (5 percent), while production
falls slightly in the developing country group (1 per-
cent). Sugar and other crops’ production rises 2.3 and
1.2 percent, respectively, in the developing country
group and falls 6.2 and 1.4 percent, respectively, in the
developed country group. Under this scenario, produc-
tion of U.S. wheat and other grains (primarily corn)
both rise 5 percent, while U.S. livestock production
rises 7 percent.
In contrast to removing tariffs, removing export subsi-
dies worldwide or removing domestic support only in
the developed countries would have a negative, negli-
gible effect on most agricultural production, particular-
ly on the developed countries. Under the same sce-
nario, production rises in most sectors in the develop-
ing county group (table 1-5). For example, removing
domestic supports in the developed countries causes
production of oilseeds and vegetable oil to fall 0.5 per-
cent in the world, but almost 7 percent in the devel-
oped country group, and rise more than 4 percent in
the developing country group. The EU would experi-
ence the largest drop in oilseed and vegetable oil pro-
duction, 19 percent, due to that region’s high levels of
support. U.S. wheat production would fall 5 percent
and other grains production (primarily corn) would fall
1.2 percent.
Welfare Effects of Reforming Agricultural
Policies Are Mixed
From a world perspective, more efficient allocation of
resources yields higher global welfare. Typically, in a
country with a high degree of agricultural support and
trade protection, consumers pay relatively high prices
for food and other agricultural goods, and/or their dis-
posable income is taxed to cover the costs of agricul-
tural policies. Removing support or trade protection is
expected to benefit consumers; however, welfare
effects across countries vary, from the global perspec-
tive, and particularly when the world price is affected
by agricultural policies.
Consumers can be worse off if their country’s terms of
trade deteriorate following agricultural policy reform
(table 1-6). That is, if the prices of the goods they
export fall relative to the prices of goods they import,
consumers can be made worse off because their expen-
ditures on imported goods increase while their income
from exported goods falls. Moreover, consumers in a
country with a low tariff rate (e.g., Mexico) may not
benefit by liberalization in high-tariff countries (e.g.,
Japan), as trade diversion may result. In other words, a
country (i.e., Japan) may import more, following
reform, from those trade partners (i.e., the United
States) on whom, prior to reform, the country imposed
high tariff rates. Post-reform, the country (i.e., Japan)
may import less from trade partners (i.e., Mexico) on
which, prior to reform, it imposed low tariff rates. In
this case, consumers in countries like Mexico may
experience negative effects from worldwide trade
reform.
Small one-time welfare gains
This analysis uses the widely accepted equivalent vari-
ation (i.e., consumers’ willingness to pay) to measure
the social welfare gains or losses due to agricultural
policy reform. Measurements consider both one-time
welfare effects and welfare effects over time. The one-
time effect measurements use the status-quo (pre-
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What income would be equivalent to the change
brought about by agricultural policy liberalization
(Varian, 1984)? The welfare effects over time are mea-
sured by summing the discounted value of this mea-
sure over time.
The one-time effects of agricultural policy liberaliza-
tion on a nation’s social welfare appear relatively small
among all countries/regions. Relative to nonagricultur-
al sectors, agriculture accounts for a small share of
gross domestic product (GDP). Further, agricultural
goods in consumers’ consumption bundles in most
countries, and particularly so in the developed
economies of the EU, Canada, and the United States,
are relatively small in proportion to their total expendi-
tures. Agriculture (including processed food products)
accounts for less than 5 percent of the GDP of devel-
oped countries and 15 percent of the GDP of develop-
ing countries. Consumption expenditures on food
account for 5 percent of total expenditures for the
developed country group and 17 percent for the devel-
oping country group. Thus, at a national level, agricul-
tural policy reform alone is unlikely to have a large,
one-time welfare effect on the aggregate economy in
the short- to medium-term. 
Nevertheless, these relatively small aggregate welfare
effects for the case of developing countries can be mis-
leading for two reasons. First, a majority of the poor in
low-income countries reside in rural areas where pri-
mary agriculture is a major source of income, either
directly or indirectly through rural labor markets and
in value-added activities related to primary agriculture.
Second, monetary returns to the market surplus from
primary agriculture (i.e., farm production minus own
consumption) are closely linked to foreign markets.
Thus, the national-level effects of reform are likely to
be small in proportion to the benefits received by rural
households and, in particular, rural households whose
disposable income ranks in the bottom quantile of a
country’s distribution of income. 
Thus, the welfare effects are positive for the world
aggregate. The sum of countries’ equivalent variation
due to worldwide agricultural policy reform is about
$31 billion. This is equivalent to 0.1 percent of world
aggregate GDP, and 1 percent of consumer expendi-
tures on agricultural and agriculture-related goods.
Such welfare gains, however, are not equally distrib-
uted among countries and regions in the world, and
some countries even experience negative welfare
effects. Developed countries experience a $28 billion
welfare gain, which is equivalent to 0.16 percent of
their GDP and 2 percent of consumer expenditures on
agricultural goods. Moreover, all developed countries
in the model gain, with the largest gains shown by the
EU ($9.3 billion), Japan plus Korea ($8.6 billion), and
the United States ($6.6 billion).
The welfare gain for the developing country group is
much smaller, at $2.6 billion. This is equivalent to 0.05
percent of GDP and 0.2 percent of consumer expendi-
tures on agricultural goods. Furthermore, some coun-
tries/regions experience negative welfare effects.
Mexico would experience a $160 million welfare loss,
which is equivalent to less than a 0.06 percent reduc-
tion of its GDP.
Most developing countries experience smaller total
welfare gains than developed countries because agricul-
tural production in developing countries is distorted by
more than just agricultural policies. While the level of
domestic support and trade protection in nonagricultur-
al sectors is quite low among most developed countries,
many developing countries still highly protect their
import-competing manufacturing and service sectors.
This protection tends to implicitly tax agricultural pro-
ducers. In extreme cases, removing agricultural protec-
tion in such countries (such as Morocco) can actually
lower social welfare because the implicit tax imposed
on agriculture by policies in other sectors actually
increases when protection is taken from agriculture.
Thus, in these countries, agriculture is not only distort-
ed by the agricultural protection policies in high-
income countries, but also by domestic manufacturing
policies and distortions in service sector markets. 
The negative effect of world agricultural policy reform
on some other countries is mainly caused by a post-
reform deterioration in their terms of trade (table 1-6).
For example, Mexico depends on the U.S. economy
for most of its agricultural imports and exports, while
the United States is more dependent on Japan, Korea,
and the EU as export markets. Japan, Korea, and the
EU have high levels of agricultural support relative to
other countries. When world agriculture and agricul-
tural trade are fully liberalized, increased import
demand from Japan, Korea, and the EU on U.S. agri-
cultural goods causes U.S. export prices to rise, in turn
causing Mexico to pay higher prices for post-reform
U.S. imports. On the other hand, the North American
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between the United States and Mexico. When world
trade is fully liberalized, the level of U.S. imports from
Mexico may not rise to the level of imports from non-
NAFTA countries because prior to reform, the United
States imposed relatively high barriers on goods
imported from non-NAFTA countries. Mexico, howev-
er, depends on U.S. imports, as trade with the United
States accounts for more than 70 percent of Mexico’s
exports. This implies that the price Mexico receives for
its exports cannot rise to the same degree as the rise in
price it must pay for imports, which results in a deteri-
oration in Mexico’s terms of trade. Thus, some mem-
ber countries of a trade bloc may experience a welfare
loss because of post-reform declines in demand for
goods they export to former member countries and
rises in world demand for the goods they import. 
These results also attest to the fact that policies that
distort agriculture in developed countries increase
world supplies of these goods and thus indirectly sub-
sidize consumers in countries that are net agricultural
importers. Agricultural policy reform increases the
world prices of most agricultural goods — some more
than others. Nevertheless, even in those low-income
and net agricultural importing countries that experi-
ence a decline in their terms of trade, returns to their
agricultural resources (land, labor, farm machinery,
and buildings) are biased downward from what would
otherwise prevail in a distortion-free economy.
Consequently, their agricultural households, defined as
those rural households that are net suppliers of agricul-
tural goods, are likely to be made better off as the
result of trade reform.
Removal of tariffs leads to global welfare gains,
while lowering domestic support and export subsi-
dies leads to welfare losses
Among the three policy categories, removing tariffs
generates positive welfare gains at the world level of
aggregation and for most countries and regions, while
removing domestic support and export subsidies has
negative effects for most developing countries (table 1-
7). Holding other policy variables constant, removing
tariffs results in a $25 billion welfare gain worldwide,
$19.6 billion of which accrues to the developed coun-
tries and $5.7 billion to the developing countries.
Removing domestic support or export subsidies results
in a much smaller welfare gain worldwide, as export
subsidy rates are much lower than the tariff rates in all
countries/regions and the domestic support policies are
mainly employed by the developed countries. The
world aggregate welfare gain is $2.8 billion from the
removal of domestic support and $250 million from
the removal of export subsidies. Developed countries
gain $4.7 billion from domestic support removal and
$2.5 billion from export subsidy removal. Developing
countries, however, experience welfare loss of $1.9 bil-
lion and $2.3 billion in the two scenarios, respectively. 
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Table 1-6—Decomposition of terms of trade effects of global agricultural liberalization in the model—
Percentage change in terms of trade from the base year
EXP-1 EXP-2 EXP-3 EXP-4
Developed country group 0.08 -0.02 0.03 0.06
Australia and New Zealand 1.82 1.40 0.37 0.03
Canada 0.35 0.16 0.22 -0.02
EFTA 0.12 -0.27 -0.21 0.56
European Union 0.24 0.02 0.01 0.16
Japan and Korea -1.36 -0.84 -0.32 -0.14
United States 0.86 0.54 0.29 0.00
Developing country group -0.15 0.03 -0.07 -0.11
China 0.26 0.36 -0.04 -0.06
Latin American countries 1.41 1.10 0.32 -0.03
Mexico -0.43 -0.20 -0.15 -0.07
Other Asian countries 0.00 -0.02 0.05 -0.04
Southern African countries -0.35 0.13 -0.20 -0.22
Rest of the world -0.98 -0.43 -0.28 -0.23
Experiment 1: Removing all agricultural supports and protections, worldwide
Experiment-2: Removing tariffs, worldwide
Experiment-3: Removing domestic supports in the developed countries
Experiment-4: Removing export subsidies, worldwide
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.Most developing countries/regions in the model
(except for the Latin American countries) experience a
welfare loss when domestic subsidies are removed in
the developed countries or export subsidies are
removed in the world. This outcome is due to the
resulting rise in the world prices for grain and live-
stock products of which most developing countries are
net importers (except for the region of Latin American
countries which is a net exporter for the livestock
products as well as for the aggregation of the primary
agricultural products). Thus, for most developing
countries/ regions, welfare measures tend to deteriorate
due to the hike in world agricultural prices. 
The region of Japan plus Korea experiences the largest
welfare decline ($3.7 billion) in the world when the
developed countries remove their domestic support,
even though the domestic support rate in Japan and
Korea on average is much lower than that in Canada,
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Table 1-7—Decomposition of static welfare effects of global agricultural liberalization in the model
EXP-1 EXP-2
US$ billion % in total % of agr. US$ billion % in total % of agr.
expenditure consumption expenditure consumption
World 31.06 0.13 1.21 25.22 0.11 0.98
Developed country group 28.48 0.16 2.04 19.56 0.11 1.40
Australia and New Zealand 1.57 0.44 4.46 1.17 0.33 3.33
Canada 0.75 0.15 2.01 0.40 0.08 1.07
EFTA 1.73 0.58 7.34 0.20 0.07 0.87
European Union 9.28 0.14 1.81 0.14 0.00 0.03
Japan and Korea  8.59 0.27 2.41 13.81 0.43 3.87
United States 6.57 0.10 1.51 3.83 0.06 0.88
Developing country group 2.60 0.05 0.22 5.66 0.11 0.48
China 0.42 0.07 0.20 0.85 0.13 0.42
Latin American countries 3.65 0.28 1.64 2.71 0.21 1.22
Mexico -0.16 -0.06 -0.24 0.19 0.06 0.27
Other Asian countries 1.52 0.14 0.53 1.71 0.16 0.60
Southern African countries 0.25 0.09 0.30 0.60 0.21 0.72
Rest of the world -3.07 -0.18 -0.97 -0.39 -0.02 -0.12
EXP-3 EXP-4
US$ billion % in total % of agr. US$ billion % in total % of agr.
expenditure consumption expenditure consumption
World 2.80 0.01 0.11 0.25 0.00 0.01
Developed country group 4.74 0.03 0.34 2.53 0.01 0.18
Australia and New Zealand 0.24 0.07 0.69 0.01 0.00 0.03
Canada 0.28 0.06 0.76 -0.09 -0.02 -0.25
EFTA 0.83 0.28 3.54 0.32 0.11 1.37
European Union 6.06 0.09 1.18 3.72 0.06 0.73
Japan and Korea -3.66 -0.11 -1.02 -1.34 -0.04 -0.38
United States 0.97 0.01 0.22 -0.09 0.00 -0.02
Developing country group -1.94 -0.04 -0.16 -2.28 -0.04 -0.19
China -0.28 -0.04 -0.14 -0.21 -0.03 -0.10
Latin American countries 0.68 0.05 0.31 -0.05 0.00 -0.03
Mexico -0.27 -0.09 -0.41 -0.11 -0.04 -0.17
Other Asian countries -0.09 -0.01 -0.03 -0.25 -0.02 -0.09
Southern African countries -0.22 -0.07 -0.26 -0.22 -0.08 -0.26
Rest of the world -1.76 -0.10 -0.56 -1.43 -0.08 -0.45
Experiment-1: Removing all agricultural supports and protections, worldwide
Experiment-2: Removing tariffs, worldwide
Experiment-3: Removing domestic supports in the developed countries
Experiment-4: Removing export subsidies, worldwide
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.the United States, and the EU.5 This result occurs
because Japan and Korea are net agricultural
importers, and agricultural prices rise in the world
because agricultural supply declines in the United
States and the EU due to the removal of domestic sup-
port. If only the United States or the EU eliminates its
domestic support to agriculture, the social welfare falls
$2.1 billion in Japan and $0.55 billion in Korea, while
if Japan plus Korea eliminate their domestic support
only, their welfare falls by $0.66 billion. 
Relatively large dynamic welfare gains — Brief
overview of method and assumptions
The earlier analysis ignored the effect of reform on
savings, investment, and the pattern of growth in a
country’s capital stock. To analyze these effects
requires assumptions regarding households’ willing-
ness to forgo consumption and invest, the functioning
of capital markets and international capital flows, as
well as the technological spillovers that seem to
accompany growth in countries’ trade. These assump-
tions may be closely approximated for developed
countries, and only poorly approximated for many
developing countries. Nevertheless, for the most part,
the analysis suggests a direction of change in the long
run that seems well within the realm of reason.
Numerous studies find empirically strong and positive
linkages between growth and a country’s total factor
productivity (TFP) and the share of its economy
involved in trade with more advanced nations (e.g.,
Coe and Helpman, 1995; Wang and Xu, 1997; and Coe
et al., 1997). Thus, a dynamic model is used to capture
not only consumer saving and producer investment
decisions but also the effects of trade liberalization on
a country’s growth in factor productivity. Such effects
are modeled by increases in technological spillovers
embodied in the trade between developing and devel-
oped countries. Specifically, if a developing country
eliminates trade protection, it then tends to increase its
rate of learning new skills, organizational methods,
and the more advanced product and process technolo-
gies embodied in its imports of investment goods from
developed countries. This process helps to increase
labor productivity and returns to land and social capi-
tal (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Romer, 1994). The
spillovers of the advanced technology embodied in
trade can also result from developed countries’ reduc-
tion of agricultural protection. As developed countries
increase imports of agricultural goods, their exports of
capital goods may be enhanced. Thus, this longer-run
type of analysis allows for agricultural trade reform to
yield broader economywide benefits, which, as shown
next, is found to be higher for developing countries.
This study calculates the change in the regional equiv-
alent variation for three different years as well as the
intertemporal welfare index that measures the welfare
gains in this dynamic setting. Changes in equivalent
variation for the three different years are compared
with the base year, while the intertemporal welfare
index is the sum of the welfare change over time
where future gains and losses are discounted relative to
current gains and losses. The over-time welfare effects
of the liberalization vary, depending on whether tech-
nological spillover-growth considerations are included
in the analysis. Thus, welfare changes are specified
under the different assumptions and, hence, the tech-
nological spillovers and growth effect of the policy
reform on welfare can be told from the differences in
the two groups of results. 
Relatively large dynamic welfare gains — Results
Without taking into account the technological
spillover-growth effects of liberalization, (that is, by
considering only the investment incentives created by
reform) the over-time welfare effect is still modest,
especially in the short run, for instance, in the first 5
years (table 1-8). As production and investment adjust-
ments take time, the welfare effect in a longer time
period, for example, in the 15th year or after, is rela-
tively large. The world welfare gain in year 10 doubles
the gain accrued in year 5. More simply stated, this
result suggests that the payoff to agricultural trade pol-
icy reform takes time.
If the technological spillover-growth effect of policy
reform is taken into account for developing countries,
the over-time welfare gains increase significantly,
especially in developing countries. The developing
countries are beneficiaries of the technological
spillovers embodied in trade with developed countries.
Such benefits are assumed to generate an additional
annual growth rate of 0.02 percent in the developing
countries. This annual growth rate further increases
welfare gains among the developing countries.
Moreover, all the developing countries/regions in the
model are better off after agricultural support and trade 
38 ❖ Agricultural Policy Reform—The Road Ahead/AER 802 Economic Research Service/USDA
5 However, market barriers are very high (Japan and Korea).protection are totally removed worldwide, and the
greater the volume of trade between developed and
developing countries, the larger the welfare gain. 
The developed countries benefit indirectly from the
growth in productivity in the developing countries,
even though the developed countries are presumed not
to experience technological spillovers from an increase
in trade and, hence, experience no additional produc-
tivity growth generated from trade liberalization. This
benefit results from the growth in the returns to
increased capital flows from developed to developing
countries, induced by the increased investment demand
of the developing countries, as most of the developing
countries do not have sufficient domestic savings to
fully finance their growth in investment demand. This
growth in investment demand creates opportunities for
the developed countries to invest abroad, either
through international lending activities or foreign
direct investment in the developing countries. These
indirect effects generated from the growing demand
for foreign capital inflows to the developing countries
tend to be stronger if the economic adjustments in the
developing countries due to agricultural trade policy
reform in the world are expected to be larger. 
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Table 1-8—Dynamic welfare effects of global agricultural liberalization in the model
Without TFP growth
Intertemporal
Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 effect
$ billion % $ billion % $ billion % %
World 15.94 0.07 30.19 0.13 36.26 0.16
Developed country group 14.69 0.08 25.66 0.14 29.74 0.17
Australia and New Zealand 3.26 0.91 3.34 0.93 3.40 0.94 0.45
Canada 1.05 0.21 1.17 0.24 1.24 0.25 0.07
EFTA -0.27 -0.09 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.03 -0.03
European Union 3.35 0.05 6.68 0.10 8.15 0.12 0.03
Japan and Korea -1.40 -0.04 3.86 0.12 5.10 0.16 0.00
United States 8.72 0.13 10.60 0.16 11.76 0.18 0.11
Developing country group 1.25 0.02 4.52 0.09 6.52 0.12
China 1.24 0.20 1.68 0.26 1.83 0.29 0.11
Latin America 3.94 0.30 4.27 0.33 4.66 0.36 0.16
Mexico -0.40 -0.14 -0.22 -0.07 0.09 0.03 -0.04
Other Asian countries -0.70 -0.06 0.54 0.05 0.93 0.09 -0.02
Southern African countries 0.16 0.06 0.33 0.11 0.50 0.17 0.05
Rest of the world -3.00 -0.17 -2.07 -0.12 -1.49 -0.08 -0.18
With TFP growth
Intertemporal
Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 effect
$ billion % $ billion % $ billion % %
World 27.17 0.12 46.98 0.20 56.39 0.24
Developed country group 17.00 0.10 29.59 0.17 35.14 0.20
Australia and New Zealand 3.32 0.92 3.43 0.95 3.52 0.98 0.46
Canada 1.13 0.23 1.27 0.26 1.37 0.28 0.07
EFTA -0.18 -0.06 0.12 0.04 0.21 0.07 0.00
European Union 4.41 0.07 8.48 0.13 10.58 0.16 0.04
Japan and Korea -0.85 -0.03 4.70 0.15 6.17 0.19 0.00
United States 9.18 0.14 11.59 0.17 13.30 0.20 0.12
Developing country group 10.16 0.19 17.39 0.33 21.25 0.40
China 1.48 0.23 2.02 0.32 2.23 0.35 0.14
Latin America 4.62 0.35 5.36 0.41 6.11 0.47 0.19
Mexico 0.53 0.18 0.99 0.33 1.60 0.54 0.14
Other Asian countries 2.10 0.19 4.47 0.41 5.11 0.47 0.13
Southern African countries 0.35 0.12 0.59 0.20 0.81 0.28 0.08
Rest of the world 1.07 0.06 3.97 0.26 5.39 0.32 0.00
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.Conclusions
This study focuses on the global perspectives of total
reform in protection and subsidies, a process began by
the URAA Final Act (1994), and analyzes the case of
total reform of three disciplines: tariffs, domestic sup-
port, and export subsidies. The study finds that freer
trade results in more trade (i.e., eliminating most agri-
cultural support and trade protection increases world
agricultural trade substantially). World agricultural
production, however, increases only marginally, while
the developed countries, as a group, experience the
largest decrease in production. As agricultural support
and protection rates are higher in most developed
countries than in the developing countries, and as the
developed countries are major players in world agri-
cultural trade, developed countries appear to benefit
more from agricultural trade policy reform than devel-
oping countries. 
Nevertheless, worldwide agricultural liberalization
would cause world prices to rise almost 12 percent. Of
the three categories — tariffs, domestic support, and
export subsidies—the results suggest that tariffs are the
major cause of distortions in world agricultural prices.
The elimination, worldwide, of import tariffs would
cause world agricultural prices to rise about 6 percent.
Within the developed country group, the major con-
tributors to distorted world agricultural prices are the
EU, the United States, and Japan plus Korea.
Consequently, these countries experience the largest
social payoff from reform relative to the rest of the
world, especially compared to the developing coun-
tries. As the protection levels and trade patterns vary
among countries, some developing countries experi-
ence larger increases in the prices for imported goods
than the increases in the prices for their exports. Such
negative terms of trade effect may cause these devel-
oping countries to experience welfare losses.
Furthermore, some member countries of a trade bloc
may experience a welfare loss because they may suffer
a post-reform decline in demand for the goods they
export to former member countries, while world
demand for the goods they import rises.
The study also finds that the payoff to reform takes
time. Over time, worldwide agricultural liberalization
generates larger gains than the short-time gains for
most countries. For example, the discounted present
value of world welfare gains in year 10 doubles the
gain accrued in year 5. Moreover, if the technological
spillover-growth effect of reform is taken into account,
the welfare gains increase significantly for all coun-
tries in the world. While the developing countries are
beneficiaries of the technological spillover embodied
in trade with the developed countries, the results sug-
gest that developed countries benefit indirectly from
the growth in productivity in the developing countries.
This benefit results from the growth in the returns to
increased capital flows from developed to developing
countries, induced by the increased investment demand
of the developing countries.
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As trade and investment become increasingly globalized,
conflicts between trade matters and environmental con-
cerns gain in prominence. Economic efficiency occurs
when trade distortions are eliminated and externalities are
internalized. Multilateral trade negotiations seek to reduce
trade distortions that may hinder economically efficient
levels of production and consumption in world markets,
and thus stimulate economic growth. Environmental poli-
cies attempt to internalize externalities and protect envi-
ronmental goods and services (e.g., clean air, wetland
water quality functions) for which there may not be readi-
ly observable market values. WTO trade rules may
infringe on environmental policies, and likewise environ-
mental policies may conflict with WTO trade rules. For
example, the United States imposed a ban on imports of
shrimp caught without turtle exclusion devices. Because
some countries were given technical assistance and longer
transition periods to alter their production technology than
other countries, the WTO dispute settlement panel found
this environmental regulation violated the United States’
WTO obligations. The inherent tension between trade and
environmental objectives raises two related issues: (1) to
what extent does trade liberalization help or harm the
environment, and (2) if harm results, what can be done to
allow domestic environmental laws to satisfy national
preferences for environmental protection without violating
the country’s WTO obligations?
The environmental effects of trade are commonly grouped
into three categories — a “scale effect,” a “technique
effect,” and a “composition effect.” Greater economic
growth, stimulated by greater trade, has the potential to
harm the environment through a greater scale of resource
use (Beghin and Potier, 1997). In other words, increased
output may generate additional pollution and accelerate
natural resource depletion. On the other hand, trade liber-
alization also has the potential to improve environmental
outcomes through a technique effect (i.e., how goods are
produced). For example, foreign direct investment may
facilitate the diffusion of green technologies when
advanced production techniques are transferred to LDCs.
Similarly, trade liberalization may impact the environment
through a composition effect (i.e., what goods are pro-
duced) (Farrentino and Linkins, 1999). For example,
phasing out tariffs on textiles under the Multi-Fibre
Agreement, as is scheduled under the Uruguay Round,
may induce LDCs to shift production from heavy indus-
tries to less pollution-intensive textiles. This end result
would tend to lower emissions in LDCs but the scale
effect may more than offset these gains for five pollutants
studied (Cole, Rayner, and Bates, 1998). For any given
sector or pollutant, however, a priori, the net environmen-
tal impact of these short-run effects is ambiguous. 
In the long run, the effect of economic growth on the
environment, trade induced or not, follows a predictable
pattern. The environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) reflects
the hypothesis that as incomes rise from an initially low
level, polluting emissions are likely to increase, but even-
tually, as incomes continue to rise, polluting emissions
tend to decrease. In other words, the scale or negative
composition and technique effects may dominate until
incomes rise to the point where an increased demand for
environmental amenities causes the positive technique and
composition effects to dominate. Strengthened regulations
and/or enforcement usually accomplish this change.
Though the exact shape of the EKC varies by pollutant,
most pollutants’ mean air and water concentrations begin
to decline before per capita incomes reach $8,000
(approximately that of South Korea) (Grossman and
Krueger, 1995). Other studies, however, show quite a
range of turning points, again varying by pollutant (e.g.,
Nordstrom and Vaughan, 1999). Per capita income clearly
affects a nation’s preferences for environmental regula-
tions and these differences create the potential for conflict
as countries strive to achieve divergent environmental
goals while meeting their WTO obligations. 
Voicing concerns over the effects of trade liberalization on
the environment, 14 U.S. environmental organizations,
including the Sierra Club, the World Wildlife Fund, and
Greenpeace USA, presented the U.S. Trade
Representative’s Office with suggestions for the U.S.
position in future WTO negotiations (Downs, 1999). In
general, the groups’ proposal opposes further trade liberal-
ization, especially in sensitive sectors such as forest and
fish products. Also, the organizations insist that environ-
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mental impacts of proposed trade liberalization should be
assessed on a global basis, and if environmentally and
socially beneficial outcomes are not anticipated, then the
assessment must propose institutional, legal, and policy
changes before trade negotiations may proceed. These
environmental organizations call for reform of WTO rules
and procedures, specifically for increased public input
into more transparent decision-making processes.
The Declaration of Principles on Trade and Environment
issued by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
encapsulated the U.S. position. To promote sustainable
development the United States will pursue trade negotia-
tions through the following actions:
• Taking fully into account environmental implications
throughout the course of the negotiations, including by
performing a written environmental review.
• Promoting institutional reforms to ensure that the WTO
and its processes, notably dispute settlement, are trans-
parent and that the public may contribute to its work.
• Strengthening cooperation between the WTO and inter-
national organizations with respect to environmental
matters.
• Identifying and pursuing “win-win” opportunities
where opening markets and reducing or eliminating
subsidies hold promise for yielding direct environmen-
tal benefits.
• Complementing U.S. trade policies with policies that
provide for high levels of environmental protection and
effective enforcement of U.S. laws.
• Ensuring that trade rules are supportive of and do not
undermine the Nation’s ability to maintain and enforce
fully its environmental laws.
• Ensuring the appropriate inclusion on U.S. trade nego-
tiation teams of environmental, health and safety offi-
cials, and encouraging U.S. trading partners to do like-
wise (USTR).
Coordination between trade and environmental strategies
offers policymakers a means to garner the economic effi-
ciency gains of trade liberalization while minimizing envi-
ronmental degradation. A study of Mexican agriculture
(Beghin, Roland-Holst, and van der Mensbrugghe, 1997)
shows that trade liberalization alone may increase emis-
sions of some pollutants but that if combined with domes-
tic effluent taxes, these increases are greatly mitigated.
Indeed, with this coordinated approach, a “win-win”
result emerges in many sectors as pollution decreases
while GDP increases from improved allocative efficiency.
This coordination between trade and environmental poli-
cies “recognizes the fact that most environmental prob-
lems originate in production and consumption, but rarely
in trade per se” (Beghin and Potier, 1997). Nonetheless,
since trade may exacerbate domestic environmental exter-
nalities, anticipating those sources of environmental stress
in order to internalize them with domestic policy instru-
ments maximizes the net welfare gains from trade liberal-
ization. The optimal policy instruments and stringency of
environmental regulations, however, should be expected to
vary across countries with different per capita incomes
and initial environmental conditions. Reconciling WTO
obligations with divergent national preferences for envi-
ronmental protection poses substantial challenges for
future trade negotiations.
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During the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the negotiating parties
agreed to convert their agricultural nontariff barriers
(NTB) to bound tariffs,1 a process known as tariffica-
tion. The conversion of NTBs (which include embar-
goes, import quotas, and discretionary import licens-
ing) to bound tariffs was a key achievement of the
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA).
Since tariffs are more predictable and transparent in
their application and do not establish maximum ceil-
ings on imports, they are less trade-distorting than
NTBs. 
Developed countries agreed to reduce all agricultural
tariffs, including those resulting from tariffication,
from their base-period rates2 by a total of 36 percent,
on a simple-average basis, with a minimum cut of 15
percent for each tariff. The cuts were to take place in
equal installments over 6 years, beginning with the
first cut in 1995.3 Countries were also to provide a
minimum level of import opportunities for products
previously protected by NTBs. This was accomplished
by creating tariff-rate quotas (TRQ), which impose a
relatively low in-quota tariff on imports up to a mini-
mum access level, with imports above that level sub-
ject to a higher, over-quota tariff. 
As a result of tariffication, tariffs and TRQs are now
the main trade policy instruments used by governments
to protect their domestic agricultural producers from
foreign competition. But while the URAA began the
process of liberalizing agricultural trade by reducing
tariffs, protection for agricultural commodities contin-
ues to stand out as a major distorting feature of inter-
national trade. For manufactured goods, the industrial
countries’ import-weighted average tariff has been
reduced from about 40 percent to under 4 percent
since 1949 (Laird). For agricultural goods, in contrast,
the simple average for industrial countries’ post-
Uruguay Round bound tariffs is estimated in this study
to be 45 percent.4 Clearly, substantial room exists for
liberalizing agricultural tariffs, which are a highly visi-
ble and easily negotiable target for reductions (com-
pared with NTBs) because of their generally transpar-
ent and quantifiable nature. 
Among the main items in the next round of trade nego-
tiations will be the manner and extent to which agri-
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Chapter 2
Options for Reducing Agricultural Tariffs
John Wainio, Paul Gibson, and Daniel Whitley
If past trade rounds are any indication, a topic of considerable debate during the next negotiations will be determin-
ing the nature of tariff cuts to be implemented. In initial negotiating proposals submitted to the WTO, countries have
demonstrated a desire to reduce both the level and disparity of agricultural tariffs, as well as to confront the issue of
tariff escalation. This study indicates that alternative tariff-cutting formulas address these objectives with varying
results, depending on the initial height and distribution of a country’s tariff schedule. Ranking formulas based on
their ability to produce desired objectives can be difficult, since it depends on the criteria used to evaluate the out-
comes. The conclusions reached here point to the need for negotiators to have detailed information on the tariffs their
exports face in major markets, the post-liberalization tariff profiles they seek, and how close alternative formulas
come to producing desired results. 
1 Tariffs are considered legally "bound" within GATT/WTO
when a country agrees not to raise them above a certain level, sub-
ject to a penalty.
2 For tariffs that were already bound, the base was the current
bound rate; for existing but unbound tariffs, the base was the 1986
tariff rate; and for duties that resulted from tariffication of NTBs,
the base was the level of protection provided by NTBs during the
1986-88 period.
3 Developing countries agreed to reduce their previously bound
tariffs by 24 percent (with a 10 percent minimum cut) in equal
installments over 10 years. For previously unbound tariffs only a
ceiling binding was required, recognizing that the binding of these
tariffs against increase was a concession equivalent to reducing
them. Least developed countries were subject to tariffication and
binding, but exempt from all reduction commitments.
4 Using a slightly different methodology, Gibson et al. estimate
the simple global average of post-Uruguay Round agricultural tar-
iffs at 62 percent.cultural tariffs will be reduced. Many have suggested
that to achieve cuts in agricultural tariffs large enough
to have significant trade liberalizing effects, countries
should consider reducing tariffs on a formula basis
(Josling, Tangermann, Anderson, et al.). In particular,
there has been a considerable interest expressed in the
Swiss formula, which was adopted during the Tokyo
Round of trade negotiations to reduce tariffs on manu-
factured items. The objective here is threefold:
• to review some features of the main tariff-cutting
formulas proposed in past rounds and summarize
the key issues to consider when evaluating alterna-
tive formulas;
• to describe the tariff structures existing in the indus-
trial countries, now that the Uruguay Round imple-
mentation period for these countries has drawn to a
close and the last of the tariff cuts have been phased
in;
• to apply standard examples of formulas to the post-
Uruguay Round bound agricultural tariffs of indus-
trial countries and illustrate how the formulas might
alter the structure of tariff schedules. 
Tariff-Cutting Formulas 
Prior to the Kennedy Round (1963-67), tariff negotia-
tions consisted of countries drawing up request-and-
offer lists containing the tariffs they proposed that
other countries reduce and/or bind as well as the con-
cessions they were willing to make in exchange.
Negotiations proceeded on a country-by-country and
item-by-item basis, focusing on those items where one
country was the principal import supplier of the other. 
During the Kennedy Round, negotiators took a radical-
ly different approach by adopting a simple yet power-
ful formula to cut industrial tariffs across the board by
50 percent. One argument for a linear cut was that if
all countries cut all tariffs by a fixed percent, then each
would give and receive the same concession on total
exports and imports, thus ensuring reciprocity in nego-
tiations.5
During the Tokyo Round (1973-79), the United States
proposed that tariffs be cut across the board by 60 per-
cent. The European Economic Community (EEC),
which had a fairly uniform set of moderate tariff rates
across all industrial products, contended that a linear
cut would not yield the reciprocity that all participants
sought. Restating an argument it had made during the
Kennedy Round, the EEC maintained that it would
benefit less from equal, across-the-board tariff cuts
than would countries with a high degree of dispersion
in their tariff schedules (i.e., moderate tariff averages
that were not uniform but that instead combined pri-
marily low tariffs with occasional very high rates, or
tariff peaks). The EEC argued that moderate rates, if
reduced by 60 percent, would lose much of their pro-
tective effect, while high, prohibitive tariffs could
remain very protective, leading to little or no trade lib-
eralization for items subject to high rates. The EEC
proposed to cut high tariffs proportionately more than
low tariffs in order to reduce tariff disparity within
countries’ tariff schedules, contending that the greater
the dispersion, the higher the level of economic and
trade distortion.6
Two other principal participants in the negotiations,
Japan and Canada, also proposed tariff-cutting formu-
las, and considerable time was spent debating the
choice of formula. In the end, negotiators agreed to a
comprehensive “harmonization” formula proposed by
Switzerland, designed to result in a fairly deep overall
reduction in tariffs while cutting high rates proportion-
ately more than low ones. 
The formulas analyzed here are extensions and combi-
nations of the various approaches discussed during the
Tokyo Round for cutting tariffs on manufactured
goods. These formulas are intended to span the various
classes of tariff-cutting formulas, which can be catego-
rized as (1) strictly linear cuts; (2) harmonization for-
mulas designed to cut high tariffs proportionately more
than low tariffs; (3) formulas which combine linear
cuts and some sort of harmonization element; (4) for-
mulas with special treatment of tariffs below or above
a certain level; and (5) “sectoral” formulas which place
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5 While the preamble to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade calls on members to enter into “reciprocal and mutually
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of
tariffs,” nowhere in the Agreement is there a definition of recipro-
cal or reciprocity. A number of studies cited here tie reciprocity to
the pervasive belief that every dollar increase in imports should be
balanced with a dollar increase in exports. Reducing one’s trade
barriers has traditionally been considered a concession that has to
be compensated by equivalent concessions from other countries, a
tenet that continues to influence today’s negotiations.
6 While a uniform tariff schedule is generally considered less
distorting than one with high dispersion, the level of distortion
caused by tariffs also depends on items such as relative size of
import demand elasticities across commodities and the presence of
economies of scale and imperfect competition. For a discussion on
how factors such as these can impact the argument for uniform tar-
iffs, see Panagariya and Rodrik.a ceiling on tariffs based on a measure such as the
global minimum or global mean for the product(s) in
question.7 The formulas used here have been modified
to reflect that agricultural tariffs today are much higher
than industrial tariffs were at the time of the Tokyo
Round.8
Table 2-1 contains the four tariff-cutting formulas eval-
uated in this study. Formulas 1 and 2 are a variant of a
harmonization formula, in that the depth of cut for the
highest tariffs is generally larger than for smaller tar-
iffs, with some exceptions. Formulas 3 and 4 are strict-
ly harmonization formulas with the depth of cut being
always larger the higher the initial tariff. All of the for-
mulas incorporate a tariff ceiling to which all higher
tariffs would have to be reduced, although the height of
the ceiling differs by formula.9 Thus each formula is
designed to eliminate the megatariffs (tariffs over 100
percent) frequently found in each country’s schedule.
Formula 1 is comprised of a linear component and
special treatment for low and high duties. It eliminates
all tariffs less than or equal to 5 percent, a concept
adapted from one of the formulas submitted by Canada
during the Tokyo Round, designed to eliminate low
rates, sometimes referred to as “nuisance” tariffs
(Laird and Yeats). It cuts all tariffs greater than 5 but
less than or equal to 100 percent by half, replicating
the 50-percent linear cut of the Kennedy Round.
Finally, all tariffs over 100 percent are collapsed to 50
percent, thus incorporating a harmonization element in
the formula.
Formula 2 combines a linear cut with a harmonization
term, which reduces tariffs above 5 percent by a slight-
ly deeper 60 percent compared with formula 1, but
then adds a flat rate of 3 percent to the resulting calcu-
lation. For tariffs less than or equal to 5 percent, there
is no cut; otherwise the 3-percent addition would result
in a tariff above the initial rate. This tariff-cutting for-
mula is similar to one proposed by Japan during the
Tokyo Round. Japan believed that initial tariffs under 5
percent were already at satisfactorily low levels, so
needed no further reduction. The effect of this formula
was to cut low tariffs by small amounts, while subject-
ing high tariffs to essentially a linear cut of close to 60
percent. At an initial tariff of 105 percent, the calcula-
tion yields a new tariff of 45 percent, which is equal to
the estimated mean of post-Uruguay Round agricultur-
al tariffs for industrial countries. The Japanese formula
is revised to include a ceiling of 45 percent for all tar-
iffs initially above 105 percent. Thus, the ceiling in
formula 2 is 5 percentage points lower than in formula
1, and assures that no new tariffs will exceed the sim-
ple agricultural tariff mean for industrial countries
existing today.
Formula 3 is the compromise Swiss formula, which
automatically includes a tariff ceiling equal to the
parameter (a). An agreement to use this formula would
also require negotiators to agree on the size of (a).
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Table 2-1—Tariff-cutting formulas
Formula number Description Mathematical expression
1 Sliding scale If  t0 £ 5 %,  t1 = 0;
if t0 > 100 %,  t1 = 50%;
otherwise, t1 = t0 * (0.5)
2 Linear/harmonization term If  t0 £ 5 %,  t1 = t0;
if t0 > 105 %,  t1 = 45%;
otherwise t1 = t0 * (0.4) + 3 %;
3 Swiss formula t1 = (a x t0) / (a + t0); a is a parameter = 45
4 Harmonization/low ceiling If  t0 £ 50 %, t1 =  t0 (1 -  t0);
otherwise,  t1 = 25%
7 The zero-for-zero tariff reduction approach is an example of a
sectoral formula with a zero-tariff ceiling. This approach has
resulted in elimination of certain countries’ tariffs on pharmaceuti-
cal products; agricultural, medical and construction equipment;
steel; furniture; beer; distilled spirits; toys; and paper (OECD,
1998a).
8 Note that while the various formulas countries submitted for
discussion during the Tokyo Round may have contained elements
that were in the national interest when it came to cutting industrial
tariffs, it is highly unlikely that these countries would submit the
same formulas for cutting agricultural tariffs.
9This approach is discussed in Josling (1998).During the Tokyo Round it was proposed that this
parameter be equal to 16, meaning that all industrial
tariffs initially above 16 percent would be reduced to
below that level. At the time of the Tokyo Round nego-
tiations, the average of tariffs on dutiable nonagricul-
tural imports for the industrial countries was estimated
at 10.7 percent (Cline et al.), so a value for (a) equal to
16 was a reasonable choice. Because agricultural tar-
iffs today are much higher than nonagricultural ones
were during the Tokyo Round, this parameter is set
here at 45, ensuring, as in formula 2, that no new tar-
iffs will be above the industrial countries’ post-
Uruguay Round average. In this case, however, the
ceiling is more restrictive since it is approached gradu-
ally (note in figure 2-1 that an initial tariff of 125 per-
cent would be cut to 33 percent). 
Formula 4 is based loosely on one of the harmoniza-
tion formulas proposed by the EEC during the Tokyo
Round, with the percentage cut in the tariff equal to
the tariff itself. An initial rate of 40 percent would be
cut by 40 percent, yielding a new tariff of 24 percent.
Note that this formula works only for tariffs equal to
or less than 50 percent. Above this level, the formula
can yield rates that are significantly below those calcu-
lated for tariffs below 50 percent. As an example, con-
sider an initial tariff of 80 percent. The formula would
generate a new rate of 16 percent, which is below the
above calculation for an initial 40-percent tariff. As a
result, for tariffs above 50 percent, formula 4 generates
the same rate that would result from cutting a 50-per-
cent tariff. The effect is to leave low tariffs virtually
untouched, while imposing a very low ceiling (25 per-
cent) on high tariffs. 
Figure 2-1 depicts the depth of cut associated with
each formula, with the initial tariff shown on the x-
axis and the new tariff on the y-axis. Formula 1 is the
most trade-liberalizing for products subject to low tar-
iffs, but contains the highest tariff ceiling, while for-
mula 4 is the most trade-liberalizing for products sub-
ject to high tariffs, but tends to cut low tariffs by the
least amount. In general, as we move from formula 1
to formula 4, the lower the formula number, the
greater the cut to lower tariffs, while the higher the
formula number, the greater the cut to higher tariffs.
There are numerous criteria that can be used when
evaluating the impact of a formula on a country’s tariff
structure. The extent to which tariffs are reduced by
the formula is perhaps the most important criteria.
Because the economic and trade distortions associated
with a country’s tariff structure depend not only on the
average size of its tariffs, but also on the distribution
of tariffs across products, the level of dispersion is
another criteria often used. Closely related to tariff dis-
persion within countries is the problem of tariff escala-
tion, which refers to the situation where tariffs are low
or zero on primary products, then increase or escalate
as the product undergoes additional processing. Since
tariff escalation can result in significant bias against
trade of processed products, the ability of a formula to
reduce escalation is also an important criterion. The
next section presents tariff profiles for industrial coun-
tries’ post-Uruguay Round bound agricultural tariffs,
and serves as a useful point of departure and standard
of comparison for the formula-generated tariffs pre-
sented later. 
Post-Uruguay Round Agricultural Tariffs 
The means and standard deviations found in figure 2-2
provide one backdrop against which to evaluate each
of the four tariff-cutting formulas.10 The means repre-
sent the simple, unweighted average of all bound agri-
cultural tariffs in each country’s schedule, with the
notable exception of the in-quota tariffs associated
with tariff-rate quotas. The URAA did not require that
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Source: Economic Research Service, USDA
10 Please refer to the technical appendix, page 56, for a discus-
sion of the biases associated with alternative methods of calculat-
ing tariff means.reductions be made in these tariffs, only that they be
set at a “low or minimal.” While no numerical rule
defined “low or minimal,” the size of some in-quota
rates suggests a need to negotiate some disciplines on
these tariffs as well. However, we have chosen not to
include them in this exercise.
The most striking characteristic of the tariff means is
the broad range of average protection across countries.
The means range from lows of below 10 percent for
Australia and New Zealand to above 100 percent for
three members of the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA) — Norway, Switzerland, and Iceland. While
we would caution against interpreting these means as
indicative of the overall restrictiveness of a country’s
trade policy, clearly the EFTA countries apply tariff
protection of a different magnitude than the others.
Their agricultural tariffs are so high that they raise the
overall industrial country mean to a level above that of
all the other countries. The U.S. mean, at 11.9 percent,
is the third lowest among these individual countries,
followed by three Central and Eastern European (CEE)
countries, each of which is in line for membership into
the European Union (EU). The relatively low tariff
means of these three countries implies that some alter-
native market access compensation may have to be
offered when they join the EU and assume the general-
ly higher tariffs found in the EU schedule. The EU and
Canada have tariff means of 21.4 and 23.7, placing
them in the middle of the ranking. Two other prospec-
tive EU members, Hungary and Poland, currently have
tariff means higher than the EU. Finally, Japan, one of
the world’s largest agricultural importers, has a mean
tariff of 33.4, among the highest of the countries being
examined in this study.
Based on the standard deviations (SD) in figure 2-2, it
is clear that a significant degree of tariff dispersion11
characterizes the tariff schedules of almost all of these
countries. At the highest and lowest levels, the SDs
follow the pattern of the means, with Norway,
Switzerland, and Iceland combining very high means
with very high SDs, while Australia and New Zealand
have both the lowest means and SDs. The United
States, on the other hand, has one of the lowest means,
but a high rate of dispersion across agricultural tariffs,
as measured by the SD. Six of the countries have
means higher than the United States, but have SDs that
are lower.12 Hungary, which has a fairly high mean,
has one of the lowest levels of tariff dispersion.
























Source: Economic Research Service, USDA
Figure 2-2
Post-Uruguay Round tariff means and standard deviations
11 We use the term significant, not in the statistical sense, but
rather because, with the exception of Hungary, all of the countries
have a standard deviation that is greater than the mean. See the
technical appendix for a discussion of what this implies.
12 A comparison of the coefficients of variation (CV), which
measure relative dispersion across countries by dividing the SD by
the country mean, shows that the United States has the highest CV
within this group.With regard to tariff escalation, the issue is addressed
at an aggregate level by identifying the appropriate
stage of processing for all tariffs, according to the
USDA BICO categories.13 Figure 2-3, which displays
tariff means by BICO category, gives a rough indica-
tion of the extent to which escalation of tariffs along
the processing chain exists in each country. When
averaged over the group, the means demonstrate that
modest escalation exists between the bulk level, 34.1,
and the processed intermediates level, 37.9. For con-
sumer-ready products, however, the mean jumps to
50.9. This observed tariff pattern, and the amplifying
rates of protection it insinuates, has negative implica-
tions for processing raw materials in the country where
they are produced. When tariffs on products escalate
with the stage of processing, the effective rate of pro-
tection, or the tariff expressed as fractions of value-
added after deducting intermediate inputs from the
product value, also increases. In addition, there is
ample evidence that demand import elasticities tend to
increase as commodities undergo additional process-
ing, thus increasing the trade restrictiveness of the tar-
iff (Yeats).
Looking at individual countries, there are signs of tar-
iff escalation in some, while in others there is evidence
of tariff de-escalation. With the exception of Japan, all
countries have an overall mean for consumer-ready
items higher than those for bulk and semi-processed
items. In terms of percentage points, the escalation in
average protection levels between bulk and consumer-
ready products is most pronounced in the EFTA coun-
tries. Mean tariffs in each of these countries jump by
over 60 percentage points as items undergo additional
processing. In terms of relative magnitudes, New
Zealand demonstrates the highest tariff escalation, with
tariffs on consumer-ready items averaging over 12
times those of bulk commodities. Even though New
Zealand’s tariff on consumer-ready items is relatively
small, the effective rate of protection for products in
this category could be much higher than would be
expected on the basis of the product’s nominal tariff,
given the even lower tariffs on raw materials. 
In several countries, including the EU, Japan, and the
United States, the mean tariff on bulk commodities is
higher than on semi-processed products. Other studies
of tariff escalation suggest that tariff de-escalation is
particularly common in the case of multiple outputs
(Lindland). Thus, while a tariff on vegetable oil might
be higher than that on the raw material (the oilseed),
the joint output (in this case, the oilmeal) may have a
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13 The BICO classifies agricultural products moving into world
markets as bulk, processed intermediate, or consumer-oriented
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Figure 2-3
Mean tariffs by BICO category 
1   refers to the USDA method of classifying traded agricultural products as bulk, processed intermediate, or consumer-oriented.
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA
Percent
1
BICOlower tariff than the raw material. This is especially
true when the processed import is itself an input. In
agriculture, a pattern of tariff de-escalation might also
be partially explained by the level of support provided
by farm programs, which, to be effective, might
require high border protection on primary products.
The results suggest that even though there might be an
indication of tariff escalation at an aggregate level,
additional work is needed to identify the extent of
escalation within individual agricultural processing
chains. 
Overall, it is clear that, despite the many positive bene-
fits of tariffication — most significantly that global
agricultural protection is now predominantly tariff-
based — many agricultural tariffs were set at extreme-
ly high levels in the Uruguay Round. In addition to
being much higher on average than industrial tariffs,
agricultural tariffs are also highly uneven across coun-
tries and commodities. The reductions in industrial tar-
iffs seen in eight previous rounds of multilateral trade
negotiations have only begun for agricultural tariffs.
The following section examines alternative ways to
begin reducing agricultural tariffs to levels that
approach those of industrial products. 
Effects of Alternative Tariff-Cutting Formulas
on Uruguay Round Tariffs
Figure 2-4 presents the new tariff means calculated
after applying the four tariff-cutting formulas to each
country’s post-Uruguay Round bound tariffs. All of the
formulas do a good job of cutting the overall mean of
industrial country tariffs, which was estimated at 45
percent before the formulas were applied. The new
overall tariff means range from a high of 11.4 (a
reduction of 75 percent) in the case of formula 2 to a
low of 10.1 (a reduction of 78 percent) for formula 4.
Although the formulas result in very similar overall
means, some individual country means vary consider-
ably depending on the formula used. 
Fully half of the countries have their means reduced by
the greatest amount under formula 1, even though we
saw that this formula does not result in the lowest
overall mean. These countries all have schedules con-
taining a relatively high proportion of low tariffs
(below 25 percent) and a low proportion of high tariffs
(over 50 percent). Of the four formulas, number 1
tends to cut low tariffs by the greatest amount and high
tariffs by the least amount, so the results are not sur-
prising. Formula 4, which yielded the deepest cut in
the overall mean, also provided the deepest cut in the
means of five of the countries (Norway, Iceland,




























Simple tariff means, by country, after applying tariff-cutting formulas
Source: Economic Research Service, USDASwitzerland, Slovenia, and Canada). These five also
happen to contain a high proportion of megatariffs
which formula 4 subjects to the deepest cuts.14 For
only one country, Hungary, does formula 2 give the
lowest mean, while Poland is the only country for
which the Swiss formula (3) produces the deepest cut
in its mean. 
Figure 2-4 ranks countries from low to high, based on
their post-Uruguay Round tariff mean (same order as
figure 2-2). It is clear, however, that this ranking no
longer holds. In particular, Canada and Japan, whose
tariff means are initially higher than the EU, are lower
after each of the tariff-cutting formulas is applied. To
illustrate why this occurs, we need to understand how
the distribution of tariffs in each country affects the
formula outcomes. All of the countries in this analysis
have tariff schedules characterized by a relatively large
proportion of low tariffs and a small proportion of very
high tariffs.15
This is illustrated in figure 2-5 for the United States,
the EU, Canada, and Japan. Figure 2-5 contains fre-
quency distributions of each country’s dutiable, or
nonzero tariffs.16 Note that Canada and Japan have a
larger proportion of tariffs in each tail of their distribu-
tion (>0-5 and >100 percent) than the EU. Thus, on
the low end, fewer of the EU’s tariffs are cut to zero
under formula 1, while on the high end, fewer of the
EU’s tariffs undergo the severe cuts that the other three
formulas impose on megatariffs. Because the EU
already has a fairly uniform tariff schedule compared
with Canada and Japan, none of these harmonization
formulas cut the EU’s tariff mean by as much as those
of Canada and Japan. The deepest cut in the EU’s
mean occurs under formula 1, a reduction of 56 per-
cent, while the range of cuts in Canada’s and Japan’s
means, over all the formulas, is between 70 and 76
percent. Clearly, the impact of each formula on a
country’s tariff structure will vary depending on the
initial height and distribution of the individual tariff
rates making up the country’s schedule.
How does the U.S. tariff mean fare under each of the
formulas?  The United States is one of seven countries
that are subject to the deepest cut (65 percent) when
formula 1 is applied, which is not surprising given 
its high proportion of tariffs at or below 5 percent 
(figure 2-5). Formula 4, on the other hand, imposes the
smallest overall cut (52 percent) for the U.S. mean.
Coincidentally, formula 4 also results in the sharpest
cut (78 percent) to the overall tariff mean of the rest of
the group. Thus the United States would see the gap
between its mean and the overall mean of the other
countries narrow by the largest amount when formula
4 is used. 
Before turning to how the formulas fare in reducing
tariff dispersion and tariff escalation, one final obser-
vation on tariff means is in order. Multilateral tariff
negotiations tend to be first and foremost a quest for
reciprocity, or an attempt to share the costs and bene-
fits of tariff reductions. This is considered a necessity
if a country’s export opportunities are to expand along
with the opening of its domestic market to increased
imports. 
With this in mind, the estimated cuts in the simple
means are the most unevenly distributed under formula
4, which, at most, would require an average cut in
Norway’s tariffs of over 90 percent, while requiring
Australia to cut its tariffs only by an average of 14 per-
cent. This formula is designed to compress tariffs with-
in a narrow range (zero to 25 percent), and most of
Australia’s tariffs are already in this range, while most
of Norway’s are considerably larger. The least disparate
cuts would occur under formula 1, with Norway still
subject to a deep overall tariff cut of 84 percent, but
with Australia’s tariff mean also reduced significantly,
by 60 percent. New Zealand and Hungary would sus-
tain the smallest cuts under this formula, with their
means reduced by just over 50 percent.
Figure 2-6 contains frequency distributions for initial
and new tariffs. In this case we include a category for
duty-free tariffs on the left-hand side of the distribu-
tion while on the right-hand side the highest tariff after
the formulas are applied will not exceed 50 percent.
Even though the overall means were shown to be very
similar across formulas, the overall distributions prove
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14 How is it that Slovenia has a low tariff mean, but a high pro-
portion of megatariffs? It’s because 76 percent of its tariffs have
been bound at zero. Of the remaining 24 percent (or, those that are
being subject to cuts) over half are above 50 percent. 
15 As a result, they have tariff schedules whose distributions are
skewed to the right, meaning that the tariffs continue much farther
to the right of the mean than to the left. This explains why the
standard deviations are so high, since they are distorted by a few
very high rates.
16 In figure 5, unlike the rest of the figures in this chapter, the
focus is only on non-zero tariffs, since these are the tariffs being
reduced by the formulas. Note, however, that each country’s entire
tariff schedule, including zero tariffs, was used in calculating the
means and standard deviations.to be quite different. Initially, duty-free tariffs account
for the largest proportion (28 percent) of tariffs in the
six categories. This proportion increases to 43 percent
when formula 1 (the only formula mandating some tar-
iffs be reduced to zero) is applied. Formula 2, like 3
and 4, does not result in an increase in duty-free tar-
iffs, but it does result in the greatest expansion in the
proportion of tariffs in the >0-10 percent category,
from an initial 27 percent to 39 percent. 
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Figure 2-5
Frequency distributions of post-Uruguay Round dutiable tariffs—selected countries
Percent
1
Duty-free tariffs are not included in this chart.
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA
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Figure 2-6
Frequency distributions for Uruguay Round rates and after applying tariff-cutting formulas
Duty-free tariffs are not included in this chart.
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA
1At the other end of the distribution, however, the pro-
portion of tariffs above 40 percent under formulas 1
and 2 remains fairly high, especially compared with
formulas 3 and 4. Formula 3, the Swiss formula,
results in a more even distribution across the various
size categories than formula 2, with a smaller propor-
tion in the >0-10-percent and >40-percent categories
but a higher proportion in the middle categories.
Finally, under formula 4 all tariffs get compressed to
25 percent or below, so the highest two categories are
empty while the proportion of tariffs in the 20-30-per-
cent range increases dramatically. Since formula 4 cuts
low tariffs by the least amount, the proportion in the
lower size categories, as well as the overall mean of
tariffs in these categories, changes little. 
Figure 2-7 contains the standard deviations associated
with the new tariff structures, ranked according to the
size of the country’s initial standard deviations.
Formula 4, which results in the lowest SD in 10 of the
countries, does the best overall job of cutting disper-
sion across the entire group. Formula 1 results in the
lowest standard deviations in Australia and New
Zealand, while in the Czech Republic and Hungary,
formula 3 cuts dispersion by the greatest amount. In
virtually every case, the cut in the SDs is greater than
the cut in the mean. This, of course, is a characteristic
of harmonization formulas, which are designed to 
produce deep cuts in tariff dispersion.17 The dispersion
over all tariffs within the group is reduced by impres-
sive amounts, with the overall SD declining by
between 92 percent under formula 4 and 87 percent
using formula 1. Within individual countries, the deep-
est cut in dispersion occurs for Switzerland under for-
mula 4, which results in a new SD 96 percent lower
than the original. The smallest reduction, also when
formula 4 is applied, occurs in New Zealand, which
sees its SD cut by only 21 percent under that formula. 
As with the means, the original rankings from low to
high no longer hold in some cases. Nowhere is this
more evident than for the United States, whose SD is
initially among the highest. Under each formula, the
U.S. SD drops from being ninth highest to third high-
est, exceeded only by Australia and New Zealand. The
fact that each of these harmonization formulas cuts the
U.S. SD by such a large amount is another indication
of how effective they are in reducing dispersion, espe-
cially when the initial level is very high.


























Source: Economic Research Service, USDA
Figure 2-7
Standard deviations, by country, after applying tariff-cutting formulas
Percent
17 A linear cut, on the other hand, results in an equal cut in the
mean and the standard deviation; thus cutting all tariffs by 50 per-
cent would reduce the mean and the standard deviation by 50 per-
cent as well.It is not always the case, however, that the formula that
yields the largest overall reduction in the mean also
results in the lowest level of tariff dispersion. The rule
is that when a country has both a low initial mean and
SD, formula 1 will result in the deepest cuts in both
measures, while for countries with high initial means
and SDs, formula 4 delivers the deepest cuts. In the
case of other countries it is harder to generalize. For
the United States, the EU, and Japan, formula 1 results
in the lowest mean but the highest SD. 
Table 2-2 contains tariff means by BICO category for
each country’s initial tariffs and those calculated after
applying each formula. As measured by nominal tariff
wedges between categories, the wedge, averaged
across all countries, between bulk and processed inter-
mediate levels declines from an initial 3.9 percentage
points to between 0.5 (formula 1) and 0.8 (formula 2)
percentage points. The larger wedge existing between
processed intermediate and consumer-oriented items
narrows from 12.9 to between 2.1 (formula 1) and 3.7
(formula 4) percentage points. All of the formulas are
effective in decreasing both tariff escalation and de-
escalation (where the wedge is initially negative).
Formula 4 results in the lowest overall mean in each
category, but formula 1 compresses the three cate-
gories closest together. It is difficult, however, to say
which formula would do the best job of reducing tariff
escalation based on the aggregate results of table 2. In
general, one would expect that when tariff escalation is
extremely high (low tariffs on raw materials and high
ones on finished products), formula 4 would be the
most effective in reducing the spread between the tar-
iffs. In other cases, the results are more ambiguous. 
Conclusions
Among the main objectives of the next trade round
will be to achieve further cuts in agricultural tariffs.
High agricultural tariffs increase food prices to con-
sumers and divert and waste resources by encouraging
output in high-cost, protected countries (and commodi-
ties) while curtailing output in low-cost unprotected
ones. It is in the interest of each country to reduce its
tariff protection in order for its processors and con-
sumers to obtain cheaper sources of supply and attain
the higher level of economic activity permitted by
more efficient allocation of resources. 
If past rounds are any indication, a topic of consider-
able debate will be to determine the precise nature of
the tariff cuts to be negotiated. In this analysis, we
considered four harmonization formulas. The statistical
measures presented here demonstrate that the effect of
alternative tariff-cutting formulas on criteria such as
the magnitude of tariffs, the level of tariff dispersion,
and level of tariff escalation varies, depending on the
initial height and distribution of a country’s tariff
schedule. We did not evaluate any strictly linear for-
mulas in this analysis, primarily because the results are
obvious — a 50-percent linear cut will cut a country’s
tariff mean and standard deviation by 50 percent. The
great advantage of a linear cut, however, lies in its
simplicity. 
Perhaps most important is that, unlike a harmonization
formula, a linear cut does not require that an ad val-
orem equivalent be provided for all specific tariffs,
something that is not a trivial requirement. It has been
suggested that a relatively simple alternative to pro-
tracted tariff negotiations would be to repeat the cuts
of the Uruguay Round. These cuts have already been
negotiated and accepted and they have the advantage
that an ad valorem equivalent need not be calculated
beforehand. The URAA allowed countries to cut tariffs
on non-sensitive commodities by large amounts, even
by 100 percent, while cutting tariffs on politically sen-
sitive commodities by the minimum and still satisfy
their URAA commitments. Obviously, any cuts of 100
percent would not be repeated a second time around,
so the average tariff reduction would fall short of 36
percent. A straight 36 percent across-the-board linear
cut would result in greater trade liberalization than a
repeat of the URAA cuts even if it would still leave
some very high tariffs. Only a harmonization formula,
however, provides a means of getting megatariffs down
to levels where trade can take place at the tariff-inclu-
sive price. 
Evaluating which formula is best for a particular coun-
try depends on the objective that a country hopes to
achieve in the negotiations. Given the mercantilist
view that most countries bring to tariff negotiations,
one might expect that each country would tend to pre-
fer that formula which produces the largest increase in
its trade balance. The reality is, however, that for some
countries to experience an increase in their trade bal-
ance, others must experience a decrease. But even if a
country’s tariffs and trade base are such that liberaliza-
tion would result in a decrease in its trade balance, it
may still pursue multilateral tariff cuts in order to
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Table 2-2—Tariff means by BICO categories for post-Uruguay Round tariffs and tariffs after 
applying formula1
1-Sliding 2-Linear/ 3-Swiss 4-Harmonization/ UR bound
scale sectoral formula low ceiling tariffs
Percent
Bulk commodities
Australia 1.3 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.4
Canada 2.0 2.4 2.3 2.3 4.2
Czech Rep. 2.6 3.1 3.2 3.4 5.4
European Union 8.5 8.2 7.7 7.3 23.3
Hungary 10.4 10.7 11.4 12.4 21.1
Iceland 18.2 16.8 13.8 10.3 61.8
Japan 9.7 9.4 8.7 7.1 50.1
New Zealand 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8
Norway 18.1 16.4 14.2 9.3 107.1
Poland 11.0 11.8 11.9 12.5 23.1
Slovakia 3.2 3.5 3.7 3.9 6.6
Slovenia 4.3 3.9 3.6 3.4 8.7
Switzerland 24.3 22.2 18.9 15.4 80.3
United States 3.6 4.2 4.2 4.3 8.3
Overall average 9.6 9.3 8.4 7.2 34.1
Processed intermediates
Australia 1.0 2.3 2.4 2.6 3.1
Canada 3.1 4.0 4.0 4.0 11.8
Czech Republic 4.3 4.8 5.0 5.3 9.1
European Union 4.8 5.7 5.9 6.1 11.1
Hungary 10.0 10.8 11.5 12.4 20.7
Iceland 22.6 20.9 16.6 12.6 73.7
Japan 6.7 7.3 7.1 6.8 7.1
New Zealand 1.6 2.1 2.5 2.8 3.3
Norway 22.8 20.9 17.6 12.3 129.5
Poland 11.5 12.2 12.4 12.8 26.2
Slovakia 5.6 5.9 5.8 6.0 11.5
Slovenia 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.4 7.1
Switzerland 25.5 23.3 19.8 15.5 114.0
United States 1.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 5.0
Overall average 10.1 10.1 9.1 7.9 37.9
Consumer-oriented
Australia 2.2 3.7 4.1 4.5 5.1
Canada 7.8 8.4 8.0 7.0 31.1
Czech Republic 6.7 7.8 8.6 9.3 14.1
European Union 11.7 12.1 12.7 13.4 25.9
Hungary 18.0 17.4 18.8 20.5 36.1
Iceland 26.7 24.8 23.2 19.2 130.6
Japan 9.8 10.6 11.3 11.6 43.0
New Zealand 4.8 6.0 7.3 8.2 9.8
Norway 26.9 24.4 21.2 14.7 176.3
Poland 20.9 20.0 19.2 19.0 46.5
Slovakia 6.4 7.4 7.8 8.3 14.0
Slovenia 8.5 7.8 7.1 6.8 19.5
Switzerland 23.7 22.3 20.6 16.9 141.6
United States 5.1 6.3 6.6 7.0 15.1
Overall average 12.2 12.4 12.3 11.6 50.9
1BICO refers to the USDA method of classifying traded agricultural products as bulk, processed intermediate, or consumer-oriented.obtain the economic efficiency gains from tariff 
liberalization.
The analysis presented here reveals little about the
realization of economic benefits from tariff reductions.
To be able to say something about this would require
consideration of a host of factors, including commodi-
ty and cross-commodity responses to price changes,
the structure of markets, time lags in the adjustment
process, and even the positive social value that govern-
ments may attribute to protection. This work should be
viewed as only the initial step in analyzing the effects
of reducing or eliminating agricultural tariffs. The next
phase in analyzing tariff reduction would be to use
these formulas in world trade models in order to be
able to rank them based on criteria such as trade cre-
ation and estimated welfare effects. 
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Technical Appendix - Data and Methodology
The data used are from the Agricultural Market Access
Database (AMAD). The AMAD was developed jointly
by several organizations, including USDA’s Economic
Research Service, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, Agriculture and
AgriFood Canada, the European Commission, the
United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, and the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations. AMAD contains
data at the tariff-line18 level on market access commit-
ments (Uruguay Round base and bound tariffs and tar-
iff-rate quotas) for about 50 WTO members, as well as
all available information on TRQ implementation,
trade, applied tariffs, and commodity production and
consumption. In this analysis, country coverage is lim-
ited to 14 industrial countries/regions (the United
States, the EU, Canada, Japan, Australia, New
Zealand, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia).
The analysis assumes full implementation of  each
country’s Uruguay Round commitments.
Almost three-fourths of the agricultural tariffs in the
countries analyzed are expressed in ad valorem terms,
with a number of countries denominating all or most
of their agricultural tariffs as ad valorem rates.19 In all
but a few cases, ad valorem equivalents (AVE) of spe-
cific duties were approximated for Uruguay Round tar-
iffs, generally using an average of 1995-97 import
value and volume data.20
Where available, a country’s own trade data were used
to calculate the import unit values needed to approxi-
19 Since most countries tended to express their in-quota tariffs
as ad valorem rates, this figure would be even higher if these tar-
iffs had been included.
20 Not all countries registered imports for every commodity
over each year. In these cases, the average might be made up of
less than three years. 
18 The term tariff-line refers to the product or products to which
the legally established tariff applies.mate the AVEs. When this information was not avail-
able, world import unit values were used.21 In some
cases, tariffs were expressed in both ad valorem and
specific terms, with the higher of the two determining
which rate applies. In these cases, when import unit
values were not available, the ad valorem rate was
used. In some cases it was not possible to approximate
an AVE, either because import unit values were not
available, or because the tariff was structured in a way
that made calculation of an AVE impossible. 
Once AVEs are calculated, relevant comparisons of tar-
iffs across countries require the calculation of a tariff
mean. There are a number of ways to compute tariff
means, none of which is without bias. The most com-
mon — a simple (unweighted) arithmetic average —
was used. Some consider applying no weighting
scheme inferior to weighting, since a “simple average”
gives equal weight to kumquat imports and wheat
imports, if each enters as a single tariff-line item under
the national tariff nomenclature. Unfortunately, there is
no ideal weighting scheme. 
Import-weighted averages were used in past rounds to
determine overall reductions in countries’ industrial
tariffs. Weights based on import values, however, tend
to bias average tariff estimates downward, because
items with the highest tariffs will receive virtually no
weight, as little or no imports will enter under these
tariffs. Weights based on shares of the value of produc-
tion would be preferable, since highly protected com-
modities produced in large amounts would get large
weights. But production data at the tariff-line level are
rarely available. Because of this, tariffs are often
aggregated in the form of simple (unweighted) aver-
ages to a level where data on appropriate production
weights are available to calculate a national average.
Tariffs used in this study were only those bound as
most favored nation (MFN) rates during the Uruguay
Round. A great deal of trade takes place at tariff levels
below the bound rate (including preferential rates
under trade agreements such as the NAFTA). If the
applied tariffs at which trade took place were used,
many of the statistics would be considerably lower. If
previous negotiations are an indication, countries’
bound MFN tariffs, not their applied rates, will be the
focus of future negotiations. In past rounds, when
bound tariffs were higher than applied rates, countries
rarely consolidated the reduced rate into their GATT
tariff schedule without extracting the maximum com-
pensation they could through negotiation (Evans).
One additional observation should be mentioned. In
order to measure the effects of alternative tariff-cutting
formulas with some precision, it is necessary to use
data at the actual tariff-line level for each country,
rather than broader average tariffs for commodity
groupings. Most industrial countries bound their tariffs
at the HS 8-digit level. In many cases, however, we
find tariffs bound at either a more aggregate (e.g., HS
6-digit) or a more detailed (e.g., HS 10-digit) level.
While we could have, for the sake of consistency,
aggregated all tariffs to an HS 6-digit level, a formula
applied to an average tariff can yield substantially dif-
ferent results from that obtained by applying the for-
mula to the individual tariff-lines. 
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21 There are a number of different ways to calculate AVEs. In
the Gibson, et al. analysis, world import unit values were used
rather than calculating import unit values with a country’s own
trade data.Animal welfare issues are becoming more prominent in
the international trade arena. While many nations and cul-
tures have norms for the treatment of animals, industrial-
ized nations have recently begun to take more of an inter-
est in animal welfare. As their consumers grow wealthier,
and are able to afford an adequate quantity of food, they
are able to devote more resources to meeting consumer
preferences for both food quality and the methods through
which food is produced. While most industrialized nations
have laws and regulations about animal welfare, the EU
has, over the last decade, enacted a number of laws that
create very specific obligations for livestock producers.
Animal welfare laws generally impose restrictions on the
conditions under which producers may keep their animals,
how often the animals must be fed, or how the animals
must be slaughtered. Livestock producers, like most other
farm owners, generally use the lowest cost technology
available to produce a product of a given quality. In some
cases, high standards for animal welfare are part of the
lowest cost technology, and some livestock producers note
that treating animals well is a profit-maximizing practice.
In other cases, requiring producers to change production
methods to adapt to animal welfare strategies increases
costs. For example, larger space requirements mean that
either more land must be purchased or fewer animals
must be kept. This increase in per animal resource
requirements increases the per animal production costs. 
How much will costs rise? Various studies indicate that
costs could rise anywhere from 5 percent to 30 percent
depending on the exact animal welfare law enacted
(Blandford and Fulponi, 1999, 2000, Bennett, 1997).
Increased production costs raise consumer food prices.
Evidence suggests that some consumers in the EU are
willing to pay more, even enough to cover higher costs,
for some “animal-friendly products”, like free-range eggs
(Bennett, 1997, MORI, 1995). However, the magnitudes
of consumer willingness to pay and the increase in pro-
ducer costs, will vary from regulation to regulation and
from income group to income group. Any policy that
imposes costs on domestic firms but not foreign firms can
put domestic firms at a disadvantage. Because the domes-
tic goods will be costlier, some consumers are likely to
purchase inexpensive imported goods instead of domestic
goods (Blandford and Fulponi, 1999).
Because domestic producers understand the consequences
of differences in regulation among countries, they some-
times apply political pressure to block imports from coun-
tries that don’t have similar regulations. When the restric-
tive legislation benefits consumers, the domestic firms are
frequently joined by consumer groups in their lobbying
efforts (Vogel, 1995). 
If countries with stringent animal welfare laws impose
trade restrictions, such restrictions could have an effect on
imports from countries that don’t have similar animal wel-
fare laws. The reduced demand from the import-restricting
country could reduce the prices of animal products in the
exporting country. The domestic prices in the country
restricting trade could rise, because supply is restricted to
more expensive domestic production. The size of the
impact depends on the volume of trade that would occur in
animal products in the absence of such regulations, and the
response of consumers and producers to changes in prices.
The EU has submitted a proposal to the WTO on animal
welfare that stresses three main points. The EU believes
that each country should have the right to its desired ani-
mal welfare standards, and it is concerned about the
effects of having higher animal welfare standards on
domestic producers, noting that consumers might not be
informed about “the welfare standards to which imported
products are produced.” The EU also notes that it is not
interested in protectionism, or imposing domestic animal
welfare standards on imports. The EU believes that animal
welfare should be addressed in the WTO through a multi-
lateral agreement, labeling, and/or minimally trade-dis-
torting subsidies for producers who produce with humane
methods.
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The Economics of Animal Welfare Issues
Lorraine MitchellIntroduction
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
(URAA) created over 1,300 tariff-rate quotas (TRQ)
for agricultural products. The new TRQs replaced
quantitative trade restrictions—that is, bans and
absolute quotas. Quantitative restrictions can result in
rationing and cause greater trade distortions than tar-
iffs. TRQs have tariff and quota elements and can be
viewed as an intermediate step in converting quantita-
tive restrictions into tariffs. Ideally, the URAA would
have converted quantitative restrictions directly into
tariffs, as tariff reform is relatively straightforward. In
contrast, liberalizing quantitative restrictions is compli-
cated, particularly if it causes rationing. Because TRQs
combine tariffs and quotas, TRQ liberalization can be
problematic. 
Liberalizing TRQs is generally viewed as a means of
increasing market access; little or no attention is paid
to the increasing risk of biased trade that results in the
entry of relatively inefficient suppliers. This paper
explains how TRQ liberalization, or reform, can
increase market access and reduce the risk of trade
bias. It first provides background information on
TRQs, particularly related to the tariff and quota ele-
ments of a TRQ. It examines how liberalizing the tariff
and quota elements of a TRQ can expand market
access. The analysis leads to a set of simple rules for
liberalizing TRQs when market access is the only con-
cern. The paper then shows how TRQs can create
“rents,” how rents provide incentives for trade bias,
and how TRQ administrative methods influence the
distribution of rents and the risk of trade bias. It also
surveys the various TRQ administrative methods.
Including the risk of biased trade in the analysis com-
plicates the simple “market access only” rules for TRQ
liberalization. 
What Is a TRQ?
A tariff-rate quota is a quota for a volume of imports
at a particular tariff rate. Once the quota is filled, a
higher tariff is applied on additional imports. At first
glance the TRQ differs little from the earlier
“absolute” quota. Under an absolute quota, however, it
is legally impossible to import more than the applied
quota level. Under a TRQ, imports can exceed the
TRQ level but a higher, over-quota tariff is applied on
the excess. In principle, a TRQ provides more market
access to imports than a quota. In practice, however,
many over-quota tariffs are so high that they effective-
ly exclude imports in excess of the quota. Thus, it is
possible to design a TRQ so that it reproduces the vol-
ume of trade of an absolute quota. 
A TRQ has four components: an in-quota tariff; a
quota defining the maximum volume of imports
charged the in-quota tariff; an over-quota tariff; and a
method of quota administration. WTO member coun-
try tariff schedules define the values of the first three
components. If the TRQ is scheduled for reform, the
schedule also specifies the rates at which the quota is
to increase or the tariffs are to decrease. Tariff sched-
ules do not typically define the method of quota
administration. Considerable differences exist among
WTO member countries concerning the interpretation
of “good” TRQ administration. 
Figures 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3 illustrate how TRQs affect
the incentives faced by importers. The two-level tariff
results in a stepped import supply function. Imports
within the quota are charged the lower tariff (t), and
over-quota imports are charged the higher tariff (T).
This results in a vertical step when the quota volume
(Q) is filled. 




TRQ liberalization, or reform, can increase market access and reduce the risk of trade bias. The analysis derives rules
for liberalizing TRQs when expanding market access is the objective. It then considers TRQ “rents” and the risk of
trade bias. Reducing the risk of biased trade complicates the “market access only” reforms. Tailoring reforms to indi-
vidual TRQ fill-rates can expand market access and reduce trade bias. The level of domestic demand for imports and the
world price jointly determine which of the TRQ ele-
ments constrains imports.1 Figure 3-1 plots three
import demand curves. If there is no demand for
imports at the world price, none of the TRQ elements
constrains imports: there would be no imports even
with free trade — D1. Similarly, if there is no import
demand at the in-quota tariff rate (1+t), domestic
demand remains the binding constraint — D2. A small
reduction in the in-quota tariff will not increase
imports, but a large reduction could make the in-quota
tariff binding. When import demand intersects the in-
quota tariff — illustrated by D3 — a volume of M(t) is
imported and the domestic market price equilibrates at
1+t. In-quota tariff revenue equals t times the volume
of imports, as shown in the shaded rectangle.
Figure 3-2 illustrates import demand constrained by
the quota. When the quota determines imports, the
import volume is Q and the domestic price is 1+t+r (r
represents the unit quota rent). The rent is the differ-
ence between the domestic price (the price an importer
can sell the product in the domestic market) and the
world price inclusive of the in-quota tariff (what it
costs an importer to purchase the product on the world
market and pay the tariff). 
Figure 3-3 illustrates over-quota imports. The over-
quota tariff determines the volume of imports at M(T)
and the domestic price equals 1+T. When there are
over-quota imports, imports within the quota are
charged the in-quota tariff and imports beyond the
quota are charged the over-quota tariff. Thus there are
two shaded rectangles of tariff revenue in figure 3-3.
In-quota imports can be imported for (1+t) and sold on
the domestic market for (1+T) so the per unit quota
rent equals (T-t). The shaded rectangle labeled “quota
rent” represents the total value of quota rents.
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1 The figures and text express all prices in terms of the world
price. All prices are divided by the world price (W). Thus, the
world price always equals 1=W/W, and the domestic price (Pd) is
expressed as P = Pd/W. This normalization assumes that all tariffs
are ad valorem tariffs.Liberalization and Market Access
What is the best way to liberalize TRQs? That is,
which TRQ element or elements should be reformed
so as to effect the greatest increase in nondiscriminato-
ry market access? The three elements (t, T, Q) largely
determine market access. Producing the greatest gain
in market access depends on which of the three ele-
ments currently constrains imports and which element
or elements are likely to constrain imports in the
future.
Table 3-1 shows the links between the binding con-
straint and TRQ liberalization actions. The table
includes one row for each potential liberalization
action, and one column for each of the four potential
binding constraints. For example, reducing t increases
market access when t is binding, thus “+”; otherwise it
has no effect, thus “0.” Relaxing any one of the three
elements, alone or in combination with the other ele-
ments, either increases market access or has no effect.
In no case does liberalization reduce market access.
Figures 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3 verify this result: A shift of
the tariff or quota constraint reveals how it changes (or
does not change) the intersection with the demand
curve. TRQ liberalization from a market-access per-
spective is an uncomplicated process. 
Quota Rents, Biased Trade,
and TRQ Administration
From the perspective of a trader, a quota rent is a prof-
it opportunity; but from the perspective of economic
efficiency and unbiased trade, rent is a four-letter
word. Quota rents bias trade by providing incentives
for relatively inefficient suppliers to enter the market
and displace more efficient suppliers. This section
explains how quotas can create rents and how rents
distort market incentives.
Rents and biased trade
TRQ administration involves distributing the rights to
import at the in-quota tariff. Whoever obtains such
rights can make a risk-free profit equal to the domestic
price less the world price inclusive of the in-quota tar-
iff. Rents indicate that the demand to import within the
quota is greater than the supply of quota: thus the
necessity to ration or administer the TRQ. 
The risk that TRQ administration can bias trade
requires an examination of the supply side of the
rationing problem. For example, two types of firms
can supply a market: least-cost and higher-cost. Least-
cost firms have a cost of production less than or equal
to PL. Higher-cost firms have a cost of production
greater than PL. If there is no quota on trade, least-cost
firms supply the entire market at the price PL. Higher-
cost firms will not enter the market; they either shut
down or re-employ their resources. When a binding
quota is imposed the demand price increases to PH. At
PH, it is profitable for higher-cost firms to enter the
market. The administration of market access deter-
mines which firms supply the quota-rationed market. If
access restrictions allow only least-cost firms to supply
the market, then a subset of least-cost firms would fill
the quota and gain a rent of PH-PL on each unit sold. If 
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Table 3-1—TRQ liberalization and market access
Binding constraint on imports
Action Demand In-quota Quota  Over-quota
tariff tariff
Reduce t 0 + 0 0
Increase Q 0 0 + 0
Reduce T 0 0 0 +
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.market access is granted to whoever sells first, that is,
on a first-come, first-served basis, the distribution of
sales by type of firm will depend on being “early”
rather than on being least-cost. In terms of economic
efficiency, production by higher-cost firms is an ineffi-
cient use of resources and reduces global welfare.
Global economic welfare is higher when only low-cost
firms supply the market. 
In terms of welfare analysis, it does not matter which
least-cost firms or countries gain market access within
the TRQ. Random displacement of one least-cost sup-
plier by another does not reduce global welfare. In an
international trade context, displaced least-cost suppli-
ers can export to other markets at the world price. If
rents are not fully absorbed through auction, tariff, or
other means, higher-cost suppliers have an incentive to
enter the market and can displace lower-cost suppliers. 
TRQ liberalization and rent creation
Any TRQ reform that increases quota rents can also
increase the risk that high-cost suppliers will displace
low-cost suppliers. Table 3-2 shows the displacement
risks. Reducing the in-quota tariff t has a positive
influence on market access and competition when the
in-quota tariff is binding (fig. 3-1). But when Q or T
are binding, reducing t increases displacement risk
(figs. 3-2 and 3-3). Similarly, increasing the quota Q
increases the probability that the in-quota tariff will be
the binding constraint. This improves market access
and import competition. However, when Q or T are
binding, increasing the in-quota volume can increase
rents and risk trade bias. When Q is binding, expand-
ing the quota can increase rents if import demand is
sufficiently elastic. If import demand is inelastic, quota
expansion can reduce rent. When T is binding, quota
expansion must increase rents. The one unambiguously
positive action is reducing the over-quota tariff. If T is
the binding constraint, that is, if there are over-quota
imports, then reducing T increases market access and
does not further bias trade shares. If Q is binding, a
large reduction in T can make T the binding constraint.
Even a small reduction in T reduces the size of poten-
tial future rents and reduces the probability that Q will
be binding in the future. Similarly, if t is the binding
constraint, a reduction in T has no immediate effect,
but it reduces the size and of future rents and thus the
probability of future displacement of low-cost suppli-
ers. Thus, a reduction in T is either an immediate
improvement or a potential future improvement, but,
importantly, it can do no harm. 
TRQ administration
TRQ administration can influence trade. The WTO has
identified several generic methods of TRQ administra-
tion. Table 3-3 defines these administrative methods
along with the percentage distribution of TRQs by
administrative method. 
Of the 137 WTO members, 37 countries notified a
total of 1,368 TRQs to the WTO Secretariat in 1999.2
Forty-seven percent of notified TRQs are administered
as simple applied tariffs, that is, the over-quota tariff is
not applied and there is no effective quantitative limi-
tation on imports at the in-quota tariff. TRQs adminis-
tered as applied tariffs do not pose a current adminis-
tration problem. But they pose a potential trade prob-
lem because the member country can, at any time,
choose to enforce them.
Norway, Poland, and Iceland have notified 431 TRQs,
or one-third of all notified TRQs. Over 85 percent are
applied as tariffs — many at high in-quota rates; but
only 63 are actually enforced as TRQs (table 3-4). In
terms of enforced TRQs, countries with relatively
developed economies with historically protectionist
agricultural policies — the EU, Hungary, South Korea
and the United States — account for over one-third of
the total. 
TRQ administration and biased trade
The most common forms of applied TRQ administra-
tion are “license on demand” and “first-come, first-
served.” The license on demand method requires
potential traders to apply for a license to import in-
quota. If demand for licenses exceeds supply, licenses
are rationed. Many countries reduce all license
requests proportionately until supply equals demand.
The first-come, first-served method charges the in-
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Table 3-2—TRQ liberalization and rent creation
Change in quota rents
Actions In-quota Quota Over-quota
tariff tariff
Reduce t 0 + +
Increase Q 0 ? +
Reduce T 0 0 -
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.
2 The data reported here and in tables 3-3 and 3-4 are from
country notifications to the WTO for 1999. All data are from WTO
(2000).quota tariff on the first Q units to clear customs. All
subsequent imports are charged the over-quota rate.
This method can create a surge of imports when the
quota period opens. Both of these methods of TRQ
administration can attract high-cost suppliers, and both
risk generating a biased distribution of trade.
Many politically sensitive TRQs are allocated based on
historical market shares and are nontransferable (e.g.,
the sugar TRQs of the United States and the European
Union). Many high-cost suppliers are guaranteed a
market for their exports under this system, but this
guarantee comes at the price of denying market access
to lower-cost, more efficient suppliers. 
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Table 3-4—Top ten countries notifying and enforcing TRQs
Countries ranked by number of notified TRQs Countries ranked by number of enforced TRQs
Country TRQs TRQs Country TRQs TRQs  applied
notified enforced enforced as tariff
Norway 232 19 EU 87 0
Poland 109 35 Hungary 68 2
Iceland 90 12 South Korea 63 1
EU 87 87 United States 54 0
Bulgaria 73 45 Bulgaria 45 28
Hungary 70 68 Poland 35 74
Colombia 67 34 Colombia 34 33
South Korea 64 63 South Africa 25 28
Venezuela 61 2 Czech Republic 24 0
United States 54 54 Slovakia 24 0
Subtotal 907 419 Subtotal 459 166
All others 461 307 All others 267 476
Total 1,368 726 Total 726 642
Source: WTO (2000).
Table 3-3—Methods of allocating right to import within quota
Method of TRQ Explanation Percent of
administration all TRQs
Applied tariff Unlimited imports are allowed at the in-quota tariff rate: 47
that is, the quota is not enforced.
License on demand Licenses are required to import at the in-quota tariff. If demand 25
for licenses is less than quota, Q, the system operates like 
a first come, first served system. If demand exceeds Q, import 
volume requested is reduced proportionately among all applicants.
First come, first served The first Q units of imports to clear customs are charged the in-quota 11
tariff; all subsequent imports are charged the over-quota tariff.
Historical  Right to import at in-quota tariff is allocated in proportion to import  5
market shares in a base period.
Auction Right to import at in-quota tariff is auctioned. 4
State trader or producer group Right to import in-quota is granted wholly or primarily to a state 
trading organization or an organization representing domestic producers
of the controlled product. 2
Mixed Describes a combination of two or more of the six methods above. 4
Other, or not specified Includes methods that do not correspond to any of the seven methods 
above and are not specified in WTO notifications. 2
Source: WTO (2000).“Additional conditions” are placed on many TRQs.
The WTO identifies four basic types of additional con-
ditions, which are usually enforced singly but in a few
cases jointly. Table 3-5 shows the number of TRQs
with additional conditions. Of the 273 TRQs, 80 per-
cent are administered by license on demand and 10
percent by mixed methods. Only 2 of the 273 are for
applied tariffs. 
Limiting the market share of the TRQ that a particu-
lar trader (or sometimes supplying country) may
obtain is the most common restriction. Such limita-
tions prevent one trader or a ring of traders from cor-
nering the market.
Past trading performance is the second most common
additional restriction. The general rationale for alloca-
tion by past trading performance is twofold. It perpetu-
ates the traditional distribution of trade and it disci-
plines quota use. If a trader obtains quota rights but
fails to use them, the rights can be reallocated to other
traders.
The two remaining additional conditions — domestic
purchase and export certificate — may face some chal-
lenges, either in the WTO or in bilateral disputes. A
domestic purchase requirement makes the right to
import in-quota contingent on purchasing a specified
amount of a domestic product. For example, to import
1 ton of beef in-quota, a trader must purchase X tons
of domestic beef. 
Export certificates are usually employed to ensure that
the product imported is the domestic product of the
exporting country. For example, an export certificate
ensures that sugar exported from Barbados is actually
produced in Barbados and not in some third country.
Of the 24 export certificate TRQs, the EU accounts for
21, the United States for 2 — raw cane sugar and flue-
cured tobacco — and Canada for 1 — beef and veal.
Export certificates allow the importing country to
determine which exporting countries gain in-quota
access as well as individual in-quota market shares.
This provides a means of discriminating among com-
peting exporters not on the basis of price or the quality
of the traded good, but rather on the basis of country
of origin, which is not in keeping with the WTO prin-
ciple of nondiscrimination.
Despite the TRQ administration methods’ obvious
inefficiencies, with and without additional conditions,
they persist. Historical allocation, for example, is often
defended as a form of foreign assistance or compensa-
tion. The apparently conflicting goals of transferring
rents to foreign governments and unbiased trade are
not necessarily incompatible. One may allocate the
right to import within the quota arbitrarily, but if the
right can be sold, a secondary market will emerge.
Low-cost suppliers will have the opportunity to pur-
chase the quota rights from higher-cost suppliers who
received the initial allocation. Allowing the resale of
quota rights creates a decentralized market. Some
high-cost suppliers may persist in exporting within the
quota, but risk of displacing low-cost suppliers is sub-
stantially reduced. 
The importing country creates a primary market in
quota rights if it auctions TRQ rights. Auctioning
relies on markets to allocate scarce rights and it is the
administrative method most favored by economists. An
auction absorbs all quota rents, and the winning bid or
bids are prices. If there are no quota rents there is no
risk of higher-cost suppliers displacing least-cost sup-
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Table 3-5—Additional conditions on TRQ allocation
Additional condition Total number License on Mixed Applied tariff All
demand others
Limits on TRQ shares 119 91 14 1 13
Past trading performance 78 71 3 0 4
Domestic purchase requirement 48 35 11 1 1
Export certificates 24 19 0 0 5
Past trading performance 
and limits on TRQ shares 3 2 1 0 0
Export certificates and 
past trading performance 1 0 0 0 1
Total 273 218 29 2 24
Source: WTO (2000).pliers. Thus, auctioning quota rights means that TRQ
liberalization cannot increase the risk of biased trade.
Auctions result in a liberalization matrix identical to
table 3-1. Few countries employ auctions, in fact, only
4 percent of all TRQs are allocated by auction.
Adding It All Up
It is possible to determine the trade-off that might exist
between greater market access and a higher risk of
biased trade discrimination, at least in theory. 
One interpretation of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) — particularly of Article XIII — is
that policies that bias trade violate the principle of
nondiscrimination, one of the fundamental pillars of
the GATT. Three ways of dealing with the conflict
between market access and nondiscrimination have
been identified. The two polar cases are (1) market
access is all that matters, violations of nondiscrimina-
tion should be ignored; and (2) nondiscrimination must
not be violated, any action that increases the risk of
discrimination must not be taken. The third approach
is to accept a trade-off between the two factors —
market access and nondiscrimination — after first
determining the appropriate weights for the two fac-
tors. 
Table 3-6 summarizes these three interpretations. The
market access-only interpretation reproduces the mar-
ket access matrix. Similarly, the strict nondiscrimina-
tion interpretation reproduces the rent creation matrix.
The signs are now reversed on the rent creation matrix.
An increase in rent increases the incentive for higher-
cost suppliers to enter the market and increases the
likelihood of biased trade and a reduction in global
welfare. The market access and nondiscrimination
matrixes can be combined by adding corresponding
cells. 
To evaluate the impact of a particular reform action,
one reads across the relevant row. For example, evalu-
ation by both factors of reducing the in-quota tariff
results in one plus and two minuses. These pluses and
minuses are qualitative measures, not quantitative mea-
sures. Without some quantitative information (and the
trade-off weights) it cannot be determined whether the
plus outweighs the minuses. These signs or values
must also be weighted by the probability of each of the
constraints being binding. This weighting is further
complicated because changes in the tariff quota instru-
ments cause the probabilities to change. So, beyond
the fact that lowering the over-quota tariff always leads
to a welfare improvement or at least causes no harm,
little can be said about the other two instruments with-
out considerable empirical research, a formidable if
not intractable task.
The problem may be much less formidable than it
seems. The search has been for simple rules to liberal-
ize all TRQs, a “one size fits all” approach. Because
TRQs come in different sizes, the only universal pre-
scriptions are to reduce over-quota tariffs and to
employ auctions or allow resale of quota rights. As
shown in the next subsection, custom tailoring TRQ
liberalization may provide an attractive option.
TRQs come in three sizes
The distribution of TRQ fill is bimodal: Most TRQs
fill at either a high level or a low level. Figure 3-4
shows the distribution of fill rates for all TRQs report-
ed to the WTO in 1995-99. There were a total of 4,152
TRQ fill rate notifications. Over half of all TRQs
reported are high-fill — at least 80 percent, and over
one-quarter are low-fill rate — less than 20 percent.
Thus, less than one-quarter are medium-fill —
between 20 percent and 80 percent. 
TRQ fill rates may be treated as a “Markov Process.”
The basic idea is that year-to-year changes in fill rates
are, in part, random. They result from a combination
of changes in supply and demand in the importing
country and the sum of changes in supply and demand
in all other countries. For agricultural commodities,
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Table 3-6—How TRQ reforms affect market 
access and nondiscrimination 
Binding constraint
Actions In-quota Quota Over-quota
tariff tariff
Market access only
- t + 0 0
+ Q 0 + 0
- T 0 0 +
Nondiscrimination only
- t 0 - -
+ Q 0 ? -
- T 0 0 +
Both factors
- t + - -
+ Q 0 ? -
- T 0 0 +
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.66 ❖ Agricultural Policy Reform—The Road Ahead/AER 802  Economic Research Service/USDA
weather is a significant and random source for changes
in supply. Demand tends to be relatively steady but is
subject to macro-financial and exchange rate shocks.
The TRQ fill notifications filed with the WTO provide
3,026 observations of TRQs reporting fill rates for 2
consecutive years. These 3,026 pairs of fill rates can
be classified by whether they are low-, medium-, or
high-fill the first year and low-, medium-, or high-fill
the second year (table 3-7A). The probability that a
low-fill TRQ in the first year remained low-fill the sec-
ond year is 610/796, or 77 percent. This is calculated
by dividing the number of observations in the low-low
cell by the total of observations in the “low” row. The
row sum is the number of TRQs that were low-fill in
the first year. The probabilities that a low-fill TRQ
“migrates” to medium-fill or high-fill status can be cal-
culated by dividing the relevant cell by 796. The prob-
abilities for the other rows are calculated in the same
manner. A low-fill TRQ this year has a 77-percent
chance of remaining low-fill next year, a 15-percent
chance of being medium-fill, and a 9-percent chance
of being high-fill (table 3-7B).3
Because low-filling TRQs are likely to remain low fill-
ing and unlikely to be high filling in the subsequent
year, reducing the in-quota tariff rate for low-filling
TRQs is not likely to create rents. Such a discipline
allows a potential increase in market access with a low
risk of rent creation. Similarly, increasing the quota for
a low-fill TRQ will not increase rents, particularly if
there is no accompanying in-quota tariff reduction.
Table 3-7B also shows that high-fill TRQs have an 83-
percent chance of remaining high filling in the next
year, so a large reduction in the in-quota tariff for con-
sistently high-fill TRQs is likely to increase rents.
Similarly, increasing the quota for a high-fill TRQ is
likely to increase rents.4
Middle-fill TRQs tend to remain middle-fill 53 percent
of the time. The probability that they migrate to high-
fill is 27 percent, and the probability that they migrate
to low-fill is 20 percent. So, there is at least a 73-per-
cent chance that a small reduction in the in-quota tariff
will not create rents and a less than 27-percent chance
that it will. Requiring medium-fill TRQs to reduce
moderately the in-quota tariff will increase market
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Table 3-7—The relative stability of TRQ fill rates:
1995-99
A: Observations
Fill rate next year
A Low Medium High Sum
Low 610 117 69 796
Medium 138 368 183 689
High 82 179 1,280 1,541
Sum 830 664 1,532 3,026
B: Probabilities
Fill rate this year
B Low Medium High Sum
Low 0.77 0.15 0.09 1.00
Medium 0.20 0.53 0.27 1.00
High 0.05 0.12 0.83 1.00
Low < 20%; 20% < Medium < 80%; 80% < High
Source: WTO (2000).
3 The probabilities reported in table 3-7.B are based on the
changes in fill rates observed in 1995-99. The probabilities for
2001 will only resemble past rates to the extent that the future is
not dramatically different from the recent past. A second caveat is
that the probabilities are for the entire set of TRQs; they do not
necessarily apply to any single TRQ.
4 Fill rates above 80 percent are commonly viewed as “filled”
TRQs because it is often practically impossible to reallocate all
unused import licenses to willing importers. There is little incen-
tive for the holder of the unused portion of an import license to
surrender it earlier than absolutely necessary. Thus it is possible
for there to be quota rents when the fill rate is less than 100 per-
cent. Clearly, stronger enforcement of existing disciplines on
licensing allocation and reallocation would, by itself, liberalize
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access with a minor risk of rent creation. A moderate
increase in the quota volume would reduce the already
minor risk of rent creation.5
The three types of TRQs, as measured by fill rates,
lead to three distinct liberalization prescriptions (table
3-8). The liberalization actions for low-fill and medi-
um-fill can increase market access with very little risk
of rent creation and trade bias. 
Conclusion
Liberalizing TRQs within the framework and spirit of
the GATT-WTO requires consideration of two areas:
market access and trade bias. If the right to import in-
quota is allocated by auction or if unrestricted re-sale
of in-quota rights is allowed, then there is little risk of
trade bias. Thus, any of the three liberalizing actions
— reducing t or T or increasing Q — leads to an unbi-
ased expansion of market access. If in-quota import
rights are allocated by other means, then only one lib-
eralization action that can be applied to all TRQs leads
to an unambiguous expansion of potential market
access with no increased risk of bias: the reduction of
the over-quota tariff T. The other liberalizing actions
cannot be applied universally: Reducing the in-quota
tariff t or increasing the quota Q, can increase quota
rents and the risk of discrimination. 
The bimodal distribution of TRQ fill rates presents an
opportunity for creating additional market access with
little or no risk of trade bias. One may reduce in-quota
tariffs and increase quota volumes for TRQs that
exhibit persistent low-fill rates. The same liberalization
prescription could also be applied to TRQs with per-
sistent medium-fill, but with some risk of rent creation. 
Finally, market access could be enhanced if existing
WTO disciplines on TRQ administration and on
import licensing were better enforced. If the lack of
current enforcement stems from a lack of clarity in
existing disciplines, then clarification of the rules is
needed. 
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Many TRQ policies are country-specific, that is, importers
designate TRQ quantities to specific exporting countries.
The exporting countries often enjoy preferential access,
allowing them to receive higher domestic prices in quota-
restricted import markets and therefore capture either all
or part of the quota rent generated by the difference
between domestic and world prices. Assessing liberaliza-
tion options for these country-specific TRQs requires sort-
ing out the effects of potential quota rent losses, changes
in tariff revenues and their transfer to exporters in the
form of quota rents, and the effects of expanded trade
under a liberalized trade regime. The implications of tariff
cuts, quota expansion, or the combination of both will dif-
fer for importing and exporting countries. The trade and
welfare impacts must factor in quota rent changes (on the
exporter side), tariff reductions (on the importer side) and
welfare gains from improved resource allocation (Elbehri
et al., 2000). 
An examination of partial liberalization of sugar TRQs by
the EU and the United States helps illustrate the effects of
country-specific TRQ liberalization. EU sugar quotas are
targeted mostly to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific
(ACP) countries and India. Because imports exceed the
quota, high over-quota tariffs are in force. These exporters
gain quota rents because they export sugar duty-free to the
EU and receive the same support price as internally pro-
duced EU sugar. The U.S. sugar TRQs are allocated to
selected exporting countries on the basis of their average
historical market shares of U.S. sugar imports, and
exporters benefit from quota rents resulting from the dif-
ference between the domestic and world prices. This
analysis is based on a modeling framework for TRQ
regimes developed by Elbehri and Pearson (2000) and
assumes that in the case of sugar, all quota-holding
exporters are assumed to capture the entirety of quota
rents. Three sugar TRQ liberalization scenarios are con-
sidered: over-quota tariff cuts (by one-third), quota expan-
sion (by one-third) and the combination of both. Since in-
quota tariffs are small in the United States and zero in the
EU, they are not varied. 
Reducing over-quota tariffs for EU sugar by one-third
results in a net welfare gain for the EU but a net welfare
loss for countries exporting sugar to the EU. Quota-hold-
ing exporters experience a loss of quota rents as over-
quota tariffs are cut, reducing the per-unit quota rent. The
importer (EU), however, shows a net gain of tariff rev-
enues as total imports expand in response to lower tariffs.
Under this scenario, the EU expands sugar imports by 5.1
percent, reduces sugar exports by 12.1 percent, and
reduces domestic sugar output by 4.1 percent. The
increased exports result largely from quota-holding sugar
exporters from Africa, Caribbean, and Latin America, but
export growth does not fully offset the effects of declining
quota rents. 
When the EU expands the sugar quota by one-third,
changes in trade volume (compared to over-quota tariff
reduction) are smaller because the quota is initially well
below current imports in the benchmark equilibrium.
Furthermore, as imports from quota-holding exporters
Welfare Implications of Liberalizing Preferential Quotas
Aziz Elbehri
Welfare effects of sugar import liberalization (US$ million, 1995 constant)
EU sugar TRQ liberalization U.S. sugar TRQ liberalization
Scenarios 1/3 tariff 1/3 quota (A) + (B) 1/3 tariff 1/3 quota (C) + (D)
cut increase cut increase
(A) (B) (C) (D)
European Union 822.5 -168.3 474.7 3.7 1.0 1.0
United States -5.3 -7.8 -10.3 312.5 147.6 147.6
Exporters:
Brazil 1.2 -0.2 0.7 -22.7 0.6 0.6
Caribbean Americas -57.7 81.8 25.2 -68.9 -5.1 -5.1
Rest of Latin America -46.3 45.9 3.4 -44.8 -7.2 -7.2
Philippines 0.3 0.2 0.4 -15.9 -0.2 -0.2
Thailand -1.1 0.0 -0.9 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8
South Africa -33.1 35.2 4.2 -5.7 -1.0 -1.0
Rest of Africa -135.0 133.7 0.3 -9.7 -1.5 -1.5
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rise, so, too, does their price, limiting the growth in
demand. Expanding the EU’s sugar quota transfers EU
tariff revenue to exporters in the form of higher quota
rents. Consequently, expanding quotas by one-third leads
to net welfare gains by the quota-holding exporters while
the liberalizing country (EU) shows a net welfare loss
from reduced tariff revenues. However, the combination
of tariff reductions and quota expansion results in welfare
improvement for both the importing and the exporting
countries. This welfare gain reflects both the increase in
exporters’ quota rents and the increase of importer’s tariff
revenue. 
The United States imports little sugar over the quota, thus,
there is much less scope for transferring over-quota tariff
revenues to exporters as is the case with the EU.
Increasing the U.S. sugar TRQ means all sugar import
expansion in the United States occurs within the quotas.
In this case, per-unit quota rents fall sharply, and the wel-
fare of the quota-holding sugar exporters declines. The
exporters’ welfare declines less if over-quota tariffs are
cut. The United States shows a welfare gain under both
tariff cuts and quota expansion due to expanded imports
under either case. 
The trade and welfare implications from this empirical
analysis of sugar TRQ liberalization lead to two important
results. First, in those country-specific TRQ cases where
imports exceed quotas and where some exporters capture
quota rents as a result of preferential access, the welfare
effects of liberalization depend on what happens to both
over-quota tariffs and quota volumes. Second, developing
countries that export to industrialized markets under pref-
erential access can suffer welfare losses under over-quota
tariff reductions due to a loss of quota rents. At the same
time, exporters that do not benefit from allocated quotas
are poised to benefit from a more liberalized trading
regime, as they are likely to expand exports without hav-
ing to withstand an erosion of preferential margins or
quota rents. 
Since country-specific TRQs by importing industrialized
economies are justified as a form of foreign assistance,
one policy implication is that tariff cuts negotiated as part
of a multilateral agreement could also be complemented
with higher quotas, therefore minimizing the welfare loss-
es on those exporting developing countries with preferen-
tial treatment. In the long run, however, high-cost produc-
ers from developing countries would benefit less from for-
eign assistance than from shifting their economic activi-
ties toward areas in which they enjoy competitive advan-
tage. A move toward a more liberalized trade regime
would strongly encourage these adjustments of economic
activities, which would benefit developing economies. 
References
Elbehri, A., and K.R. Pearson (2000), “Implementing
Bilateral Tariff Rate Quotas in GTAP using GEM-
PACK,” Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)
Technical Paper No. 18.
Elbehri, A., T.W. Hertel, M. Ingco, and K.R. Pearson
(2000), “Partial Liberalization of the World Sugar
Market: A General Equilibrium Analysis of Tariff-Rate
Quota Regimes,” Presented at the AAEA Annual
Meetings, July 30-August 2, Tampa, Florida.Introduction
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
(URAA) created new global rules for the treatment of
domestic farm support by distinguishing support poli-
cies on the basis of their market-distorting potential
(table 4-1). The URAA placed “ceilings,” or limits, on
support from programs presumed to be the most trade
distorting (amber box support) while exempting other,
more market-oriented, programs from any limitations
under a set of special conditions (green box support).
Another exempt category (blue box) was devised for
payments related to production-limiting programs
(U.S. deficiency and European Union compensatory
payments), on the assumption that the limits offset at
least some production and trade distortions.
The URAA also defined a single, quantifiable national
indicator of trade and production-distorting support,
the “aggregate measurement of support” (AMS),
which includes the estimated value of only amber box
policies. Developed countries agreed to reduce their
AMS levels by 20 percent from a ceiling calculated as
their average annual level of overall support provided
in the base years, 1986-88. Thus, under the URAA,
countries with the highest level of amber support in the
base years were granted the highest support ceilings
(fig. 4-1). By using an aggregate measurement of
domestic support instead of commodity-specific sup-
port limits, countries could comply with their overall
WTO ceiling and avoid a binding limit on support to
specific, highly protected commodities such as dairy,
rice, and sugar (fig. 4-2).
WTO member countries have proposed a variety of
alternatives for further reducing domestic support. Two
generic scenarios are evaluated here: 1
• a “ceiling reduction scenario” that reduces overall
levels of domestic support ceilings from a 1986-88
base, allowing support levels to remain uneven
across countries and commodities, and 
• a “support-leveling scenario” which levels the dis-
persion of domestic support across commodities and
countries.
These options were developed to illustrate the implica-
tions for world and U.S. agricultural trade of two gen-
eral approaches to reducing domestic support. As such,
these scenarios do not represent specific proposals
under consideration in future negotiations.
Potential adjustments in global and bilateral trade
under these scenarios are discussed for selected coun-
tries and commodities. In addition, reform of policies
on raw agricultural products can change input costs for
domestically processed agricultural products, affecting
countries’ competitiveness in processed products. 
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Chapter 4
Options for Reducing the Aggregate Measurement of
Support in OECD Countries
C. Edwin Young, Mark Gehlhar, Frederick Nelson, Mary E. Burfisher, and Lorraine Mitchell
The URAA left in place uneven levels of domestic farm support across countries and commodities. This analysis
examines two generic approaches to reducing domestic support in the World Trade Organization negotiations. The
ceiling-reduction scenario reduces the URAA limits on countries’overall levels of domestic support. This approach
leaves in place the uneven base support ceilings established by the URAA. The more restrictive support-leveling 
scenario places commodity-specific limitations on the level of support relative to total value of production, thereby
reducing dispersion of relative support across commodities and countries. Potential adjustments in global and bilat-
eral trade under these scenarios are discussed for selected countries and commodities. U.S. agricultural exports
expand by similar amounts under both scenarios, even though the individual commodity adjustments are quite 
different.
1 This analysis evaluates amber box policies and does not evalu-
ate the impacts of blue box programs such as European Union
compensatory payments or green box programs such as U.S. pro-
duction flexibility contract payments.The AMS as a Starting Point
The AMS concept is a measure of production and
trade-distorting domestic support that includes:
• government subsidy expenditures on agriculture
• the value of market price support (measured as the
gap between domestic and fixed international refer-
ence prices) for commodities that receive adminis-
tered or guaranteed price supports.
All domestic support policies included in the AMS have
some effect on production and trade, but the magnitude
of effects varies considerably among different types of
policies (Young and Westcott, 2000; Rude, 2000).
This analysis uses a framework that recognizes that
different types of amber box programs affect produc-
tion and trade differently.2 Output subsidies and mar-
ket price support create the largest trade distortions by
raising producer returns and thereby creating direct
production incentives (table 4-2). Output subsidies
directly stimulate increased production by increasing
the expected returns from the subsidized commodity.
Subsidies on variable inputs such as seeds and fertiliz-
er, and on fixed inputs such as capital equipment and
buildings, raise output by lowering input costs.
Subsidies can also provide income support to the
farmer through direct payments intended to achieve a
guaranteed return. These payments affect only produc-
ers’ returns and may be somewhat less distorting of
consumer demand than market price support programs
that fix market prices. 
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Table 4-1—Treatment of domestic agricultural support in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
Category General criteria Examples of policies
Exempt support  Measures must be financed by the  Green box programs include direct payments
(green box) government rather than consumers and  to farmers that do not depend on current 
must not provide price support to producers  production decisions or prices; disaster 
assistance, and government programs on
Specific criteria are defined for general research, extension, and pest and disease 
government services, public stockholding, control
domestic food aid, direct payments,
and other programs
Exempt direct payments Direct payments under production-limiting Blue box policies are direct payments to
(blue box) programs must be based on fixed area and producers, linked to production of specific
yields, or cover 85 percent or less of the base crops, but which impose offsetting limits on 
level of production or head of livestock output
Nonexempt support Market price support, nonexempt direct Amber box policies include market price
(amber box) payments, and any other subsidies not specifically supports, and output and input subsidies
exempted are subject to reduction commitments







AMS ceilings and actual AMS as a percent of 
value of production, 1997
Source: 1997 WTO notifications.







2 Domestic support is measured in this study using (1) the
OECD’s producer support equivalent (PSE) measures of direct pay-
ments that are defined as amber box payments in the AMS concept,
along with (2) tariffs and export subsidies as a measure of market
price support for commodities that are supported using domestic
administered price programs to guarantee minimum prices to pro-
ducers. See appendix 2 for a more detailed discussion. Thus, the
AMS market price support (administered price) programs are
included, but they are measured in a way more consistent with the
PSE concept, which emphasizes current market value of the inter-
nal-external price difference in the world, than with the AMS con-
cept, which fixes the external reference price at 1986-88 levels.Market price support programs create a single price for
producers and for consumers that is higher than the
free market or world price of a commodity. The calcu-
lation of the market price support measure in the AMS
explicitly accounts for the operational linkage between
price support and trade policies. In order to maintain a
domestic price that differs from the world price, most
market price support programs rely on trade policies to
restrict imports and may require export subsidies. In
the absence of such trade policies, domestic price sup-
port and storage programs would become costly. 
If the new negotiations continue within the framework
of the URAA, market access limitations (tariffs and
other trade barriers) and export subsidies will be
addressed separately from domestic support, but
reforms of the three policies are linked. Reductions in
trade intervention alone could either reduce the effec-
tiveness and current subsidy value of market price sup-
port programs as domestic prices fall, or lead to a high-
er current subsidy value if countries respond with larger
expenditures on stock building or price subsidies.3  On
the other hand, constraints on a domestic support pro-
gram would not necessarily lead to a dismantling of
trade barriers. Such barriers can be beneficial to the
domestic sectors without the need for administered
prices, although the administered prices provide an
additional layer of intermediate support. 
In this analysis, reductions in the AMS are assumed to
be achieved by proportionally reducing all domestic
subsidy expenditures as well as the related tariffs and
export subsidies whenever commodities benefit from
administered market price support programs.4 Trade
policies not related to administered prices are
unchanged. In effect, tariff and export subsidy reduc-
tions lower domestic price levels and are used to repre-
sent market price support reductions, because further
WTO constraints on domestic support would be diffi-
cult to achieve without reforming the related trade bar-
riers that help keep domestic prices high. By reducing
trade policies, we may overestimate the effects of
reducing a domestic price support program, since in
practice the domestic program could be administrative-
ly removed while leaving the trade policy in place. 
Agricultural policy data are for 1998, the most recent
year for which a comprehensive policy database could
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4 Technically, the calculation of the AMS as defined in the
URAA would not change since it uses the gap between the admin-
istered price and a fixed base reference price, instead of the current
































Composition of AMS, 1997
Source: 1997 WTO Notifications.
3 The WTO AMS calculation excludes support that does not
exceed 5 percent of the member’s total value of production (10
percent for developing countries.)  But this de minimis support is
included in our estimates of the AMS on the assumption that trade
distortions do not begin or end when a threshold is reached. For
example, the estimates in this analysis include U.S. support for
programs such as crop insurance and irrigation subsidies that are
considered de minimis for reporting to the WTO. This approach
overstates domestic support. be assembled. AMS support levels were estimated for
11 of the 15 Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) countries for 1998 (see
appendix 2).5 Three OECD members — the European 
Union (EU), Japan, and the United States — account
for over 80 percent of all WTO domestic support ceil-
ings. Appendix 3 documents the global computable
general equilibrium model used to estimate scenario
impacts. 
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Table 4-2—Amber programs used in OECD countries1
Examples of  Expenditures 
Category Production effects amber policies ($ billion)
Market price support Raises producer and consumer U.S. sugar program 1522
(administered prices) prices above world levels
This price control can be implemented EU intervention
through government purchase and  price support
storage programs, whereby the 
government agrees to acquire domestically 
produced commodities at the announced 
minimum administered price
Administered prices in combination with 
trade policies, however, provide greater 
control over domestic prices, minimizing
costs of purchase and storage programs
Output subsidies Production incentives are greatest when U.S. loan deficiency  9
subsidies are tied directly to specific payments
commodities, since production decisions 
are based on the level of government
payments in addition to expected returns Mexico's former 
from the marketplace; resulting increases guaranteed producer 
in production tend to reduce domestic prices
prices, leading to some increased domestic
use and higher exports or lower imports
Capital subsidies Use of capital inputs increases, leading to  Investment tax credits 3
a longrun increase in production of capital-
intensive products Interest subsidies
Other input subsidies Output increases for commodities that Irrigation and insurance  7
use subsidized input subsidies
Transfer payments Whole-farm payments increase land  Canada's NISA 4
values, raise wealth and investment, 
and reduce risk aversion; aggregate output 
increases slightly, but cross-commodity 
distortions are not created, so these 
subsidies are assumed to have a smaller 
impact on production than other forms of
domestic support
1Countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development are Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, European Union, Hungary, Iceland, Japan,
South Korea, Mexico, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Switzerland, Turkey, and United States.
2OECD PSE measure of price support.This analysis uses actual tariffs and export subsidies as a measure of market price support for commodities that have
administered price programs.
5 Australia, Canada, European Union, Japan, Korea, Mexico,
Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Switzerland, and United States.Reform Options
WTO member countries have proposed a variety of
alternatives for reducing domestic support. Two gener-
ic scenarios are evaluated here.
The “ceiling reduction scenario” extends URAA lim-
its on the overall, aggregate levels of domestic support
by imposing an additional 20-percent reduction in sup-
port level ceilings — down to 60 percent of the 1986-
88 base. This leaves the base support ceilings estab-
lished under the URAA in place, which are uneven
across countries. It also continues to allow countries
maximum flexibility to concentrate support on individ-
ual commodities (table 4-3). Although reductions in
ceilings may cause countries to restructure the com-
modity allocation of their support, they are assumed in
this analysis to achieve lower ceilings by reducing all
types of amber box support among all of the supported
commodities by the same percentage. Countries are
thereby assumed to maintain the relative allocation of
subsidies among crops from the model base year
(1998). 
The EU would be required to reduce 1998 AMS sup-
port by a moderate 7 percent across all subsidized
commodities, while Japan would be required to reduce
support by 10 percent. Many countries, including the
United States, Canada, Mexico, Australia, and New
Zealand, would not be affected by a further 20-percent
reduction in AMS ceilings, since their 1998 level of
support was already below the new ceilings. 
The support-leveling scenario requires countries to
limit commodity-specific support to no more than 30
percent of their 1998 value of production. This is a
more restrictive scenario that reduces the dispersion of
relative support across commodities and countries. The
30-percent value of production was selected because it
permits the EU to maintain approximately the same
level of aggregate support as in the first scenario. This
provides a degree of comparability between the two
scenarios. Countries that provide less than the maxi-
mum commodity-specific levels of support are
assumed not to increase their subsidies. Proportional
cuts are assumed for all policies for a commodity if
the overall subsidy for a commodity exceeds 30 per-
cent of the value of production. 
Most countries have commodity programs that this
approach would affect, including the EU, Japan, the
United States, Canada, and Mexico (table 4-4). This
approach achieves significant trade liberalization in
commodities that tend to be most protected, including
sugar and dairy. 
In both scenarios, countries are assumed to continue to
use the same types of policies as in 1998. In actuality,
some countries have altered their programs in the
interim, or AMS reform could lead to further policy
change. If WTO domestic support ceilings are further
reduced (scenario 1), countries will likely have oppor-
tunities for alternative ways to provide support to their
producers. The use of blue and green box types of sup-
port may increase, or countries may elect to change the
mix of allowable commodity-specific support to focus
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Table 4-3—Reduction commitments required to lower AMS another 20 percent from 
Uruguay Round ceiling
AMS as percent of Cuts in AMS required to reach additional 20-percent









New Zealand 0 0
Poland 8 0
Switzerland 71 -2
United States 45 0
Only OECD countries represented in the CGE model are included in this table (excludes Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, and Turkey).
AMS = Aggregate Measurement of Support.
Source: ERS estimates using OECD PSE data and WTO notifications.on “favored” commodities, such as dairy and rice.
Likewise, if commodity-level support were constrained
to 30 percent of the value of production (scenario 2),
countries might elect to increase support for those
commodities currently under the 30-percent ceiling.
Clearly, it is not possible to predict which areas of sup-
port might increase. 
Finally, unless otherwise constrained by a new WTO
agreement, countries might substitute other policies
such as tariffs or nontariff barriers (labeling require-
ments, phytosanitary constraints, etc.) for AMS
domestic support. As a result, the trade adjustments
presented in this paper should be viewed as indicative
of the pressures for market adjustments that might
occur if domestic support were further constrained.
Rather than allowing trade adjustments, countries may
respond to these market pressures by adjusting the mix
of policy support provided to their farmers.
Leveling of Support Produces Larger 
Trade Impacts 
The analysis indicates that world trade expands more
when support is leveled across commodities than when
ceilings on overall support are lowered. World agricul-
tural trade expands by 0.3 percent under the ceiling-
reduction scenario, while under the support-leveling
case it increases by 1.2 percent. 
U.S. agricultural exports increase 1.3 percent when
AMS ceilings are lowered, and rise 1.7 percent when
commodity support is leveled (table 4-5). In the ceil-
ing-reduction scenario, U.S. export growth is mostly to
the EU, with an annual increase of  $440 million (table
4-6). In the leveling scenario, most U.S. export growth
is to Japan, with an annual increase of $500 million
(table 4-7). U.S. imports decline negligibly when ceil-
ings are reduced and increase by 0.5 percent in the
support-leveling scenario. 
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Table 4-4—Reduction commitments required to put commodity-specific AMS at 30 percent or less of 
value of production
Wheat Rice Coarse grains  Oilseeds Sugar
Percent change from 1998 AMS
Australia 0 0 0 0 0
Canada 0 0 0 0 0
European Union 0 0 0 0 -28
Japan -65 -64 -56 -17 -51
Korea 0 -57 -57 -61 0
Mexico 0 0 0 0 -9
Norway -37 0 -31 0 0
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0
Poland 0 0 0 0 0
Switzerland -35 0 -36 -52 -47
United States 0 0 0 0 -19
Dairy Beef &  Other Wool Fruits & Miscella-
products sheep meat vegetables neous
Percent change from 1998 AMS
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Canada -48 0 0 0 0 0
European Union -44 -15 0 0 -16 0
Japan -62 -6 -11 0 0 0
Korea 0 -27 0 0 0 0
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0
Norway -10 0 -20 0 0 0
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0
Switzerland -43 -36 -40 0 0 -40
United States -49 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 4-5—Changes in U.S and world agricultural trade resulting from reductions in support
Scenario: Ceiling reduction Scenario: Support-leveling
Change from base  Change from base
US$ million Percent US$ million Percent
U.S. exports 904 1.3 1,045 1.7
U.S. imports -19 0.0 244 0.5
World trade 1,402 0.3 5,422 1.2
See tables 13 and 14, page 18, for breakdown by country.
Source: ERS estimates.
Table 4-6—Changes in U.S. agricultural trade from a 20-percent reduction in URAA AMS ceilings 
Exports
Other Total Total
Canada Mexico EU EFTA Japan Korea countries exports imports
Change from base in US$ million
Rice 0.0 -0.1 6.1 0.1 17.0 0.0 0.7 23.9 -0.2
Wheat 0.1 1.6 55.8 3.1 15.0 1.6 63.2 140.5 -1.1
Coarse grains 1.0 -1.4 87.4 3.2 -6.7 -1.1 53.6 136.0 -13.9
Oilseeds 1.3 8.8 190.1 0.7 9.4 4.1 8.1 222.4 -0.2
Sugar 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 1.3 -0.4
Cotton and fiber 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.7 1.8 0.0
Fruit and vegetables 0.0 -0.8 18.4 2.1 40.2 8.9 -3.8 65.1 7.8
Other crops -0.8 -0.5 -12.6 0.4 3.6 3.4 -5.6 -12.1 11.3
Beef 2.0 -0.3 52.8 1.0 50.6 9.8 10.2 126.0 -13.4
Other livestock 5.2 0.9 17.0 1.4 37.8 14.3 68.4 145.0 -0.5
Dairy products 1.2 4.1 7.0 1.0 20.7 5.7 10.8 50.5 -0.6
Processed foods 3.1 1.5 16.6 0.0 -27.8 -2.7 12.6 3.3 -7.6
Total 13.3 13.8 439.6 13.0 160.5 44.3 219.0 903.5 -18.7
Source: ERS estimates.
Table 4-7—Changes in U.S. agricultural trade from reducing commodity-specific AMS to 30 percent or less
of the value of production
Exports
Other Total Total
Canada Mexico EU EFTA Japan Korea countries exports imports
Change from base in US$ million
Rice -0.3 -0.4 -1.7 0.6 265.4 0.3 -0.9 263.0 1.6
Wheat 0.1 -0.7 -5.7 9.2 87.9 1.4 41.7 134.0 3.7
Coarse grains 1.6 -0.4 -11.0 8.9 -18.5 -0.4 83.0 63.4 -25.4
Oilseeds -0.1 -1.6 -19.1 4.2 29.7 21.3 7.3 41.6 0.0
Sugar 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.2 0.0 2.1 4.9 111.3
Fiber 0.4 0.2 1.1 0.1 2.5 1.6 10.0 15.9 -0.1
Fruit and vegetables 0.9 -0.3 75.0 5.0 -14.3 0.1 8.8 75.4 -2.1
Other crops -0.2 -0.3 -15.4 -0.5 -2.4 -0.4 -1.5 -20.8 3.7
Beef 10.4 3.2 216.2 5.5 -4.4 23.7 31.5 286.2 -39.0
Other livestock 0.6 0.9 -2.0 1.1 9.5 4.9 8.4 23.5 -1.6
Dairy products 58.6 -21.4 40.0 2.2 164.6 -2.6 -44.4 197.0 173.8
Processed foods -1.3 0.7 -19.0 -0.6 -19.7 -3.9 4.4 -39.5 18.1
Total 71.4 -19.6 259.0 35.9 501.4 45.9 150.5 1,044.5 244.0
Source: ERS estimates.Trade impacts in the support-leveling scenario are
somewhat larger for two reasons. Limiting support for
individual commodities reduces large market distor-
tions for the most heavily protected commodities. For
example, in the ceiling-reduction scenario, Japan low-
ers its agricultural support by 10 percent for all sup-
ported commodities including rice, while in the level-
ing scenario rice support must shrink by 64 percent to
reach 30 percent of the value of production. Second,
since countries can no longer focus support on
“favored” commodities, more countries are drawn into
the reform process in the leveling scenario, including
NAFTA countries, which increases bilateral trade
opportunities.
Over 80 percent of the global trade effects for both
scenarios result from reducing the market price sup-
port and related import barriers and export subsidies.
Most amber box domestic farm support is provided
through market price support programs, and most price
support programs are implemented through trade
restraints and export subsidies rather than government
commodity stock holding. This suggests that only
negotiating tariff reductions would create significant
pressures for reductions in related domestic support
programs. The use of market price support compared
with other types of domestic support varies by com-
modity. Dairy support in OECD countries relies heavi-
ly on border measures in order to transfer income to
producers. Wheat and coarse grains in these countries
rely more heavily on direct payments to producers. 
U.S. Exports Gain in Both Scenarios 
The two approaches have the potential to affect world
commodity markets differently. As a large diversified
sector, U.S. agriculture benefits from both approaches.
While the value of total U.S. export gains is similar
under both scenarios, commodity impacts differ (tables
4-6 and 4-7). The export gains illustrate the directions
and relative magnitudes of the pressures that are likely
to result from policy reform. 
Under the ceiling-reduction scenario, changes in U.S.
exports are concentrated in bulk grains and oilseeds
destined for the European Union (almost $300 mil-
lion). The analysis assumes that the EU cuts amber
box domestic support for all commodities included in
the AMS by 7 percent. These cuts lead to decreased
EU domestic production and exports, which has the
direct effect of increasing U.S. exports to the EU and
the indirect effect of increasing U.S. sales to EU 
markets.
Under the support-leveling scenario, the largest U.S.
impacts are on rice exports to Japan. In this case,
Japan cuts domestic support for rice by 64 percent.
This leads to a potential annual increase in total U.S.
rice exports of almost 30 percent, a significant increase
for U.S. rice exports, since Japan imports mostly
japonica rice grown almost exclusively in California.
In order to expand U.S. exports of rice to Japan by 30
percent, japonica acreage in California would need to
remain at near-record levels, while part of current
exports to the Middle East and domestic processing
use would need to be diverted to the higher priced
Japanese market. U.S. dairy exports also increase by
about 30 percent in this scenario, with Japan being the
leading market. 
Under both scenarios, annual U.S. exports of meat
(beef, pork, and poultry) increase by about 4 percent
(about $300 million). In the ceiling-reduction scenario,
all types of meat exports increase. In the support-level-
ing scenario, most of the meat export growth occurs in
beef exports to the EU. This analysis does not account
for nontariff barriers such as the beef hormone ban,
which could limit potential U.S. export growth.
U.S. wheat exports increase about 3 percent (about
$140 million) in both scenarios. When the aggregate
ceiling is reduced, EU cuts in domestic support for
wheat lead to a decrease in its wheat exports. This cre-
ates an opportunity for U.S. wheat exports to expand
and to capture a larger share of the world wheat mar-
ket. However, when support is leveled, EU domestic
support for wheat is assumed not to be reduced, and
wheat imports from the United States are nearly
unchanged. Instead, U.S. wheat exports to Japan
expand, as Japan is required to cut support to all grains
by about 60 percent. 
U.S. fruit and vegetable exports increase by about $70
million in both scenarios. The increase in fruit and
vegetable exports are mainly to the EU and Japan
when ceilings are reduced and mainly to the EU when
support is leveled. The EU reports an administered
price program to the WTO for fruit and vegetable
products. This support is assumed to be cut by 7 per-
cent in the ceiling-reduction scenario and by 16 per-
cent in the support-leveling scenario, which creates
export opportunities for U.S. products. U.S. fruit and
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nario, because the cut in Japan’s support to grains and
oilseeds is large enough to free up land for increased
domestic production of fruit and vegetable products,
thereby reducing imports.
Adjustments in world dairy trade under the two sce-
narios reflect two characteristics of this complex sec-
tor. First, dairy is one of the most highly supported
sectors in world agriculture. Second, dairy trade is a
multiproduct sector with highly differentiated products
— cheese, for example. Consequently, many countries,
including the United States, import some dairy prod-
ucts while exporting other products. With this two-way
trade, reductions in foreign and domestic support can
lead to simultaneous growth in exports and imports. 
Liberalization can have positive benefits for U.S.
dairy. In the ceiling-reduction scenario, the U.S. is
not required to reduce any domestic support, includ-
ing dairy, while the EU, Norway, Switzerland, and
Japan cut dairy support. As a result, U.S. exports
expand somewhat while imports are almost
unchanged (table 4-6). 
In the support-leveling scenario, U.S. dairy support is
cut by 49 percent. In comparison, Japan reduces
domestic support by 62 percent, Canada by 48 percent,
and the EU by 44 percent. Reductions in world dairy
support help expand U.S. annual dairy product net
exports. 
Japan is a key market for world dairy trade. Japanese
dairy imports from all sources increase by about $1
billion when support is leveled. Though not a major
supplier, the U.S. is currently a supplier of frozen
dairy products to Japan. In the support-leveling sce-
nario, Japan represents the most important market for
increased U.S. dairy exports. Canada is another poten-
tial destination for U.S. dairy exports with the reduc-
tion in support levels. 
Domestic Support Reforms 
Could Have Spillover Effects
The two scenarios analyzed here have direct impacts
on commodities that receive amber box support.
Spillover impacts in related sectors may also occur if
the policy reforms affect input costs or if they free up
labor and capital for use in other sectors. 
While no policy changes are assumed for processed
agricultural products, these products are likely to be
significantly affected by AMS policy reforms.
Processed agricultural products include a wide range
of oilseed products as well as processed foods and
beverages. The main spillover effects are changes in
input costs (raw agricultural products) as countries
reduce domestic support. 
Prices of raw agricultural products are expected to
decline in countries that relied on market price sup-
port, permitting countries to expand production of
processed agricultural products. As a result the EU,
European Free Trade Association (Iceland, Norway,
Switzerland, and Liechtenstein), and Japan can expand
exports of processed products, and the EU, Japan, and
Korea reduce their imports of processed products.
Japan in particular increases exports of processed
products by $280 million while decreasing imports of
processed products by nearly $700 million. These
changes in Japan’s processed product trade illustrate
the potential problem of tariff escalation.6 If processed
foods are protected by a high tariff, lowering trade bar-
riers (market price support) for raw materials can
increase the effective rate of protection for processed
foods.
Other Direct and Indirect Impacts of Reform
A small number of countries have WTO domestic sup-
port reduction commitments. Of these countries, the
EU, Japan, and the United States account for over 80
percent of all WTO domestic support ceilings. Most of
the growth in U.S. trade resulting from the two scenar-
ios occurs among countries assumed to reduce domes-
tic support. Increased U.S. exports to two countries —
the EU and Japan — account for about 70 percent of
U.S. export gains under both scenarios. 
In addition to the direct benefits of policy reform
affecting U.S. exports to the EU and Japan, indirect
benefits to U.S. exports result from reduced competi-
tion in third markets. Changes in world wheat trade
illustrate these impacts. The EU relies heavily on non-
OECD markets as a destination. Reductions of 7 per-
cent in the EU’s amber box support under the ceiling-
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6 Tariff escalation refers to the situation where tariffs are zero
or low on primary (unprocessed) products, then increase, or esca-
late, as the product undergoes additional processing. Tariff escala-
tion can result in a significant bias against trade of the processed
product. reduction scenario lowers all forms of EU support,
including domestic subsidies and administered price-
related export subsidies for wheat. As a result, EU
wheat exports to non-OECD countries decline by $300
million, leaving a gap for other suppliers to fill. The
United States, Canada, and Australia increase wheat
exports, filling about one-third of the gap, leaving pro-
duction and trade by non-OECD countries to fill the
remainder.
Summary and Conclusions 
Two generic scenarios were selected for this study. In
one case the overall AMS ceiling is reduced to 60 per-
cent of the historical base, while the alternative
requires a leveling of support by commodity to levels
that do not exceed 30 percent of the 1998 value of pro-
duction. The ceiling-reduction scenario permits coun-
tries to maintain maximum flexibility to protect indi-
vidual commodities. The support-leveling scenario
constrains high levels of support among countries and
across commodities. 
The results show that the aggregate impacts for the
United States are similar under both scenarios. In the
ceiling-reduction scenario, export gains are largest for
wheat, feed grains, oilseeds, and meats. In the support-
leveling scenario, export gains are largest for rice,
meats, dairy, and wheat.
The market adjustments presented in this paper should
be viewed as indicative of the types of adjustments
that might occur if domestic support were further con-
strained as a result of WTO negotiations. The discus-
sion assumes that only domestic support is disciplined
and that countries do not alter the mix of domestic
policies that they provide to meet the new policy con-
straints. 
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Multifunctionality is an issue that has arisen in the new
WTO negotiations on agriculture as part of the continuing
discussions of distortions affecting agricultural markets
and trade. Multifunctionality refers to the concept that,
besides producing food and fiber, agriculture creates non-
food joint or spillover—multifunctional—benefits such as
open space, wildlife habitat, biodiversity, flood preven-
tion, cultural heritage, viable rural communities, and food
security. While the basic concept appears uncontroversial,
multifunctionality has become the subject of debate in
international forums because some countries seek to use
multifunctionality to justify exemptions from WTO com-
mitments to reduce their governments’ production-related
support to agriculture. 
The new agricultural trade negotiations will continue the
reform process with the long-term objective of achieving
“substantial progressive reductions in support and protec-
tion resulting in fundamental reform.” As part of the built-
in agenda of the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture (URAA), WTO members agreed that the new
negotiations would take into account “non-trade con-
cerns,” including certain multifunctional issues like food
security and the need to protect the environment.
The WTO disciplines policies based on their effects on
production and trade. In the URAA, countries agreed to
reduce spending on domestic policies that distort produc-
tion or trade, while policies that do not distort trade or are
minimally trade distorting were exempt from reduction
commitments. Some countries propose using policy
objectives (i.e., whether the policy’s aim is to achieve a
desired nonfood output) rather than its effects, as criteria
for determining which policies to discipline. This
approach could weaken WTO rules regulating domestic
agricultural policies that distort international markets. On
the other side of the debate, some countries maintain that
objectives can be met with different policies, including
many that are non- or minimally trade-distorting, and that
the most efficient way to meet policy objectives is to tar-
get the policy to the objective.
Arguments for multifunctionality can be made clearer by
examining the economic issues that underlie the argu-
ments for production-linked support.
Jointness. Some countries have argued that production of
food and nonfood outputs are closely linked in terms of
the economic principle of “joint products.” Joint products,
or jointness, characterizes a production relationship where
two (or more) outputs are produced from the same produc-
tion process. For example, hides and meat are joint prod-
ucts of cattle.  Proponents of this view maintain that the
socially desired nonfood outputs, such as scenic farmland
vistas, are produced jointly with agricultural production
which is necessary to obtain the nonfood output. Some
claim further that production-linked support for agriculture
is necessary to achieve multifunctional benefits. 
Opponents of this view argue that joint production rela-
tionships are not immutably fixed and can change over
time with changes in technology. The jointness defense of
production-linked agricultural support is argued to be
inconsistent with the current WTO criteria that any poli-
cies exempt from disciplines be only minimally trade dis-
torting. An alternative consistent with the reform process
is to produce the desired nonfood outputs independently
of agriculture through a range of policy instruments and
private actions. For example, scenic vistas and open land
can be produced through parkland or land used for recre-
ational purposes (such as golf courses).  These uses could
be undertaken by government or by private associations,
and could be encouraged through favorable tax treatment.
Externalities and market failure. Agricultural production
activities can have positive (and negative) side effects, or
externalities, that may not be accounted for in the market.
For example, a positive externality of agricultural produc-
tion might be flood protection, while the harmful effects
of agricultural runoff on water quality would constitute a
negative externality. In the multifunctionality debate, the
existence of positive externalities is frequently cited as
justification for government intervention in agriculture.
Similarly, some countries contend that some of these non-
food “outputs,” such as cultural heritage and scenic vistas,
are public goods that require government support to
ensure their supply. (Public goods are a certain class of
goods or services, like national defense, from which all
citizens benefit and are therefore usually supplied by the
government.) Countering this view is the fact that multi-
functional services need not originate in agricultural sup-
port policies.
Efficient policy design. Efficient policies target the spe-
cific objective associated with the nonfood output, and are
less likely to result in trade distortions. Production-linked
policies that target the nonfood objective indirectly are
more likely to have spillovers that distort production and
trade. The principle of efficient policy design—that poli-
cies should be targeted to the objective—is inconsistent
with the jointness rationale for production-linked support.
Multifunctionality: Options for Agricultural Reform
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Proponents of the joint production argument favor pursu-
ing the desired nonfood output indirectly by supporting
agricultural production, while efficient policy design sug-
gests that the policy be targeted directly to nonfood objec-
tives themselves, such as environmental or rural develop-
ment goals. For example, preservation of agricultural land
need not be accomplished indirectly through price sup-
port.  Alternative public policy instruments include specif-
ic programs for protecting farmland, conservation ease-
ments, and purchase of development rights. Private alter-
natives include land buyouts by private entities. 
Options for Reform
The issue for the multifunctionality debate is how to
accommodate demand for nonfood benefits of agriculture
while respecting fundamental principles of the GATT and
the guidelines agreed to in the URAA. Options include
the following:
Use minimally trade distorting government (green box)
policies to address non-trade concerns. The green box
contains specific provisions for addressing nontrade con-
cerns, including support for rural communities and ameni-
ties and payments for environmental programs.  Countries
seeking to preserve and increase multifunctional benefits
can adopt policies that are among the wide range of
options provided in the green box.
Use trade-distorting (blue and amber box) policies with-
in agreed-upon WTO limits to achieve domestic policy
objectives. Shifting some other expenditures to exempt
(green box) programs would provide greater flexibility for
a country to use trade-distorting support to achieve objec-
tives linked with multifunctionality.  
Private actions can increasingly be used to address a
number of nonfood objectives. Private groups can be
encouraged to undertake these actions through tax policies
and other inducements. 
For more information, see The Use and Abuse of
Multifunctionality (Bohman et al.) in the ERS WTO
Briefing Room: http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/wto/
pdf/multifunc1119.pdfIntroduction
In the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
(URAA), members of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the predecessor to the
World Trade Organization (WTO), committed to
reducing the volume of their export subsidies by 21
percent and the value of the subsidies by 36 percent
over 6 years, from 1995 to 2000 (14 and 24 percent
over a 10-year period for developing countries).
Members also agreed to continue agricultural negotia-
tions starting in the year 2000. Though the negotia-
tions in Seattle in December 1999 did not result in the
start of a new comprehensive trade round, negotiations
on agriculture are progressing under the URAA’s built-
in agenda. In these negotiations, the United States has
proposed reducing export subsidies to zero. 
Twenty-five countries have made WTO export subsidy
reduction commitments. The European Union (EU) is
the largest user of export subsidies, accounting for
roughly 90 percent of all export subsidy expenditures
(fig. 5-1). Because the EU is the dominant user of
export subsidies, this discussion will focus on the
impact of EU export subsidy elimination on U.S. agri-
culture. 
This analysis includes the following topics:
• an overview of EU export subsidy expenditures;
• explanation for the EU’s reliance on export subsi-
dies;
• the types of domestic policy reforms that would be
necessary for the EU to eliminate export subsidies,
and what past EU agricultural reforms have accom-
plished; and
• quantitative analyses of the effects of EU export
subsidy elimination.
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Chapter 5
Effects of Eliminating EU Export Subsidies
Susan Leetmaa
In the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) 25 GATT contracting parties agreed to reduce the volume
and value of subsidized exports. The current WTO negotiations on agriculture may impose further disciplines on
export subsidies. Export subsidies amounted to over US$ 27 billion from 1995 to 1998, and the European Union (EU)
accounts for nearly 90 percent of expenditures. This study analyzes the impact of eliminating EU export subsidies
either by bringing EU domestic intervention prices in line with world prices or by reducing domestic production to
match domestic consumption (eliminating exports). The impact on world markets would be felt mainly in the wheat
and pork sectors. In the case of wheat, world prices would decline as EU exports increased following production
shifts out of less competitive crops. Conversely, world pork prices would increase as EU exports decline.
















Export subsidy expenditure by country, 1995-98
Source:  Economic Research Service, USDA
Figure 5-1
$ billionAgricultural Policies Force Reliance
on Export Subsidies
Export subsidies are typically used by countries (such
as EU member states) whose domestic prices are sup-
ported above world price levels. Price supports stimu-
late production, often resulting in a production sur-
plus. Export subsidies are employed to bring the price
of the commodities down to world price levels, in
order to export surpluses. Because export subsidies
increase the world supply of commodities, they
depress world prices. 
The EU is the largest user of export subsidies in both
value and volume. According to its official notifica-
tions to the WTO of export subsidy use, the EU spent
an average of $6 billion annually from 1995 to 1998
subsidizing exports. Over the same period, the EU’s
volume of subsidized exports averaged about 28 mil-
lion tons a year plus 3.6 million hectoliters (95 million
gallons) of liquids (wine and alcohol). From 1995 to
1998 the EU subsidized nearly all of its exports of
coarse grains, butter and butter oil, beef, and skim
milk powder1 (fig. 5-2). The majority of wheat and
other dairy exports also required subsidies.
For most commodities, the EU supports high internal
prices and employs import barriers to keep cheaper
imported products out of the domestic market. The
size of EU export subsidies change with world price
and exchange rate fluctuations, as the price gap
between the domestic and world price is the per-unit
export subsidy. In the case of grains and beef, the EU
employs intervention systems that purchase domestic
products at guaranteed prices which act as price floors.
There is one intervention price for all grains, which is
currently set at 110.25 euro/ton (US$102/ton) and is to
be reduced to 101.21 euro/ton (US$93.7/ton) for the
period 2001/02 to 2006. Given world grain prices, this
common price implies relatively high subsidies on bar-
ley and other coarse grains compared to wheat. This
domestic price structure has encouraged barley and
other coarse grains production. Grain and beef produc-
ers also receive direct payments.2 Oilseed prices are
not supported; producers receive world prices for
oilseeds, as well as direct payments. Sugar and dairy
production are supported by high guaranteed prices,
and production is fixed by quotas. The EU is a net
exporter of dairy and sugar, both of which require sub-
sidies for export. 
WTO members are required to reduce their export sub-
sidies on a product-by-product basis. This ensures that
a country cannot reduce subsidization of one commod-
ity while increasing subsidies for another. The single
largest EU export subsidy expenditure has been for
beef, accounting for 22 percent of EU export subsidy
expenditures from 1995 to 1998, although its expendi-
ture share has been declining over time. Other com-
modities that have required large EU subsidy expendi-
tures are other milk products (yogurt, ice cream, etc.),
sugar, coarse grains, and incorporated products
(processed products produced from other EU agricul-
tural products). Grains have accounted for the majority
of the EU’s volume of subsidized exports, averaging
67 percent of subsidies from 1995 to 1998.
High world grain prices kept the EU’s use of export
subsidies well below WTO commitments in 1995 and
1996. For some time, the EU even imposed taxes on
wheat exports to keep domestic supplies from falling
and prices from rising. But when world wheat prices
fell in 1997 and 1998, subsidy expenditures and the
volume of subsidized exports increased. The EU has
carried over unused portions of its 1995 commitments
to make up for overruns in later years. The URAA has
been interpreted to allow the use of “rollover” of the
additional amount not used in earlier years to any of
the years up to 1999/00, after which “rollover” is no
longer possible.
EU Volume Commitment Has Been More
Binding Than Value
From 1995 to 1998, the EU has come closer to filling
its volume commitments than its expenditure commit-
ments. The only expenditure commitments that have
been consistently more binding than the EU’s volume
commitments from 1995 to 1998 have been for sugar,
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1 The EU uses export statistics from July-June expressed in
product weight for their notification of total exports and export
certificates issued during the marketing year in question in equiva-
lent weight, irrespective of actual date of export. Therefore, notifi-
cations of subsidized exports may exceed total exports notified,
and the percent of total exports subsidized as seen in figure 5-2
can exceed 100 percent.
2 The payments to grain and oilseed producers are partially
decoupled (i.e., although they are tied to area planted up to a maxi-
mum fixed area, yields are fixed at historical levels). The payments
to beef producers are fully coupled as they are tied to production,
though are only available for a fixed herd size.processed fruits and vegetables, tobacco, and alcohol,
none of which are included in the model in this analy-
sis. If the average of only 1997 and 1998 is taken, only
sugar and alcohol expenditure commitments have been
closer to their expenditure bounds than their volume
commitments. This is because the EU at the time was
carrying-over unused sugar subsidies from 1995 and
1996 to increase its subsidized sugar exports, and
because the per-unit subsidy expenditure is by far the
highest for the EU’s alcohol products.
It is likely that the EU’s value commitments became
more binding for grains in 1999 than in past notifica-
tions, because world grain prices were low in 1999.
Value commitments become more binding as world
prices fall, because the gap between the EU support
prices and world prices increases; volume limits also
constrain exports when prices are low. Therefore, even
though past WTO notifications have shown that the
value limit has been less restrictive than the volume
limit, that could change in the future if world prices
remain low. 
This situation highlights the importance of  both vol-
ume and value restrictions. Targeting both constrains
exports in times of both high and low prices. When
prices are low, the value limit becomes more constrain-
ing because the wedge between the domestic support
price and the competitive export price becomes larger.
Volume limits prevent export of excess supply in
response to low domestic prices. When world prices
are high, the value constraint becomes less binding but
the volume constraint can still be effective. Limits on
value and volume weaken the ability of export subsi-
dies to maintain fixed internal price support programs. 
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Figure 5-2
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EU Export Subsidies
The EU could employ a number of options to limit or
eliminate the need for subsidized exports. It could
apply production controls such as production quotas to
eliminate surplus production. Through the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP), the EU already employs
production controls for arable crops, dairy, sugar, and
beef, in the form of a mandatory land set-aside pro-
gram, and quotas. It also limits acreage and herd size
eligible for direct payments. However, most producers
dislike the existing production controls. Additionally,
production controls would have to be very limiting in
order to eliminate subsidized exports. The dairy quota
would have to be cut by over 30 percent, as the majori-
ty of diary products require subsidies for export.
However, the EU dairy quota is currently in the
process of being increased 2.4 percent due to the
Agenda 2000 reforms. Therefore, it is doubtful that
reducing production quotas would be a practical solu-
tion for EU export subsidy elimination.
If the EU elected to eliminate export subsidies without
changing agricultural policies, it would build unman-
ageable stocks of beef, coarse grains, and dairy prod-
ucts. Building stocks is costly to the government,
which would incur great losses if the stocks had to be
disposed of on the domestic market. Stockholding,
then, is not a likely method the EU would employ to
reduce or eliminate the need for export subsidies.
Another policy option the EU could employ to elimi-
nate reliance on export subsidies would be to reduce
support prices. This would increase domestic con-
sumption, possibly reduce domestic production, and
decrease the need for export subsidies. The EU’s past
two agricultural reforms have reduced support prices
and compensated producers by increasing direct pay-
ments, but not by the full amount of the price
decrease, such that total support falls. Policymakers
would most likely follow a similar path of reform in
the future.
Until the EU’s 1992 reform of the CAP, high internal
prices provided the majority of income support to
farmers. The 1992 reform lowered EU support prices,
instead supplementing farmers’ income with direct
payments, and imposed a land set-aside for supply
control. Agenda 2000 built on the 1992 reforms by fur-
ther reducing prices for some commodities while com-
pensating producers for half of the price decline
through direct payments. 
The Agenda 2000 policy reforms addressed the follow-
ing areas:
• Support prices. These were reduced for grains (15
percent) and beef (20 percent), and will be reduced
for dairy (15 percent) over 3 years beginning in
2006.
• Compensatory payments to producers. These
increased, except to oilseed producers whose pay-
ments were cut by 33 percent over 3 years in order
to equal the grains payment by 2002. After 2002,
compensatory payments will no longer play a role in
arable crop producers’ production decisions, as they
will be the same across commodities (except durum
wheat). 
• Land set-aside. Policy is maintained and the base
rate3 of the required set-aside is set at 10 percent
from 2000 to 2006.
• Dairy quota. Quota was raised 2.4 percent over the
period of the Agenda 2000 reforms.
• EU agricultural spending. Total was fixed for
2000-06 at 40.5 billion euros (US$37.5 billion) in
real terms.
Developing a Scenario for Export
Subsidy Elimination
This study analyzes the impact of eliminating EU
export subsidies by reducing internal EU prices until
domestic supply equals domestic demand, or until
world prices are equaled — whichever point is reached
first. If EU price declines bring domestic supply and
demand into balance before world price levels are met,
the EU would have no need to export. If prices fall to
world price levels, excess EU production is exported
because it does not require subsidies. 
Two external factors affect EU reliance on export sub-
sidies: world prices and exchange rates. The per-unit
export subsidy for a commodity is the gap between EU
and world prices. As world prices change, the gap
between EU and world prices changes, altering the
value of the subsidy and often the percentage of
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3 The base rate is the default set-aside rate. To change the set-
aside rate from the base rate, EU member countries would have to
agree on a new rate.exports requiring subsidies. If world prices increase,
the EU’s reliance on export subsidies decreases, and if
world prices decrease, the EU becomes more reliant on
export subsidies.
Similarly, changes in the value of the euro alter the
gap between EU internal prices and world prices. If
the euro increases in value, the EU perceives world
prices in euros to be lower and the need for subsidies
increases. Conversely, if the euro falls in value, world
prices faced by the EU appear to be higher, reducing
the need for subsidies.
Scenarios
In this study, two export subsidy scenarios are exam-
ined. One scenario reflects USDA’s 2000 baseline
exchange rates, with the euro’s value greater than US$1.
The second scenario assumes a U.S. dollar/euro parity
exchange rate. As of January 2001, the euro was worth
just less than US$1 ($0.96); however, the baseline
assumes a euro stronger than the dollar and appreciating
over time. The inclusion of two scenarios provides some
sensitivity analysis on how changes in exchange rates
can alter dependence on export subsidies.
The commodities included in this analysis are wheat,
barley, corn, other coarse grains, oilseeds and their
products, beef, pork, and poultry. These account for
just over 50 percent of EU expenditures on export sub-
sidies (not accounting for subsidy expenditures on
incorporated/processed products), and roughly 75 per-
cent of the volume of subsidized exports. The results
of this analysis are applicable to other EU commodi-
ties, in that the general direction of price movements
would be similar.
Dairy has been omitted from this analysis due to
model constraints. However, analysis of the EU’s
WTO export subsidy notifications suggests that current
dairy prices are too high to allow the EU to export
most dairy products without a subsidy. The EU export
subsidy for skim milk powder (SMP) has declined
over 80 percent from the January 2000 level (810
euro/ton to 150 euro/ton), though it is unclear whether
current market conditions will continue to allow for
such a small export subsidy. Currently, the world SMP
price is high, due to high demand, and subsidies are
low due to a relatively weak euro.
EU dairy price reforms under Agenda 2000 will begin
to be phased in in 2005 (a 15-percent decline over 
3 years). However, the EU milk production quota will
increase 1.2 percent in 2001 and by an additional 1.2
percent from 2005 to 2007. It is likely that the EU will
need to subsidize most dairy exports until at least 2005,
and perhaps longer. From 1995 to 1998, the EU subsi-
dized over 90 percent of its butter exports, nearly all
SMP and other dairy exports, and over 82 percent of
cheese exports. The Agenda 2000 15-percent reductions
in support prices are far smaller than the average 1995-
98 export subsidies for both butter and SMP. Therefore,
if market conditions are similar, the EU will probably
need to subsidize much of its exports even after the
dairy reforms are implemented. While there is no EU
support price for cheese, both butter and SMP are com-
ponents in cheese production. Dairy reform is thus not
likely to make EU cheese competitive in most markets. 
Key assumptions that drive the results of the analysis
include the following:
• The economic model used in this analysis includes a
very complete feed sector, including nongrain feed-
stuffs (such as corn gluten and manioc) which are
important components of EU feed, given existing
EU policy pricing. It is important to examine how
EU demand for all foodstuffs will change with the
elimination of grain price distortions the CAP has
induced. 
• As is consistent with actual trade flows, the model
assumes that pork and poultry exports are partially
price competitive; not all exports require subsidies.
• Imports do not respond to price changes. 
• The milk production quota remains in place for the
duration of the analysis, as do livestock headage
limits and area bindings for arable crops.
As in the official USDA baseline projections4 for the
EU, it was assumed that:
• the set-aside rate is fixed at 10 percent of arable
land,
• total farmland is fixed with only yields changing,
• the EU’s Blair House limits on oilseed area are
maintained,
• the EU dairy quota would remain in place through
the projection period 2001-09,
86 ❖ Agricultural Policy Reform—The Road Ahead/AER 802 Economic Research Service/USDA
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consumption, and trade for the period 2000-09. See USDA
Agricultural Baseline Projections to 2009, WAOB-2000-1.• the dairy quota also constrains EU beef production
as more than half of the beef produced is a product
of the dairy herd,
• stocks are held constant, and
• compensatory payments will stay at the Agenda
2000 rates for the period analyzed.
The EU will be able to export commodities without
subsidy when domestic EU prices are lower than or
equal to world prices. The base world prices for this
analysis are the prices used for the official 2000 USDA
baseline projection exercise. 
Scenario One: Export Subsidies Eliminated 
and Euro Stronger Than Dollar
Arable Crops: With a relatively stronger euro, even if
EU internal prices equal world price levels, the EU
would have exportable surpluses of all grains. Grain
prices would fall from a common internal price under
the CAP for all grains to different world prices for
each of the grains. The world price of wheat is higher
than for barley and other coarse grains (fig. 5-3); con-
sequently, EU wheat production increases at the
expense of other grains (table 5-1). The EU would 
export more wheat as production shifts out of less
lucrative crops.5 At much lower internal prices, barley
and rye feeding would increase while wheat feeding
would decline, as wheat would became a more costly
feed relative to other grains and would be exported.
Total area planted to grains would decrease, even
though wheat area would increase slightly. Oilseed
area would increase slightly as well, as EU oilseed
producers already receive world prices for their prod-
ucts and the relative decline in oilseed prices, due to
cross-price effects, would be less than that for coarse
grains. A slight decline in the world price of rapeseed
would result in a slight decline in yields and a minimal
increase in feeding of rapeseed, reducing EU exports
slightly.
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5 The other studies included in this report use a 1997 base year
and policies from 1998, when the EU was using export subsidies
for wheat. This study uses a time-path model that accounts for
changes likely to occur between our 1997 base year and future
years. One of these changes is that the world wheat price is
expected to increase, while the EU domestic support price is
expected to decrease, eliminating the need for EU export subsidies.
Additionally, this analysis holds imports constant at a fixed level,
whereas the other analysis allows imports to vary.Meats: If export subsidies were eliminated, the EU
would continue to be noncompetitive in exports of
beef, as the domestic price decline would drive up EU
beef consumption sufficiently to eliminate the need for
exports prior to reaching the world price. Direct pay-
ments constitute a large portion of the support beef
producers receive and much of the EU’s beef supply is
a by-product of the dairy herd; therefore, EU beef pro-
duction is not very responsive to price declines. The
model assumes that only 25 percent of any producer
price decline reaches consumers, as this has been true
of past price declines (which have not been as large as
in this scenario). Thus, the EU internal beef price
would have to decline nearly 60 percent to drive up
consumption sufficiently to absorb excess EU produc-
tion. However, even such a large price decline is not
quite enough to eliminate the need for export subsidies
for the type of beef the EU tends to export. As most of
EU beef is a by-product of the dairy herd, consequent-
ly much of it is used for ground beef. Additionally, due
to current EU policies, much EU beef has been in
frozen storage for many months (sometimes years),
which is undesirable to most consumers and signifi-
cantly reduces its value. The “world” price of EU beef
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Table 5-1—Elimination of EU export subsidies: Changes from 2000 baseline under two scenarios, 2007/08
Commodity Euro stronger than dollar Euro/dollar parity
Percent change
Wheat EU price -8.6 +14.9





Barley EU price -16.6 +3.1





Other coarse grains EU price -13.2 +8.2










Beef EU price -59.7 -39.3




Pork EU price -13.9 -0.1




Poultry EU price -12.0 +2.8




*EU beef exports do not compete with other world beef exports; hence there is no impact on the world beef price.
Note: All euro-to-U.S. dollar conversions assume an exchange rate of US$1 = 1.08 Euis therefore much lower than the world price of stan-
dard beef.
The EU does produce a relatively small quantity of
“premium” beef — grain-fed beef not produced from
dairy animals — which could be exported at a higher
price. However, it is unlikely that it would be exported,
as there is excess demand for high-quality beef in the
EU which cannot be fully met by U.S. or Canadian
beef, due to the EU beef hormone ban. Therefore it is
doubtful that the EU would begin to export higher
quality beef even if able to do so without subsidy.
However, the EU beef industry could restructure in
order to enter into the world’s higher quality beef
trade.
Smaller price declines than for beef would be neces-
sary to bring EU pork and poultry supply in line with
consumption. This is due to reduced feed costs and
narrower gaps between internal and world prices than
is the case with beef. The EU would be able to export
more pork and poultry without subsidy than they cur-
rently do. The EU is highly competitive in exports of
whole birds (most are exported to the Middle East and
North Africa) and Danish pork exports. However, it
would take a 12-percent decline in the EU poultry
price to bring EU poultry supply and demand into bal-
ance. To make EU poultry parts competitive with U.S.
poultry parts on the world market, EU poultry prices
would have to fall further. The U.S. is highly competi-
tive in the parts market since U.S. consumers are will-
ing to pay a premium for boneless chicken breasts;
therefore, the export price of U.S. dark meat (which is
preferred by consumers in many countries) is very
competitive. 
Scenario Two: Export Subsidies Eliminated 
and Exchange Rates at Parity 
A weaker euro than in the baseline scenario would
help the EU achieve export subsidy elimination. If the
euro remains at or near parity with the U.S. dollar, EU
prices would not have to fall as far as under the base-
line exchange rate scenario in order for the EU to
eliminate export subsidies. For most commodities, EU
internal price levels would be higher than those under
the baseline exchange rate scenario. 
Under exchange rate parity, the EU would have been
able to export wheat without subsidies starting even in
2000. The EU would experience a more pronounced
increase in wheat area, production, and exports than
under baseline exchange rates, since the internal EU
wheat price decline would be minimal and the wheat
price would be higher than prices for other grains. As
under baseline exchange rates, barley feeding would
increase, as wheat would command a higher price on
world markets and thus be exported. Consumption of
other coarse grains and oilseeds would be up as well,
but barley would capture the bulk of displaced wheat
feeding.
A euro/dollar parity would have little impact on the
livestock sector, as producers are less responsive to
price changes. As under baseline exchange rates, no
beef would be exported, since domestic supply and
demand would balance before EU export prices would
equal world prices. Pork and poultry exports would be
only slightly higher than under baseline exchange
rates.
Impact on U.S. Agricultural Sector
For most commodities, the impact of both scenarios on
the U.S. agricultural sector would be minimal. The
commodity most affected would be wheat, as EU
exports would increase under both scenarios, lowering
world prices. The larger the EU exports, the more they
would drive down the world price of wheat. The lower
the world price falls, the more U.S. wheat production
declines and consumption increases, decreasing
exports. If EU export subsidies were eliminated, the
world price would decline by about 6 percent and U.S.
exports could decline roughly 5 percent. There would
be little impact on other U.S. grain or oilseed exports,
with most changes around 1 percent.
Declines in EU livestock exports would drive up world
prices of livestock products. This would slightly
increase U.S. production, and consequently exports.
The largest impact would be in the beef sector, where
EU exports would be severely limited or eliminated.
U.S. pork exports could increase as well.
These results are similar to those in an OECD study of
global export subsidy elimination. That study also
finds that export subsidy elimination results in fairly
modest world price impacts. The largest impacts in the
OECD study were on world dairy markets, which were
omitted from this study. A substantial share of  trade in
world dairy markets occurs with subsidy. The OECD
study found that EU exports of butter and skim milk
powder would be severely reduced by 2005, while EU
cheese exports would increase. In the case of cheese,
Economic Research Service/USDA Agricultural Policy Reform—The Road Ahead/AER 802 ❖ 89the EU internal price would fall by 5 percent and the
world price would increase 10 percent on average.
They also found that EU milk price changes would not
be large enough to cause EU milk producers to under-
fill their quotas, so the production quota would contin-
ue to be binding. One slight drawback of the OECD
study is that the analysis does not include nongrain
feeds and consequently eliminates a new source of
demand for feed that would lead to an increase in both
food and feed grains with the elimination of export
subsidies. 
Conclusions
The current WTO negotiations on agriculture may
impose further disciplines on export subsidies, which
would have the most direct consequences for the EU,
as the world’s largest user of export subsidies. Past EU
agricultural reforms have reduced support prices and
increased farmers’ direct payments. This study finds
that if the EU employed similar reforms to eliminate
export subsidies or to bring domestic supplies in line
with domestic demand (which would eliminate
exports), the EU would continue to have exportable
surpluses of all grains, while the EU would remain
uncompetitive in beef exports. The impact on world
markets would be felt most in the wheat and livestock
sectors. In the case of wheat, world prices would
decline due to increased EU exports as production
shifts out of less competitive crops. Conversely, world
livestock prices would increase as EU exports decline
due to the reduction in EU livestock prices necessary
to reduce or eliminate subsidies. 
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Introduction
Despite improvements in global food availability over
time, many developing countries remain vulnerable to
food insecurity. Food security is defined as access by
all people at all times to enough food for an active and
healthy life. Three conditions must be fulfilled to
ensure food security: food must be available, each per-
son must have access to food, and the food must fulfill
consumption requirements. Many factors affect a coun-
try’s food security position, including the natural
resource endowment of the country, the level and vari-
ability of food production, population growth, income
distribution, and foreign exchange availability to import
food. Performance of these factors, in turn, is affected
by adoption of agricultural technology, environmental
degradation, domestic policies, employment, barriers to
trade, export earnings, import prices, political environ-
ment, and the state of the world economy.
This article highlights briefly how trade liberalization
may affect food security of low-income developing
countries. The global trade modeling results in Chapter
1 of this report are used as input to USDA’s Food
Security Assessment model to show how such out-
comes affect baseline food supply projections for these
countries (USDA, 1999). The projections of food gaps,
which exclude food aid, show that the food gaps are
reduced in varying degrees, depending on the trade lib-
eralization scenario considered.
Background
The developing countries account for the majority of
the world’s population (about 80 to 90 percent,
depending on definitions) as well as the majority of
the world’s countries. Characterizing these many dif-
ferent countries and economies is difficult. This article
focuses on 67 developing countries monitored in the
USDA’s Food Security Assessment report.1 These
countries account for about 40 percent of the global
population. Almost all are net food importers and his-
torically have received food aid. Forty-eight of the 67
countries are considered “least developed countries”
by the United Nations classification system. This
analysis excludes all high middle-income food-export-
ing countries, such as Brazil, Argentina and Thailand.2
To help classify these developing countries by econom-
ic characteristics, macroeconomic, trade partner, and
agricultural trade flow data were compiled in separate
tables (for additional geographic discussions, see Box).
Table 6-1 shows the macroeconomic structures of these
countries compared to all countries. In 1996, per capita
Chapter 6
Impacts of Agricultural Policy Reform on 
Low-Income Countries
Shahla Shapouri and Michael Trueblood
This article considers how global trade liberalization affects the food security of 67 low-income, food-deficit coun-
tries. In the baseline scenario, food gaps based on recent per capita availability levels are projected to reach 12.73
million tons. The first trade liberalization scenario isolates the impact of rising food prices and the second scenario
examines the additional effect of an increase in foreign exchange. The overall results show a slight decline in food
gaps of about 0.74 million tons. Regionally, Sub-Saharan Africa will gain the most because of its low food-import
dependency and high share of agriculture in total exports.
1 The countries are Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad,
Colombia, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Côte d’Ivoire, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia,
Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea (D.P.R.),
Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Tajikistan,
Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Vietnam, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe.
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income ranged from $261 in Sub-Saharan Africa to
$1,768 in Latin America. The largest population share
is in Asia, which includes India and Indonesia. Sub-
Saharan Africa and the New Independent States (NIS)
of the former Soviet Union are the most dependent on
foreign aid. Each geographic region has a low global
share of foreign direct investment (FDI), ranging from
0.2 percent in NIS to 3.7 percent in Asia. All low-
income countries account for only 14.5 percent of glob-
al investment, which is quite low considering China
alone accounts for 12 percent. With the exception of
the NIS countries, almost all of the countries are mem-
bers of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Most of these countries’ trade goes to developed coun-
tries, often due to historical ties and geographic prox-
imity (table 6-2). For example, the largest share of
Latin American countries’ trade is with the United
States, while both North Africa and Sub-Saharan
Africa trade mostly with the European Union (EU).
The Asian countries have relatively equal trade shares
with the United States, EU, and Japan. An exception is
the NIS countries, which are still interdependent on
trade with other NIS countries, in particular Russia.
Table 6-3 shows the different agricultural trade struc-
tures for these low-income countries. All regions are
net food importers, although Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia,
and Latin America are net agricultural exporters.3 All
regions are net importers of cereals, meats (except
Asia), and dairy products, and all are net exporters of
fruits and vegetables. Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and
Latin America are net exporters of beverage crops
(coffee, cocoa, tea, and spices).
A review of the historical export performance and
structure of different regions can provide insights to
the countries’ potential gains from trade liberalization.
Export growth data of 61 low-income countries during
1980-90 and 1990-97 show that Sub-Saharan Africa is
the only region that experienced a slowdown in export
growth between the two periods (from 3.0 percent to
1.6 percent per year). A simple comparison of trends
in export growth and commodity composition in dif-
ferent regions demonstrates the likely linkages
between these two factors. Sub-Saharan Africa, with a
high dependency on primary commodity exports,
experienced the lowest export growth of all the
regions. About 29 of 41 countries in the region depend
on only three primary commodities to provide at least
50 percent of their export revenues. In contrast, low-
income countries in Latin America, which have a simi-
lar share of agricultural exports, have been successful
in recent years in expanding the share of manufactured
exports, which tend to have higher demand than agri-
cultural goods. 
The low-income Asian countries have the largest and
fastest growing markets. These countries have
achieved a high level of export diversification (for
example, the share of manufacturing grew from 54
percent in 1980 to 74 percent in 1997). Their
Table 6-1—Macroeconomic indicators for 67 low-income countries compared to all countries, 1996
Average Share of
GNP Open- global Aid/
Region per cap. Pop. Agri. Indus. Serv. ness FDI GNP
U.S. dollars Mil. Percent of GNP Ratio1 Percent Ratio
67 low-income countries, 
by region
North Africa 1,302 124 15.8 36.3 47.9 55.0 0.4 2.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 261 547 32.5 28.1 39.4 72.9 0.9 9.0
Asia 520 1,622 24.2 31.6 44.2 43.3 3.7 0.9
Latin America  1,768 127 12.7 30.8 56.5 43.5 2.3 1.7
NIS 495 27 30.5 25.8 43.8 78.5 0.2 8.9
All countries, by income2
High income 26,527 893 2.0 34.4 63.6 41.4 63.4 0.0
Medium income 2,560 1,550 10.1 34.2 55.7 55.8 22.1 0.5
Low income 444 3,272 24.5 39.2 36.3 45.1 14.5 1.7
1Exports plus imports, divided by GNP.
2High income: > $10,000/cap.; medium: $700-$10,000/cap.; low income: < $700/cap.
Source: Author calculations, based on World Bank, World Bank Indicators 2000 CD-ROM database.
3 Agricultural exports include nonfood commodities such as
rubber, fiber crops (including cotton), tobacco, and hides and
skins.economies are rich in resources, in particular human
resources, and their markets are highly protected. As a
result, they can achieve significant export gains with
increases in global trade. During the last two decades,
the average growth rate of export earnings in low-
income Asian countries was almost double that of the
other developing regions.
Despite the variety of economic and trade structures,
low-income developing countries have some common
interests in the “three pillar” agricultural trade issues
(market access, domestic support, and export subsi-
dies), which affect import prices and market access.
These countries are also concerned with the projected
food price rises, food price volatility, and donor food
aid budgets, which declined throughout most of the
1990s. Many low-income developing countries also are
concerned about eroding trade preference arrange-
ments. For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, there is
concern about the erosion of special preferences of the
EU’s Lomé Treaty, which gives countries in the region
preferential access to the EU market. Currently, the
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Table 6-2—Trade partners for 67 low-income countries by region, 1996
Other
Region U.S. Japan EU15 developed Other World
Exports, value ($ million):
North Africa 2,763 488 16,787 871 6,359 26,397
Sub-Saharan Africa 9,734 1,105 18,721 1,180 15,130 44,690
Asia 24,357 21,432 26,948 4,378 54,378 127,115
Latin America 12,011 1,186 6,933 1,359 14,652 34,782
NIS 38 1 423 97 1,934 2,396
Export shares (percent):
North Africa 10.5 1.8 63.6 3.3 24.1 100.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 21.8 2.5 41.9 2.6 33.9 100.0
Asia 19.2 16.9 21.2 3.4 42.8 100.0
Latin America 34.5 3.4 19.9 3.9 42.1 100.0
NIS 1.6 0.0 17.7 4.0 80.7 100.0
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, 1999 Yearbook.
Table 6-3—Composition of agricultural trade, 67 countries, 1995-1997 average (US$ billion)
Total Total Total Fruit Bev. Oil-
Region merch. agri. food Cer. Meats Dairy & veg. crops seeds Sugar Other
Exports:
North Africa 26.1 1.9 1.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.7
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 76.2 10.5 4.8 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.7 4.7 0.2 0.4 4.1
Asia 128.5 17.3 9.1 2.6 0.3 0.0 1.9 3.6 0.3 0.5 7.9
Latin America 31.4 9.8 4.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 2.5 4.3 0.1 1.0 1.5
NIS 2.4 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4
Imports:
North Africa 38.2 9.1 7.4 3.6 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.8 2.6
Sub-Saharan
Africa 61.1 7.0 6.0 2.8 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.7 2.2
Asia 146.8 16.2 11.7 4.2 0.2 0.9 1.4 0.4 0.6 1.0 7.5
Latin America 45.4 6.3 5.0 2.4 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.3 2.1
NIS 3.8 1.2 1.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
Net exports:
North Africa -12.0 -7.2 -5.9 -3.4  -0.3  -0.7 0.5  -0.4 -0.2 -0.7 -1.9
Sub-Saharan
Africa 15.1 3.5 -1.2 -2.6 -0.1 -0.6 0.4  4.6 0.2 -0.3 1.9
Asia -18.3 1.1 -2.6 -1.6 0.1 -0.9 0.5 3.2 -0.2 -0.4 0.4
Latin America -13.9 3.5 -0.5 -2.2 -0.1 -0.4 2.0 4.2 0.0 0.6 -0.6
NIS -1.3 -0.7 -0.9 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.2 0.1
Source: UNFAO, FAOSTAT website database, June 2000.African countries face almost no tariffs for most of
their products exported to Europe (but the reverse is
not true), so there is not much room for further negoti-
ation.4 As developed countries have lowered their tar-
iffs to other developing countries (especially Asian
countries), however, the relative competitive edge of
Sub-Saharan African countries has eroded. Tariff esca-
lation is another area of concern for developing coun-
tries, which typically face tariff rates in developed
countries that rise for products involving higher levels
of value-added processing. 
Understanding the Link Between Trade 
and Food Security
To improve food security by increasing food availabili-
ty on the national level, countries have two options:
accelerate domestic agricultural production or increase
imports. The first option is possible for many of the
low-income countries that have performed below their
potential. In some countries, however, the agricultural
sectors have been performing well and yet the coun-
tries continue to face food gaps. For these countries, as
well as those where potential for agricultural growth is
limited, commercial imports have played a major role
in improving their food security position.5
For developing countries, global agricultural trade lib-
eralization can affect food security through (1) world
price levels, which can have a strong influence on
domestic producer prices; (2) export earnings
(incomes); and (3) availability of food aid. This article
focuses on world prices and export earnings.6
The most important components of agricultural trade
negotiations are the three pillars — domestic support,
export subsidies, and market access. These issues are
not equally important for all countries. In a scenario in
which major exporters would eliminate trade barriers,
domestic price support and export subsidies, the
expected effect would be a decline in exports of staple
foods and an increase in world prices (other market
conditions being constant). Those developing countries
that have adequate agricultural resources face a higher
price incentive to produce. For resource-poor coun-
tries, increasing the prices of food means that there
would be lower food imports and a reduction in for-
eign exchange availability for alternative uses.
Improvement in market access for exporters of restrict-
ed commodities could mean higher foreign exchange
earnings due to increases in world prices. Besides
financing imports, high rates of export growth can
indirectly affect a country’s creditworthiness and
attract foreign investment. On the other hand, countries
that have benefited from nonreciprocal market access
preference schemes provided by their trading partners
will experience little or no gain. 
Elimination of domestic support and export 
subsidies and increase in global food prices
Trade liberalization leading to a removal of domestic
support in the developed countries can be expected to
unambiguously raise world food prices, other policies
held constant. This occurs because lower prices induce
farmers in the protected developed countries to reduce
their variable inputs, which leads to a contraction of
global output. Similarly, removing developed coun-
tries’ export subsidies unambiguously raises the prices
to the food-importing countries. In both cases, rising
food prices would hurt consumers in developing coun-
tries, especially in the short run (assuming no protec-
tion in developing countries). Rising prices, however,
would send signals to expand output for domestic pro-
ducers, which may be beneficial in the long run in
terms of productivity and rural incomes.7
Market access and export earnings 
of low-income countries
Trade liberalization is expected to accelerate global
trade, improve economic efficiency, and increase eco-
nomic growth. The gain, however, depends on how
much trade is enlarged. The gain also will not be uni-
form among regions and countries. On the import side,
some developing countries with high tariff levels will
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4 About 95 percent of agricultural exports from the African,
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries enter the EU duty-free
(McQueen, 1998). However, trade barriers exist for commodities
that are sensitive for the EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP)
or for commodities that have separate trade protocols.
5 This has been the case for many countries in North Africa,
Latin America, and Asia, which have become more reliant over
time on commercial grain imports for their food supplies.
6 For low-income countries, food aid has been a supplement to
commercial imports. Food aid donations, however, are made at the
discretion of donor countries and the recipient countries have little
impact on the decision-making process regarding allocations. Also,
food aid is not likely to grow, given budgetary policies in many
donor countries and the expected decline in surplus food produc-
tion by donor countries. This means that commercial imports will
be the key to increasing food supplies in countries where produc-
tion growth is lagging. 
7 These dynamic gains from liberalization may be substantial,
given the importance and size of agriculture in developing
economies and the likely multiplier effects (Delgado et al., 1998;
Bonilla-Diaz and Reca, 2000).be forced to compete internationally, which will lower
domestic prices. This will reduce costs to consumers
and lower returns to producers. If tariff rates are rela-
tively low, however, world prices would be expected to
pass through the domestic economy, leading to higher
prices (recall that market access liberalization model-
ing scenarios in chapter 1 raise world prices as the ini-
tial lowering of producer prices induces shifts in sup-
ply and demand that ultimately lead to higher world
prices). On the export side, improved market access to
developed country markets should lead to an increase
in export earnings for developing countries. This result
is tempered, however, by the fact that many low-
income, food-importing countries already receive pref-
erential trade treatment through multilateral agree-
ments such as the Lomé Agreement and Caribbean
Basis Initiative, not to mention separate bilateral
treaties with developed countries.
Currently, industrial countries are the main trading
partners of all low-income countries. Most low-income
countries’ exports to industrial countries fall under
nonreciprocal preference schemes. In 1968, the inter-
national community adopted the concept of nonrecip-
rocal trade preferences to help developing countries
increase their export earnings. This concept served as
the basis for different Generalized Systems of
Preferences (GSP) schemes supported by the industrial
countries. These programs are determined unilaterally
by the preference-giving countries, and the programs
vary in terms of preference margins, commodity cover-
age, and beneficiary countries. The GSP schemes pro-
vide preferential market access in the form of zero tar-
iffs or tariffs significantly lower than normal rates to
exports of low-income countries. The nonreciprocal
trade preferences have increased trade ties between
developing and industrial countries. Therefore, interre-
gional trade remains limited, with the exception of
Latin American countries in the last decade. Poor
transportation systems and lack of export complemen-
tarity are among factors that impede interregional trade
growth. 
The results of pre-Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture (URAA) studies measuring the benefits
from preferential schemes differ, depending on the
degree of aggregation and commodity coverage. A
study examining the impact of preference erosion in
Sub-Saharan Africa concludes that African countries
would probably experience net trade losses as a result
of URAA tariff cuts (Yeats, 1994). Another study esti-
mates that losses due to the erosion of preferences
would be 1.5 percent of the export earnings of all
African countries (Weston, 1995). Another study esti-
mates that the total potential value of the main three
preference givers (United States, EU, and Japan) was
$1.9 billion in 1992. About 33 percent went to Africa,
40 percent to Latin America and the Caribbean, and
the rest to countries in the Far East and Oceania
(Yamazaki, 1996). For African countries, the estimated
value of preferences was about 1.2 percent of their
export earnings.
Overall, the loss of low-income countries’ preferences,
or competitive edge, in the markets of industrial coun-
tries relative to other suppliers is significant but not
large. The final gain from global liberalization, howev-
er, depends on the degree to which trade is enlarged
from trade liberalization, in particular how world
demand changes for commodities that low-income
countries export. Global trade liberalization is project-
ed to increase the demand for developing countries’
exports. Countries with more diversified market struc-
tures and trading partners are likely to adjust quickly
and take advantage of incentive signals, while coun-
tries with weak market infrastructures that rely on few
export commodities will show limited gains (World
Bank, 1987; Shapouri and Rosen, 1989). 
The growth in demand and trade in agricultural prod-
ucts among developing countries will be a critical fac-
tor in boosting exports of these commodities, while
trade with developed countries is expected to grow at a
slower pace. As one study indicates, there are low
price and income elasticities of import demand by
developed countries for most primary commodities
exported by low-income countries (Bond, 1987).8
Similarly, a study of demand and supply elasticities
found that the income responsiveness to agricultural
exports from developing countries was lower than that
found for minerals and energy (Goldstein and Khan,
1984). Among agricultural commodities, the income
responsiveness to exports of beverages, tobacco, and
agricultural raw materials was lower than for food. The
results also indicate that the price response of export
supply generally is lower than corresponding price
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8 An elasticity typically measures the degree of responsiveness
to prices or incomes, which is free of particular monetary units.
For example, a price elasticity of -0.20 (typical of necessity foods
like wheat or sugar) means that if prices were to increase by 10
percent, demand would decrease by only 2 percent.elasticities of demand in the short run, but is higher
over the long term. 
Modeling Food Imports and Gaps Under
Alternative Scenarios
The Food Security Assessment (FSA) model deter-
mined the direct impact of changes in the growth paths
of food prices and foreign exchange earnings, food
imports, and food gaps in 67 low-income countries in
5 regions (Shapouri and Rosen, 1999). Economywide
effects are not considered. A baseline scenario was
developed for these countries for later comparisons.
According to this baseline forecast, long-run food gaps
will grow over the next decade. To maintain recent per
capita availability levels (status quo), the gaps are esti-
mated at 12.7 million tons; nutrition-based food gaps
are 21.9 million tons (table 6-4).9 In each scenario,
Sub-Saharan Africa has the largest food gaps, which
are disproportionately large compared to the region’s
population share.10
The first scenario focuses on the price impacts of full
agricultural trade liberalization (removing domestic
support, export subsidies, and market access). Chapter
1 of this report finds real-world food prices rise by
about 12 percent in the long run.11 The direct implica-
tion of higher prices is twofold. On the import side,
higher food import prices will reduce the import
capacity of the low-income developing countries,
thereby reducing imports. On the production side,
higher international prices outweigh relatively low pro-
tection levels (by the pass-through effects) and
increase incentives to producers.12 Over the long run,
higher prices reduce commercial food imports slightly
compared with the baseline scenario, but induce a pos-
itive supply response. The net result for all countries is
a small decline in both status quo (12.63 million tons)
and nutritional gaps (21.39 million tons). The results,
however, vary by region. Food gaps will increase in
regions that are highly dependent on imports for their
staple food consumption (e.g., North Africa). This
increase occurs because the decline in commercial
imports cannot be offset by the increase in domestic
production. In contrast, in Sub-Saharan Africa, where
import dependency is low, the gains from the produc-
tion response will lead to lower food gaps. It should be
noted that estimates are based on the parameters of
price responsiveness used in the model (i.e., any tech-
nological changes due to an increase in investment
influenced by market liberalization are not included in
the estimated results). 
In the second scenario, in addition to the price effects
listed previously, developing countries’ exports
increase in nominal terms by about 30 percent.13 It is
important to note that the loss of preferences due to
global agricultural trade reform is not taken into
account in the model. Again, the results indicate that
the impact is small. Total status quo food gaps decline
from 12.63 to 11.99 million tons while nutrition needs
decline from 21.39 to 20.53 million tons. In each case,
this is a slight additional reduction from the baseline
scenario. 
Three factors account for the relatively small impact
on food security of the additional export growth in a
full-liberalization scenario. First, in low-income coun-
tries, the food production response to the increase in
prices is low unless investments are increased to
improve agricultural productivity. Second, agriculture’s
share of total exports in the developing countries is
declining (similar to developed countries). In fact, in
the base period, agricultural shares of total exports are
13 percent for Asian countries and 7 percent for North
African countries. Thus, even with high agricultural
export growth (31.3 percent cumulatively), total export
earnings increase only by 4 percent (Asia) and 2 per-
cent (North Africa) over the 10-year projected period
(assuming no growth in other sectors). 
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9 The status quo food gap is calculated by comparing projected
availability of per capita food supplies against a recent 3-year aver-
age per capita consumption target. The nutritional food gap is cal-
culated by comparing projected per capita food supplies with mini-
mal nutritional requirements. 
10 Food aid generally has not been sufficient to meet food needs
around the world. Cereal food aid donations have fluctuated over
the years, averaging about 11.2 million tons over the 1980-98 peri-
od (FAO, 2000). Food aid has exceeded 15 million tons twice,
once in 1987 and again in 1992. However, for the 1996-98 period
(before the effects of the Asian and Russian financial crises), food
aid donations averaged only 6.8 million tons.
11 For the modeling purposes here, the 12-percent price increase
is treated as a 1.2-percent increase per year over a 10-year horizon.
The FSA model uses the USDA baseline food price forecasts,
which are projected to decline for the next decade, so an increase
in the growth rate of prices still implies that prices are declining.
12 Chapter 1 of this report shows that tariff rates are relatively
low in developing countries, so this result should not be too sur-
prising. However, it needs to be emphasized that much of the tariff
data are unavailable for many of the 67 low-income food-import-
ing countries analyzed here. This model assumes that protection
levels are similar to those that are available for the other develop-
ing countries in chapter 1.
13 Like the first scenario, this additional real export growth is
phased in over a 10-year period as an increase over the trend fore-
cast of real export growth.Third, total food imports are a small component of
overall food availability in many low-income coun-
tries. Therefore, even a relatively high growth rate in
agricultural exports that leads to an increase in com-
mercial imports has a small impact on overall food
availability. In these countries, many in Sub-Saharan
Africa but also in other regions, food aid comprises a
large share of total imports (about 20 percent on aver-
age in Sub-Sahara Africa in recent years). It is also
important to note that the regional results of agricultur-
al market liberalization mask the differences at the
country level. For example, countries such as Ethiopia
and Nicaragua, which have a large share of agricultur-
al exports (94 percent and 50 percent during 1995-97)
and a low level of food imports, will gain the most
from market liberalization. Nutritional gaps are pro-
jected to decline by 25 percent (Ethiopia) and 50 per-
cent (Nicaragua) over the projected period. In contrast,
for a country like Algeria, which has no agricultural
exports and high food import dependency, the nutri-
tional gap is projected to increase by 44 percent. 
In sum, agricultural trade liberalization will slightly
reduce the food insecurity of low-income, food-deficit
countries on average, but the impact will vary depend-
ing on the country. For most food-insecure countries,
however, domestic food production is the most impor-
tant factor influencing food security position.
Domestic food production contributes to about 90 per-
cent of availability in food-insecure countries. In these
countries, an increase in investment to expedite the
adoption of new technologies, in addition to market
liberalization, is the key to improving food security. 
Improved market access leading to higher export earn-
ings also falls short of solving the food security prob-
Economic Research Service/USDA Agricultural Policy Reform—The Road Ahead/AER 802 ❖ 97
Table 6-4—Summary of food gaps in 67 low-income countries under different modeling scenarios 
(million tons)
Region Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2
North Africa
Production 32.01 32.35 32.33
Commercial imports 24.04 23.10 23.30
Status quo food gap 0.72 1.12 1.03
Nutritional food gap 0.91 1.31 1.22
Sub-Saharan Africa
Production 145.51 148.15 148.06
Commercial imports 12.06 11.63 12.49
Status quo food gap 8.30 7.79 7.38
Nutritional food gap 16.57 15.63 15.07
Asia
Production 405.69 409.24 409.21
Commercial imports 22.70 21.05 21.56
Status quo food gap 3.22 3.16 3.14
Nutritional food gap 3.45 3.44 3.42
Latin America
Production 16.19 16.61 16.53
Commercial imports 16.17 15.39 16.85
Status quo food gap 0.47 0.51 0.44
Nutritional food gap 0.89 0.91 0.82
NIS
Production 5.96 6.04 6.03
Commercial imports 1.93 1.82 1.87
Status quo food gap 0.02 0.05 0.00
Nutritional food gap 0.07 0.10 0.00
Total, 67 countries
Production 605.36 612.39 612.16
Commercial imports 76.89 72.99 76.07
Status quo food gap 12.73 12.63 11.99
Nutritional food gap 21.89 21.39 20.53
1 This scenario considers only the price effects of agricultural trade liberalization.
2 In addition to the price effects in the first scenario, this scenario also considers changes in exchange earnings.lems in low-income countries. In many cases, the
export growth needed to boost the import capacity to
the level necessary to close the food gaps is simply
unrealistic. For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, com-
mercial food imports must grow nearly 10 percent
annually to close the average nutritional gap by 2010.
The parameters used in the model assume that the
response of food imports to changes in foreign
exchange availability is not one-to-one. Thus, in order
to achieve a 1-percent growth in commercial food
imports, foreign exchange availability must grow by
1.2 percent to 1.4 percent, depending on the country.
Consequently, the export growth requirement would be
more than 12 percent to 14 percent per year to achieve
the 10-percent growth requirement. Clearly, achieving
such high growth in total export earnings based on
agricultural reforms is unlikely. Eradicating food inse-
curity in poor countries is a complicated task that
requires a comprehensive strategy to increase export
earnings in both the agricultural and nonagricultural
sectors, as well as increase domestic food production. 
Conclusion
This article considers how global trade liberalization
affects the food security of 67 low-income, food-
deficit countries. In the baseline scenario, food gaps
based on recent per capita availability levels are pro-
jected to reach 12.73 million tons, while nutrition-
based food gaps are 21.89 million tons in the next
decade. Two scenarios were used to assess the impact
of the global market liberalization. The first scenario
focused on the impact of rising food prices, and the
second scenario studied the impact of full agricultural
trade liberalization on foreign exchange earnings. The
results indicate that the impacts are positive but rela-
tively small in both scenarios. Several factors explain
this relatively modest result, including low production
response, small food import or export shares, and low
initial export growth rates. 
To put these food gaps in perspective, it is helpful to
compare these projections with recent food aid vol-
umes. Global food aid donations twice have reached a
peak of 15 million tons, once in 1987 and again in
1992 (UNFAO, 2000). Based on this historical experi-
ence, it is possible that the status quo food gaps could
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Sub-Saharan Africa 
• Very low per capita income; high dependency on foreign and food aid
• Exports mostly primary commodities, imports grains and dairy products
• EU is the largest trade partner; intra-regional trade is very low
• Low productivity growth
• Nonreciprocal preferences are important (GSP, Lomé)
• Weak infrastructure inhibits trade 
North Africa
• Mostly middle-income countries
• Arable land and water resources are very limited, leading to highly volatile production
• Share of food imports is increasing
• EU is the largest trade partner; recently signed EU trade preference agreement
Low-Income Latin American Countries
• Relatively high per capita incomes
• Exports beverage crops and fruits and vegetables; imports grains and dairy products
• United States is the largest trade partner; intra-regional trade is very high and growing
• Trade protection has been substantially reduced in last decade
• Nonreciprocal preferences important for most countries (GSP, Lomé, CBI)
Low-Income Asian countries  
• Most populous region
• Relatively low, but growing, per capita incomes
• Exports beverage crops and fruits and vegetables; imports grains and oilseeds
• EU, United States, Japan equally large trade partners; intra-regional trade is very limited
• Trade protection has been substantially reduced in last decade, but is still high
• Nonreciprocal preferences important for most countries (GSP)
• Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) very important to region
Regional economic structures and concernsbe met with food aid donations. It should be noted,
however, that food aid volumes have not exceeded 10
million tons since 1994, partly due to donors’ budget
pressures. In addition, food aid is not necessarily allo-
cated based on needs, which means that an increase in
quantities may not reduce food insecurity in these 67
low-income, food-importing countries.
Although international agriculture market liberaliza-
tion is an important factor affecting food security,
reform is not sufficient to alter the situation signifi-
cantly. Most studies show much larger gains in devel-
oping countries resulting from economywide market
liberalization. The experience of developing countries,
in particular Latin American countries, shows that
market liberalization and implementation of structural
adjustment policies improves the performance of the
agricultural sector, including both food and export
crops. Improving export performance has enhanced the
financial condition and creditworthiness of these coun-
tries and thereby has attracted foreign investment. For
the low-income, net food-importing countries, increas-
ing export earnings will increase the capacity to import
not only food products, but also capital goods that are
essential for long-term growth. 
The baseline projection of food availability indicates a
decline in per capita food availability for Sub-Saharan
Africa and some Latin American and Asian countries.
For these countries, accepting a decline in per capita
availability from already low levels could have severe
nutritional consequences. Increased food aid alone,
however, will not solve the problem. Further global
market liberalization aimed at diversifying exports will
help stimulate earnings growth. Commodity diversifi-
cation would improve export performance because a
decline in the price or the volume of one commodity
would have a less disruptive impact on a country’s
overall receipts. For the resource-poor countries where
poverty and agricultural resource degradation are
growing, such as Haiti, Bangladesh, and many coun-
tries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the situation is expected to
deteriorate unless external investment and assistance
are provided.
Agricultural market liberalization can improve another
important dimension of food security in low-income
countries — the disparity in purchasing power within
countries. In low-income countries, most of the food-
insecure people live in rural areas. Any increase in the
prices of agricultural commodities because of increas-
es in world prices or increases in earnings resulting
from improvement in market access can reduce income
disparity between rural and urban population. In coun-
tries such as India, Pakistan, Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire, and Nigeria, if avail-
able food were distributed equally, everyone would
meet nutritional requirements. Unfortunately, the
insufficient incomes of the poorest segment of these
populations do not allow them to gain access to avail-
able food. 
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Appendix table 1-1—Uruguay Round Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) agricultural tariffs 
of selected OECD countries
UR tariffs
UR tariffs Simple average mean Tariff dispersion
Average Average Average Average 0-5 5-25 25-100 100.0
Base Bound Base Bound
Australia 86.0 98.0 7.7 3.9 74.0 24.0 1.0 0.0
Canada 70.0 72.0 27.2 21.8 57.0 34.0 2.0 8.0
Czech Republic 100.0 100.0 17.5 12.2 48.0 40.0 11.0 1.0
EU 66.0 67.0 31.6 21.1 30.0 46.0 20.0 3.0
Hungary 100.0 100.0 44.1 29.3 13.0 28.0 59.0 1.0
Iceland 81.0 81.0 156.5 102.3 29.0 14.0 18.0 39.0
Japan 82.0 82.0 44.0 33.4 37.0 44.0 13.0 6.0
New Zealand 91.0 99.0 13.9 7.3 51.0 46.0 3.0 0.0
Norway 40.0 46.0 196.4 152.0 45.0 4.0 6.0 44.0
Poland 100.0 100.0 56.1 35.9 17.0 42.0 35.0 6.0
Slovakia 100.0 100.0 17.6 12.6 55.0 33.0 10.0 2.0
Slovenia 76.0 76.0 18.5 15.3 76.0 5.0 15.0 5.0
Switzerland 8.0 15.0 159.1 126.1 24.0 20.0 24.0 32.0
United States 49.0 53.0 16.6 11.9 63.0 27.0 9.0 1.0
All above 71.0 74.0 61.4 45.0 41.0 31.0 16.0 13.0
Source: Wainio, Gibson, and Whitley in this report, based on AMAD.
Appendix 1
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Appendix table 1-2—Tariff rate quota regimes: Numbers of tariff quotas and average fill rate 
for selected countries
Cereals Oilseeds Sugar Dairy Meat
Number Simple Number Simple Number Simple Number Simple Number Simple
of TRQ  average of TRQ  average of TRQ  average of TRQ  average of TRQ  average
lines fill rate lines fill rate lines fill rate lines fill rate lines fill rate
Canada 4 53 1 6 11 98 4 100
EU15 15 62 3 100 12 92 28 76
Japan 4 92 1 57 12 59
United States 1 14 2 100 6 100 24 72 1 71
Korea 15 93 5 67 2 50 5 58 7 54
Norway 37 55 2 98 2 97 14 54 32 56
Switzerland 3 82 2 61 6 88
Hungary 7 20 4 35 2 53 4 24 8 60
Iceland 17 64 22 75 3 100 4 67 13 26
Poland 12 99 4 2 8 - 14 58
Colombia 13 93 20 75 4 71 5 100 17 64
Philippines 2 100 1 100 9 33
Thailand 2 50 6 50 1 2 46
South Africa 11 70 8 82 3 96 6 40 5 98
Venezuela 19 56 19 63 3 78 6 57 10 39
Beverages Fruit and vegetables Fibres Total
Number Simple Number Simple Number Simple Number Simple
of TRQ  average of TRQ  average of TRQ  average of TRQ average
lines fill rate lines fill rate lines fill rate lines fill rate
Canada 21 85
EU15 1 2 25 94 87 66
Japan 1 94 1 45 20 67
United States 5 44 7 33 54 66
Korea 1 100 20 73 2 31 67 70
Norway 1 100 116 74 232 65
Switzerland 3 97 9 96 28 90
Hungary 4 30 33 51 70 43
Iceland 1 100 18 84 90 70
Poland 5 2 37 16 3 na 109 41
Colombia 4 100 2 100 67 79
Philippines 1 7 14 50
Thailand 5 40 1 23 48
South Africa 1 75 12 54 1 100 53 71
Venezuela 1 100 61 58
All fill rate values are for 1998 except for Iceland and Venezuela, where the reported fill rates are from 1995-97 average.
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Appendix table 1-3—Summary data on export notifications to the WTO: 1995-1998
1995 1996 1997 1998 1995 1996 1997 1998 1995 1996 1997 1998
Value of notified subsidy Percent value of WTO  Percent volume of WTO
(US$ million) commitments commitments
Wheat
European Union 155.3 402.6 201.5 560.3 5.1 15.1 9.3 29.5 13.6 75.0 72.4 83.3
Hungary 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 45.9 0.0 0.0 0.1
South Africa 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rice
European Union 39.6 91.5 37.0 28.7 55.5 141.3 68.6 58.3 54.4 144.2 50.2 99.0
Other grains
European Union 396.9 493.3 309.8 855.8 18.9 26.0 19.8 60.1 48.2 90.3 69.9 123.3
Hungary 4.9 0.0 0.0 9.8 281.6 0.0 0.0 412.6 42.7 0.0 0.0 81.3
Oilseeds
Hungary 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 11.3 13.8 0.0 0.0 5.4 4.9 0.0 0.0
Vegetable oilmeal
European Union 81.2 49.5 8.8 0.0 77.8 52.2 11.2 0.0 96.4 103.7 72.6 0.0
Turkey 1.3 0.0 0.2 1.0 -- 0.0 -- -- -- 0.0 0.7 5.1
Sugar
Columbia 5.0 4.6 4.9 4.4 -- -- -- -- -- 33.6 170.2 80.6
European Union 495.8 665.7 883.5 890.2 51.7 76.5 121.8 134.1 55.0 80.1 117.8 111.5
Poland 0.1 15.8 8.8 13.0 0.2 35.8 21.4 34.2 0.7 116.4 149.2 119.0
Slovakia 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.6 3.5 0.0 23.6 24.3 4.2 0.0 100.0 100.0
South Africa 4.8 10.7 7.9 7.9 -- -- -- -- -- 5.1 5.0 3.3
Turkey 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 97.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Dairy
Canada 37.5 4.2 0.0 0.0 117.6 15.7 0.0 0.0 -- 2.0 0.0 0.0
Czech Republic 40.1 43.7 50.0 59.4 -- -- -- -- 101.9 69.0 71.2 41.6
European Union 2043.6 4123.4 2495.0 2271.7 -- -- -- -- -- 457.9 84.0 73.9
Norway 63.7 64.9 84.1 80.0 -- -- -- -- -- 85.2 101.2 121.5
Slovakia 6.3 7.0 11.8 11.7 -- -- -- -- -- 54.4 63.6 76.7
Switzerland 285.8 269.6 305.3 275.6 81.0 78.1 80.8 78.8 86.5 82.0 81.7 79.7
United States 0.0 0.1 110.2 145.3 0.0 -- -- -- 0.0 45.4 72.4 90.3
Bovine livestock
Hungary 9.9 12.4 6.0 0.0 -- -- -- 0.0 -- 118.8 -- 0.0
Switzerland 26.1 15.1 0.1 0.3 93.9 55.5 0.3 1.1 110.9 80.1 0.8 4.0
Non-bovine livestock
European Union 1970.7 1935.9 953.4 720.0 -- 85.4 50.8 42.3 94.9 116.5 93.7 76.1
Iceland 5.5 7.3 0.1 0.0 26.5 39.4 0.8 0.0 61.4 10.4 -- 0.0
Norway 3.1 2.5 13.1 14.2 -- -- -- -- -- 15.9 82.1 808.6
Non-bovine meat
European Union 2815.7 4877.7 3005.0 3662.2 -- -- -- -- -- 9.2 9.5 11.0
Hungary 9.2 6.8 11.8 18.0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Switzerland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 -- -- 100.0 0.0 67.7 78.2
United States 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.4 0.0 0.0 -- -- 0.0 0.0 -- --
Fruits and vegetables
Colombia 8.4 12.9 17.1 14.8 -- -- -- -- -- 75.9 105.3 126.7
European Union 92.1 78.4 29.5 35.4 90.7 85.1 38.4 50.4 98.8 98.6 98.1 93.0
South Africa 12.8 30.7 11.8 0.0 -- -- -- -- -- 23.8 15.2 0.0
Switzerland 14.4 0.0 6.6 21.3 -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 25.9 69.1
Turkey 0.3 17.6 14.0 5.2 -- -- -- -- -- 46.4 38.9 10.5
Other food products
Colombia 1.4 1.4 0.8 0.9 33.0 -- -- -- -- 1.2 0.6 91.4
Cyprus -- -- -- -- 76.9 81.5 53.9 91.7 68.4 73.9 231.2 181.5
European Union 791.0 956.3 795.6 815.8 -- -- -- -- -- 81.1 61.6 56.8
Hungary 5.7 1.2 0.1 1.1 90.6 17.3 1.3 12.9 9.4 6.6 0.2 1.5
Norway 3.9 5.7 7.3 6.2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
South Africa 9.5 16.8 9.6 0.0 -- -- -- -- -- 101.0 52.4 --
Switzerland 120.3 118.0 132.6 141.8 84.3 84.5 86.8 -- -- -- -- --
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Appendix table 1-4—Effective export subsidy rate (ratio of export outlays over value of exports), 1998




Cereal grains n.e.c. 34.2
Vegetables, fruit, nuts 0.8 2.7 2.3
Crops n.e.c. 0.4 26.9
Bovine cattle, sheep, goats,
and horses 7.4
Animal products n.e.c.
Meat from bovine cattle, sheep 
and goats, horses 27.1 65.4 0.5 32.6
Meat products n.e.c. 4.2 1.8 56.9
Dairy products 24.2 28.0 97.4
Sugar 54.4 1.6 6.2
Food products n.e.c. 4.5 0.2 0.4 0.3





Vegetables, fruit, nuts 1.0 65.6 0.9
Crops n.e.c. 0.1
Bovine cattle, sheep, goats, 
and horses 3.9
Animal products n.e.c.
Meat from bovine cattle, sheep 
and goats, horses 45.2
Meat products n.e.c. 0.3 0.0
Dairy products 26.7 80.1 0.1 18.6
Sugar 1.9 2.6
Food products n.e.c. 0.6 1.3 10.4 2.0
Source: ERS calculations based on WTO export subsidy notifications and UN FOB trade data from 1998. Subsidy data for the EU and United States are from 1997
because they better match the 1998 trade data. EU sugar subsidy expenditures include subsidies for ACP countries, which were not included in their WTO 
notification.Measuring Domestic Support
To develop a consistent measure of 1998 domestic
support, we organize data from the 1998 OECD
Producer Support Estimates (PSE), Agriculture Market
Access Data (AMAD) tariffs, and WTO export subsidy
notifications into a policy database that is consistent
with the concept of domestic support as defined in the
AMS (app. table 2-1). We do not use AMS data, since
countries’AMS notifications to the WTO have been
sporadic. PSE data are also not comprehensive: They
are only available for OECD members.1 However,
three OECD countries, the European Union, Japan,
and the United States, account for over 80 percent of
WTO domestic support reduction commitments. 
While both the PSE and the AMS are measures of
domestic support, their concepts differ. Thus, without
further manipulation, the PSE database cannot be used
for analyzing options for domestic policy reform using
current WTO criteria. The PSE is a broad concept
designed to measure overall developments in agricul-
tural policies, across countries, based on a measure of
current benefits to farmers (or costs to consumers and
taxpayers). The PSE has two components: market
price support and budgetary outlays. It includes the
effects of trade policies (import barriers and export
subsidies) in its measure of market price support,
which is calculated as the gap between the domestic
producer price and a current world reference price for
each commodity. It also includes all government bud-
get expenditures on farm programs, including exempt
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Appendix 2
Measuring Agricultural Policies
1AMS equivalents were estimated for 11 of the 15 OECD coun-
tries for 1998. Poland was selected to represent the transition
economies. Turkey was excluded since it does not have any WTO
domestic support reduction commitments. Iceland was excluded
because it is not represented in the economic models used in this
report. 
Appendix table 2-1—Domestic subsidy expenditure in OECD countries, categorized by production impacts
(excludes market price support programs)
Australia Canada EU Iceland Japan Korea Mexico
Percentage of value of production net of subsidies
Fixed payment per unit of output1
Unlimited/amber 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Limited
Amber 0.0 0.0 1.3 17.8 1.4 0.0 0.0
Blue 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Fixed payment per unit of intermediate input2
Unlimited/amber 0.0 2.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.3
Limited 
Amber 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.2 0.0 0.2
Blue3 0.0 0.0 9.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Direct and whole-farm payments4
Unlimited/amber 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Limited/amber 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0
Green   0.8 0.3 1.6 9.8 0.0 0.0 4.0
Capital-based payments5
Unlimited/amber 0.0 1.0 0.0 2.4 2.6 1.9 0.0
Limited/amber 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Green   0.1 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Other policies with minimal 
impacts6 1.3 0.1 2.9 1.2 0.2 0.0 0.5
Total green 2.2 0.4 6.3 11.0 0.2 0.0 5.5
Total amber (excl. market 
price support) 0.3 5.2 1.8 21.5 5.3 3.2 0.5
Total blue 0.0 0.0 9.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Continued(green box programs), nonexempt (amber box), and
blue box forms of domestic support (see box).
The AMS is a narrower measure. In contrast to the
PSE, the AMS measures only the domestic support
that is subject to URAA disciplines (amber box poli-
cies). In general, the AMS excludes explicit trade poli-
cies (import barriers and export subsidies) that are cov-
ered by the PSE because these policies have separate
conditions placed on them by the URAA. The AMS
calculation also excludes support that does not exceed
5 percent of the member’s total value of production
(10 percent for developing countries). Trade policies
are included in the market price support component of
the AMS only for commodities for which there is an
administered price support program. In contrast to the
PSE, the AMS calculation of market price support is
measured as the gap between the current administered
price and a fixed reference price for each commodity.
The reasoning is that the gap then reflects only those
variables over which policymakers have control, rather
than current market conditions. 
For our analysis, we define “domestic support” as an
economic concept based on the AMS. To calculate the
PSE-based AMS, we reorganized and augmented the
PSE data in four steps. First, we decomposed PSE data
on budgetary outlays into green, amber, and blue box
forms of support based on WTO notifications, when
available, and ERS calculations. 
Next, we identified commodities for which there are
administered price support programs (app. table 2-2).
For these commodities, we include a measure of market
price support in our calculation of the AMS. Because
our objective is to model production and consumption
responses to changes in relative prices under policy
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Appendix table 2-1—Domestic subsidy expenditure in OECD countries, categorized by production 
impacts (excludes market price support programs) —continued
Norway New Zealand Poland Switzerland U.S.
Percentage of value of production net of subsidies
Fixed payment per unit of output1
Unlimited/amber 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8
Limited
Amber 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Blue 29.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Fixed payment per unit of 
intermediate input2
Unlimited/amber 0.0 0.3 1.7 0.3 1.7
Limited  
Amber 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0
Blue
3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Direct and whole-farm payments4
Unlimited/amber 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8
Limited/amber 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Green   0.5 0.0 0.0 8.9 2.8
Capital based payments5
Unlimited/amber 2.2 0.0 0.9 1.7 0.0
Limited/amber 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Green   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other policies with minimal
impacts6 5.4 0.0 0.7 13.4 3.3
Total green 5.9 0.0 0.7 22.3 6.1
Total amber (excl. market
price support) 2.2 0.3 2.6 2.2 5.3
Total blue 29.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1/  Includes variable and fixed payments per unit of output. 2/  Includes variable and fixed payments per unit of input. Includes crop insurance and payments on
area or animal numbers if these affect  relative returns and crop mix. Excludes disaster payments and credit subsidies. Environmental and conservation-oriented
are assumed to be exempt as defined by Annex 2 of the URAA and are not included here.3/  Includes programs in EU, Iceland, and Norway with offsetting supply
controls.The EU has some blue policies with unique regulations that are not necessarily supply control but which are included here. 4/  Includes payments
assumed to accrue jointly to land, labor, and or/capital--or to just land. Includes payments based on area (but not animal numbers) if these do not affect crop mix.
Includes long-term real estate subsidies.There are no "blue land based payments," as blue box programs are usually commodity specific.5/  Includes some
exempt policies, reflecting that some of these payments are possibly production distorting.Includes payments based on specific nonland assets. May include short-
term credit subsidies. 6/  Includes all other PSE data not included elsewhere. Includes URAA Annex 2 exempt policies except those assumed to accrue to land,
such as decoupled direct payments. Includes environmental and conservation payments, disaster payments, and credit subsidies.Economic Research Service/USDA Agricultural Policy Reform—The Road Ahead/AER 802 ❖ 107
Appendix table 2-2—Commodities with administered market price support programs
Wheat Rice Course Oilseeds Sugar Milk Beef  and Other Wool Misce-




European Union x x x x x x horticulture
Iceland x x x
Japan x x x x x x x potatoes
Korea x x x x
Mexico x
Norway x x x x x potatoes
New Zealand
Poland x x x
Switzerland x x x x x x
Turkey  
United States x x peanuts
Source:  WTO notifications.
Producer Support Estimate (PSE) Sum of A to H Examples of programs
A. Market Price Support
1. Based on unlimited output U.S. milk and sugar programs
2. Based on limited output EU and Canadian milk programs
B. Payments based on output
1. Based on unlimited output Norway deficiency payments program
2. Based on limited output Japanese rice payment, U.S. and Canadian crop 
insurance programs
C. Payments based on area planted animal numbers
1. Based on limited area or numbers
2. Based on unlimited area or numbers EU compensatory payments
D. Payments based on historical entitlements
1. Based on historical plantings, animal numbers or production Mexico PROCAMPO
2. Based on historical support programs U.S. production flexibility contracts
E. Payments based on input use
1. Based on use of variable inputs Input subsidies, interest concessions
2. Based on use of on-farm services Extension services, pest and disease control
3. Based on use of fixed inputs Capital grants, interest, and tax concessions
F. Payments based on input constraints
1. Based on constraints on variable inputs Limits on fertilizer and pesticides
2. Based on constraints on fixed inputs U.S. CRP
3. Based on constraints on a set of inputs Organic farming
G. Payments based on over-all farming income
1. Based on farm income level Income tax concessions, Canadian NISA




General Services Support Estimate
Consumer Support Estimate
Source: OECD (2000).
Classification of policy measures included in the OECD Producer Support Estimatereform, we attempt to measure the actual price wedges
implied by the trade policies that are linked to a market
price support program. Therefore, we incorporate the
actual applied tariffs from the AMAD database and
export subsidies based on WTO notifications. We do
not use the broader measure of market price support as
calculated in the OECD PSE, or the more narrow mea-
sure used in the AMS. In effect, we use tariff elimina-
tion to represent market price support elimination, rec-
ognizing that they are not fully equivalent. By eliminat-
ing the tariff, we may be overstating the effects of elim-
inating a domestic price support program, since in
practice, the domestic program could be administrative-
ly removed while leaving tariffs in place. Such barriers
can be beneficial to the domestic sectors without the
need for administered prices, but the administered
prices provide an additional layer of short-run protec-
tion to producers and also a strong incentive for the
government to maintain effective barriers.
Third, we differentiate and model the impacts that dif-
ferent types of domestic subsidies can have on produc-
tion and trade. Domestic subsidy expenditures are con-
ceptualized as being separable into five generic types:
subsidies linked to output; subsidies linked to inputs;
whole-farm transfer payments that do not distort rela-
tive returns among sectors and which are often capital-
ized in land values; sector-specific subsidies to capital
inputs; and subsidies with minimal trade impacts (app.
table 2-3). The categorization of countries’ policies
according to their production effects is based on the
new OECD PSE classification system and descriptions
of the operation of specific policies and programs in
the WTO notifications and other sources. 
The AMS calculation also excludes support that does
not exceed 5 percent of the member’s total value of
production (10 percent for developing countries). This
de minimis support is included in our analysis on the
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Appendix table 2-3—Links between OECD PSE data,WTO notifications, and effects of policies 
on production
WTO "color" Australia Canada EU Japan Korea Mexico
Fixed $/unit of output
Unlimited Amber B1 B1 B1 B1 B1
Limited
Nonexempt Amber B2 B2 B2
Blue Blue B2
Fixed $/unit of 
intermediate input
Unlimited Amber C1,  E1 C1  (except C1, E1 C1, E1
livestock),
Limited   E1 (livestock)




Unlimited Amber (1 - .17)
x G1
Limited Amber
Exempt 5/ Green G .17 x G1 D1, D2, F1,  G D1+G2
G1, G2, F2 
(except beef)
Capital based payments
Unlimited Amber E3 E1 + E3 E3
Limited Amber F2
Exempt Green E3 E3 E3




Continued—assumption that trade distortions do not begin or end
when a threshold is reached.2
Domestic subsidies are incorporated into the com-
putable general equilibrium models (CGE) used in this
report based on their linkage to production. Output
subsidies directly stimulate output. Subsidies on inter-
mediate and capital inputs raise output by lowering
input costs. Some output and input subsidies (blue
box) are offset with supply limitations; we incorporate
these limitations explicitly as increases in aggregate
land area or land productivity when the blue box pro-
grams are removed. The most important program mod-
eled this way is the EU compensatory and set-aside
payments program, which is modeled as an input sub-
sidy linked to the production of specific crops, with
explicit supply constraints to capture the set-aside
requirements. Direct, whole-farm payments to farm
households do not affect the crop mix or directly affect
aggregate production levels, but are capitalized in
aggregate land values. We represent whole-farm pro-
grams in the CGE models as government transfers to
households. These programs include the U.S.
Production Flexibility Contracts, the Canadian
National Income Stabilization Accounts (NISA),
Mexican PROCAMPO payments, and some green box
programs in the EU and EFTA countries, including
landscape maintenance payments, environmental
schemes, and disaster payments.
Direct, whole-farm payments are assumed to have
minimal effects on production and trade; they are
incorporated into the CGE models as payments to the
farm household that increase aggregate consumption
of all goods, including agricultural products. The
extent to which farm household transfer payments may
affect production is the subject of debate. Tielu and
Roberts (1998) describe how decoupled payments may
stimulate aggregate production through their effects on
increasing farm investment by increasing wealth and
lowering risk, reducing farm exit by raising land val-
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Appendix table 2-3—Links between OECD PSE data,WTO notifications, and effects of policies on 
production—continued
WTO "color" Norway New Zealand Poland Switzerland US




Blue Blue B1, B2, C2
+ 0.86*E1
Fixed $/unit of 
intermediate input
Unlimited Amber E1 E1 C1  (corn), Part of
E1 (wheat) C1 & E1
Limited  




Unlimited Amber G1, part D2
Limited Amber
Exempt   Green D, G, F1, F2 E3, part D2
(except beef)
Capital-based payments




Other minimal impacts Green E2 + E3 G E2 B2+C1 (except E2,F,H2,
corn)+C2+E2 & Part
+H2 +F3 (C1&E1,E3)
Notes: Colors refer to whether the policies are subject to WTO disciplines. Letters refer to OECD PSE classification codes.
Source: ERS calculations.
2 This overstates domestic support. For example, it includes
U.S. support for programs such as crop insurance and irrigation
subsidies that are considered de minimis for reporting to the WTO.ues, and encouraging continued output by creating
expectations of future payments. The effects linked to
wealth and risk are likely to be small (Young and
Westcott, 2000; Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder,
2000). We conduct a sensitivity experiment to test the
importance to our analytical results of our assumption
that whole-farm, land-based payments have minimal
output effects. We analyze and compare the effects on
production and trade of the full elimination of decou-
pled domestic subsidy payments, under the two
assumptions that they have minimal effects on produc-
tion, and that they behave as fully coupled output sub-
sidies (app. table 2-4). We find that the assumption
about the coupling of direct payments has relatively
small effects on the results of our analysis. The change
in the world agricultural price index from a full
domestic subsidy removal by developed countries
would be 4.8 percent if the direct payments are consid-
ered to be fully coupled, compared to 3.6 percent if
they are minimally coupled. When direct payments are
assumed to be fully coupled, welfare gains would be
larger for the United States and Canada but slightly
smaller for the EU and EFTA. Returns to farmland
would be larger (or less negative) because higher
world prices would help offset farmers’ loss of the
transfer payments. The relatively small effects from
even an extreme assumption about the rate of coupling
suggest that the potential benefits from reducing these
kinds of programs may be quite small.
Finally, we estimate countries’1998 support levels rela-
tive to their 1998 ceilings under the URAA by assum-
ing that the change in AMS levels, based on each coun-
try’s most recent WTO notification, would be the same
as the changes in PSE level, if there are missing years
of AMS data. We then compare the implied AMS
expenditures to their URAA ceiling commitments. To
estimate support as a percent of ceiling in the final year
of the URAA implementation, we assume 1998 levels
of support are continued through 2000.
Tariff and Export Subsidy Data
Data on import tariffs are from the AMAD database.
In order to analyze supply and demand responses to
relative price changes, we use applied tariff data when
available for developing countries, because there is
often a substantial difference between their bound
rates and the tariffs that they actually apply to imports.
We use Uruguay Round bound rates for developed
countries; their bound and applied rates are generally
the same. The AMAD data include the over-quota tar-
iff rates from TRQ regimes in its tariff database. This
approach can lead to an overestimate of the tariff in
the cases where imports are below the quota (and enter
at lower, within quota rates) or where over-quota tar-
iffs are not enforced. We adjusted AMAD tariffs in our
analysis in those cases where the tariff represented an
unenforced TRQ. The countries and commodities for
which tariff rates were reduced from AMAD rates
include imports of coarse grains and oilseeds by Japan,
and imports of wheat and corn by Mexico. 
Export subsidy rates were calculated using UN trade
data and export subsidy value data from the WTO. 
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Appendix table 2-4—Sensitivity test: Effects of removing domestic subsidies in developed countries under
alternative assumptions about coupling of direct payments to farm households 
World Australia/ Japan/Korea U.S. Canada EU EFTA
New Zealand
Percentage change from the base year
Remove all domestic subsidies, no direct payments removed
World agricultural price 3.55
Returns to farmland 4.11 -1.28 -1.38 1.93 -7.26 -21.43
Total social welfare ($ billion) 0.24 -3.66 0.97 0.28 6.06 0.82
Remove all domestic subsidies, with direct payments assumed mostly decoupled
World agricultural price 3.6
Returns to farmland 3.65 -1.3 -8.71 -1.52 -14.49 -32.58
Total social welfare ($ billion) 0.25 -3.89 1.04 0.31 5.92 0.83
Remove all domestic subsidies, with direct payments assumed fully coupled
World agricultural price 4.78
Returns to farmland 5.09 -0.63 -4.31 6.43 -7.2 -22
Total social welfare ($ billion) 0.37 -6.5 1.23 0.34 5.52 0.81
Source: Diao, Somwaru, and Roe in this report.Introduction
The model-based analyses in this report use com-
putable general equilibrium (CGE) models and partial
equilibrium models. Descriptions of each model fol-
low, including discussion of sectoral structure, factor
markets, macro closure, data sources, and any innova-
tive features of the model, such as dynamic behavior. 
Dynamic Global CGE Model (Xinshen Diao,
Agapi Somwaru,Terry Roe)
The model is based on neoclassical growth theory. It is
a global intertemporal (dynamic) GE model with 10
countries/regions and 7 production sectors. The data
used for calibrating the base-run are GTAP database,
version 5.2. The dynamic model is different from a
static CGE model in which firms only make a produc-
tion decision for one period at a given level of factor
endowments. In the intertemporal dynamic model,
firms of each region have intertemporal optimization
behavior (i.e., besides employing labor, capital and
land, as well as intermediates to conduct production,
firms also make investment decisions to maximize
firm’s intertemporal profits). Thus, capital accumulates
over time endogenously. On the other hand, the repre-
sentative consumer of each region maximizes an
intertemporal utility function by making consumption
and savings decisions. Thus, another difference from a
static CGE model is that a country’s savings are
endogenously determined. This implies that the model
captures not only bilateral commodity trade flows, but
also financial capital flows among countries/regions
over time. The intertemporal budget constraint for each
country/region is equivalent to the so-called macro-
closure in the static model, but along transition, inter-
national borrowing/lending, trade deficits/surplus, and
hence the accumulation of foreign debt/assets in each
region are endogenously determined. Thus, economic
adjustments due to policy reform take time and the
entire transitional path to the steady state can be
solved from the model. 
The model also captures the linkage between trade and
total factor productivity (TFP) growth by introducing
technological spillovers. That is, if a country becomes
more open in trade to other countries, it is more likely
to learn and adopt advanced technologies embodied in
international trade, which will improve its factor pro-
ductivity, so that more outputs can be produced using
the same amount of productive resources. The techno-
logical spillover elasticity is borrowed from economet-
ric studies (Coe and Helpman, 1995; Coe, Helpman
and Hoffmaister, 1997; and Wang and Xu, 1997). The
detailed description of the model can be found in Diao
and Somwaru (1997). 
Global CGE Model (C. Edwin Young et al.)
This analysis uses the GTAP model. GTAP is a global
trade applied general equilibrium framework docu-
mented in Hertel (1997). Our model is calibrated to
1997 macro and trade data. We aggregated global data
into a model with OECD countries and the rest of the
world, and 16 traded commodities. The GTAP version
5.2 data have tariffs and export subsidies from the
AMAD database and domestic support data from the
USDA/ERS’s database on the AMS (see appendix 2 in
this report). 
GTAP is a comparative static model with price-taking
behavior for all economic agents and full employment
of resources. Land is employed in agriculture only, and
it is imperfectly mobile across sectors. All sectors
employ labor and capital, which are perfectly mobile
across sectors in a region. Households maximize utility
derived from consumption and savings subject to
regional income, which consists of primary factor pay-
ments and net tax collections. International trade clears
commodity markets, with each commodity being dif-
ferentiated by its place of origin. Regional investment
is financed by domestic savings and net capital inflow
from all other regions. A price index for global savings
is the numeraire. 
ESIM Model (Susan Leetmaa)
The European Simulation models (ESIM) are linear,
time-dependent, constant elasticity, partial equilibrium
models. ERS currently has five individual
country/region ESIM models (EU15, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) and the EU-
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Appendix 3
Model Documentation18 model used for this analysis (EU15 plus the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland). ESIM covers 18
major commodities in the agricultural sector: wheat,
corn, barley, other coarse grains, soybeans, rapeseed,
sunflowerseed, soymeal, rapemeal, sunmeal, soyoil,
rapeoil, sunoil, other oils, fluid milk, beef and veal,
pork, and poultry. ESIM also includes 12 feeds and a
detailed feeding scheme (developed by Jan Blom of
LEI/DLO in the Netherlands).
Food Aid Needs Assessment Model (Shahla
Shapouri and Michael Trueblood)
The Food Security Assessment model used in this
report was developed at the USDA/ERS for use in pro-
jecting food consumption and access, and food gaps in
67 low-income countries through 2010. The model
database is an average of 1997-99. The reference to
food includes grains, root crops, and a category
“other,” which includes all other commodities con-
sumed, thus covering 100 percent of food consump-
tion. All of these commodities are expressed in grain
equivalent. 
Food gaps are projected using two consumption crite-
ria: (1) status quo target, where the objective is to
maintain average per capita consumption of the recent
past; and (2) nutrition-based target, where the objec-
tive is to maintain the minimum daily caloric intake
recommended by the UN’s Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO). 
Projection of Food Availability. The simulation
framework used for projecting aggregate food avail-
ability is based on partial equilibrium recursive models
of 67 lower-income countries. The country models are
synthetic, meaning that the parameters that are used
are either cross-country estimates or estimates from
other studies. Each country model includes three com-
modity groups: grains, root crops, and other. The pro-
duction side of the grain and root crops are divided
into yield and area response. Crop area is a function of
1-year lag return (real price times yield), while yield
responds to input use. Commercial imports are
assumed to be a function of domestic price, world
commodity price, and foreign exchange availability.
Foreign exchange availability is a key determinant of
commercial food imports and is the sum of the value
of export earnings and net flow of credit. Foreign
exchange availability is assumed to be equal to foreign
exchange use, meaning that foreign exchange reserves
are assumed to be constant during the projection peri-
od. Countries are assumed to be price takers in the
international market, meaning that world prices are
exogenous in the model. However, producer prices are
linked to the international market. The projections of
consumption for the “other” commodities are simply
based on a trend that follows the projected growth in
supply of the food crops (grains plus root crops).
Although this is a very simplistic approach, it repre-
sents an improvement from the previous assessments
where the contribution to the diet of commodities such
as meat and dairy products was overlooked. 
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Agreement on Agriculture. Part of the Uruguay
Round agreement covering issues related to agriculture
(e.g., market access, export subsidies, and internal 
support).
AMS (Aggregate Measurement of Support). An index
that measures the monetary value of the extent of gov-
ernment support to a sector. The AMS, as defined in
the Agreement on Agriculture, includes both budgetary
outlays as well as revenue transfers from consumers to
producers as a result of policies that distort market
prices. The AMS includes actual or calculated amounts
of direct payments to producers (such as deficiency
payments), input subsidies (on irrigation water, for
example), the estimated value of revenue transferred
from consumers to producers as a result of policies
that distort market prices (market price supports), and
interest subsidies on commodity loan programs. The
AMS differs from the broader agricultural support
measure, the Producer Subsidy Equivalent, by exclud-
ing estimated benefits (or costs) of certain noncom-
modity specific policies (e.g., research and environ-
mental programs), and by using special WTO-defined
measures of deficiency payments and market price
supports. Furthermore, the final AMS for the WTO
implementation period (1995-2000) is adjusted to
exclude deficiency payments under WTO special pro-
visions, even though they are included in the WTO
base period.
Bound tariff rates. Tariff rates resulting from GATT
negotiations or accessions that are incorporated as part
of a country’s schedule of concessions. Bound rates
are enforceable under Article II of GATT. If a GATT
contracting party raises a tariff above the bound rate,
the affected countries have the right to retaliate against
an equivalent value of the offending country’s exports
or receive compensation, usually in the form of
reduced tariffs of other products they export to the
offending country.
Cairns group. A group formed in 1986 in Cairns,
Australia, that seeks the removal of trade barriers and
substantial reductions in subsidies affecting agricultur-
al trade. The group includes Argentina, Australia,
Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Fiji, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand,
Paraguay, the Philippines, Thailand, South Africa, and
Uruguay. The Cairns Group was a strong coalition in
the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.
Ceiling binding. In cases where an existing tariff was
not already bound, developing countries were allowed
to establish ceiling bindings. These ceiling bindings
could result in tariffs that were higher than the existing
applied rate. The ceiling bindings took effect on the
first day of implementation of the Agreement.
Country schedules. The official schedules of subsidy
commitments and tariff bindings as agreed to under
GATT for member countries.
De minimis rule. The total AMS includes a specific
commodity support only if it equals more than 5 per-
cent of its value of production. The noncommodity-
specific support component of the AMS is included in
the AMS total only if it exceeds 5 percent of the value
of total agricultural output.
EFTA (European Free Trade Association). An inter-
national organization with four member countries:
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. The
purpose of EFTA is to monitor and manage relation-
ships among the EFTA States. Iceland, Liechtenstein,
and Norway also participate in the EU common mar-
ket through an Agreement on the European Economic
Area (EEA).
EU (European Union). Established by the Treaty of
Rome in 1957 and known previously as the European
Economic Community and the Common Market.
Originally composed of 6 European nations, it has
expanded to 15. The EU attempts to unify and inte-
grate member economies by establishing a customs
union and common economic policies, including CAP
(Common Agricultural Policy). Member nations
include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece,
Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom.
Glossary114 ❖ Agricultural Policy Reform—The Road Ahead/AER 802 Economic Research Service/USDA
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).
Originally negotiated in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1947,
among 23 countries, including the United States,
GATT is an agreement to increase international trade
by reducing tariffs and other trade barriers. The agree-
ment provides a code of conduct for international com-
merce and a framework for periodic multilateral nego-
tiations on trade liberalization and expansion.
In-quota tariff. The tariff applied on imports within
the quota. The in-quota tariff is less than the over-
quota tariff. 
“Like-minded” developing country group. A group of
least developed, developing countries that presented a
joint proposal at the WTO. The group includes Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Haiti,
Nicaragua, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, and
El Salvador.
Market access. The extent to which a country permits
imports. A variety of tariff and nontariff trade barriers
can be used to limit the entry of foreign products. 
Megatariffs. Extremely high tariffs that effectively cut
off all imports other than the minimum access amounts
granted under the agreement. Some well-known exam-
ples of megatariffs resulting from tariffication include
the base tariffs calculated for EU tariffs on grains,
sugar and dairy products; U.S. sugar, peanuts, and
dairy products; Canadian tariffs on dairy products and
poultry; and Japanese tariffs on wheat, peanuts, and
dairy products. 
MERCOSUR. The Common Market of the South
(Mercado Comun del Sur) created by the Treaty of
Asunción signed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and
Uruguay in 1991. Chile and Bolivia became associate
members in 1996 and 1997, respectively. 
NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement). A
trade agreement involving Canada, Mexico, and the
United States, implemented on January 1, 1994, with a
15-year transition period. The major agricultural provi-
sions of NAFTA include (1) the elimination of nontar-
iff barriers — immediately upon implementation, gen-
erally through their conversion to tariff-rate quotas or
ordinary quotas; (2) elimination of tariffs — many
immediately, most within 10 years, and some sensitive
products gradually over 15 years; (3) special safeguard
provisions; and (4) country-of-origin rules to ensure
that Mexico does not serve as a platform for exports
from third countries to the United States.
Nontariff trade barriers. Regulations used by govern-
ments to restrict imports from, and exports to, other
countries, including embargoes, import quotas, and
technical barriers to trade. 
Notifications. The annual process by which member
countries report to the WTO information on commit-
ments, changes in policies, and other related matters as
required by the various agreements.
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development). An organization founded in 1961 to
promote economic growth, employment, a rising stan-
dard of living, and financial stability; to assist the eco-
nomic expansion of member and nonmember develop-
ing countries; and to expand world trade. The member
countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the
United States
Over-quota tariff. The tariff applied on imports in
excess of the quota volume. The over-quota tariff is
greater than the in-quota tariff. 
PSE (Producer Subsidy Equivalent). A broadly
defined aggregate measure of support to agriculture
that combines into one total value aggregate, direct
payments to producers financed by budgetary outlays
(such as deficiency payments), budgetary outlays for
certain other programs assumed to provide benefits to
agriculture (such as research and inspection and envi-
ronmental programs), and the estimated value of rev-
enue transfers from consumers to producers as a result
of policies that distort market prices.
Round. Refers to one of a series of multilateral trade
negotiations held under the auspices of GATT for the
purposes of reducing tariffs or other trade barriers.
There have been eight trade negotiating rounds since
the adoption of GATT in 1947.
Special and differential treatment. The provision
allowing exports from developing countries to receive
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ing to accord the same treatment in their domestic
markets.
Tariff. A tax imposed on commodity imports by a gov-
ernment. A tariff may be either a fixed charge per unit
of product imported (specific tariff) or a fixed percent-
age of value (ad valorem tariff).
Tariff-rate quota. Quantitative limit (quota) on import-
ed goods, above which a higher tariff rate is applied. A
lower tariff rate applies to any imports below the quota
amount.
Tariffication. The process of converting nontariff trade
barriers to bound tariffs. This is done under the UR
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